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Abstract 
The central purpose of many non-government organisations (NGOs) focused on 
poverty alleviation is to help the poor (as NGOs’ key beneficiaries). As such, these 
NGOs are accountable to beneficiaries for sustainable long-term benefits of their 
programs. However, NGO accountability to beneficiaries is considered under-
developed in practice. The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of 
accountability to beneficiaries of NGOs engaging in microenterprise development 
(MED) and establish how such accountability impacts on these NGOs’ activities and 
outcomes.  
 
Building on legitimacy and stakeholder theories, this study examines MED NGOs’ 
approaches to gaining legitimacy, the impact of these approaches on management 
strategies for NGO accountability to beneficiaries, and the extent to which such 
accountability enhances program outcomes. This study investigated 20 NGOs 
operating in two countries: Bangladesh and Indonesia. Data were collected from 
publicly available sources and in-depth interviews with senior executives of the 
participating NGOs. Further, 10 interviews were conducted with beneficiaries 
(individuals and groups) from four of the participating NGOs in order to gain an 
understanding of beneficiaries’ perceptions of the NGOs’ accountability 
mechanisms.  
 
Findings reveal NGOs in this study adopted a strategic approach to gaining 
legitimacy through selecting and persuading donors (with similar goals and interests) 
and beneficiaries (who satisfied NGOs’ conditions and prerequisites). This approach 
emphasised the active role of beneficiaries, facilitating a participatory approach to 
accountability. NGO accountability to beneficiaries focused on a socialising 
dimension by engaging beneficiaries (the poor), the private sector and local 
government in MED programs. Further, NGOs’ facilitation role aimed to ensure 
beneficiaries became accountable for their own development and different 
stakeholder groups were accountable to each other. While NGOs considered that 
accountability to beneficiaries and donors were both important, accountability to 
donors was considered a short-term objective, while accountability to beneficiaries 
was considered a long-term and overriding objective. The findings also identified 
mechanisms for facilitating accountability to beneficiaries. While these mechanisms 
have the potential to provide more effective and sustainable outcomes for NGOs’ 
MED programs, a number of barriers were also identified.    
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Glossary 
Co-operative A term used by NGOs operating in Indonesia referring to a 
collective of microenterprises formed mainly for 
economic/business purposes. Co-operations are typically large in 
size (e.g. 150 members or more), require monthly membership 
fees, and often receive government support. 
 
Extremely poor Those living in poverty on less than US$1.25 a day 
Federation A term used by NGOs operating in Bangladesh referring to a 
collective of microenterprises, involved in a wide range of social 
and economic activities. Federations are often small in size, do 
not require membership fees, and typically do not receive 
government support. 
International 
NGO (INGO) 
An NGO which has its head office in one country, and operating 
in other countries. 
Linkages  Supported by NGOs, focusing on connecting microenterprises 
with small traders or suppliers, so that microenterprises can buy 
in bulk or sell larger quantities.  
Livelihood 
support 
Supported by NGOs, focusing on providing the poor with basic 
needs (food, basic business skills) for short-term 
production/outputs. 
Local NGO 
(LNGO) 
 
An NGO which operates solely in the country in which it was 
established. 
Microenterprise 
development 
(MED) program 
NGO programs, helping poor communities engage in business 
activities, with the aim of generating sustainable (long-term) income 
streams, and accumulating savings as a way of getting out of 
poverty. 
 
MED NGO An NGO which has a strong focus on empowering and building 
capacity for the poor through economic and social development. 
Specifically, the NGO works with the poor to establish 
microbusinesses, as a means of establishing additional income 
streams for the poor. Further, where these microbusinesses are 
integrated into the local business community, valuable social 
networks are formed. 
 
Microfinance 
NGO 
An NGO which provides financial services including loans, 
payment services, and insurance for poor and low income 
households and their microenterprises. Reliability and accessibility 
of these financial services helps to smooth consumption, improve 
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family welfare, and create assets for the poor. 
 
Microenterprise A very small business with a self-employed owner, and up to 
five employees. Such businesses typically have a very small 
capital investment, and in the context of poverty alleviation are 
commonly funded by MED programs or microfinance programs. 
MEs are mainly small vendors, traders or small manufacturers. 
 
NGO Self-governing, private, not-for-profit organisation that aims to 
improve the quality of life of disadvantaged people. 
NGO 
organisational 
legitimacy 
Legitimacy morally derived from pursuing an NGO’s key 
mission and values. 
 
NGO operational 
legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy obtained by NGOs through achieving and 
demonstrating effective performance outcomes. 
 
Participatory 
approach 
Approach to accountability by MED NGOs which focuses on the 
active participation of the poor, facilitating collaboration and co-
operation between actors (e.g. NGOs, poor communities, private 
sector companies, local government). 
 
Poor 
 
Those living in poverty on less than US$2 a day 
Social enterprise A business established for a social purpose that trades to support 
its mission. 
  
Value chain 
development 
Assisting the poor to participate in established product chains 
(e.g. cacao, coffee, potatoes) and market development. This 
process often involves large private sector companies to achieve 
long-term impact. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Poverty is a growing problem (World Bank, 2015) and has once again gained 
government attention internationally with the formulation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). These goals were agreed to in 2000 by 189 world 
leaders to help more than 1 billion people get out of extreme poverty by 2015 
(UNDP, 2000; World Bank, 2015). Following the commitment to the MDGs, 
members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD1 allocated 
approximately US$126 billion in 2012 for poverty alleviation. Further, a 
commitment was made to increase this amount by 0.7 per cent of gross national 
income each year by 2015 (OECD, 2013). Non-government organisations (NGOs) 
have received large amounts from this aid initiative for their development projects 
(Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, & O’Dwyer, 2009; Lehman, 2007; Michael, 
2004), and are perceived as essential actors in delivering aid programs. As NGOs’ 
purpose in this context is primarily to address the needs of the poor (beneficiaries), 
their accountability to the poor in the form of effective programs and operations is 
critical. This is particularly so, given that funds are entrusted by donors to NGOs on 
beneficiaries’ behalf (Agyemang et al., 2009; Najam, 1996). Thus even a small 
change in the effectiveness of NGOs’ programs can substantially affect poor peoples’ 
lives (Agyemang et al., 2009). However, while NGOs have grown worldwide in 
number and roles, criticisms and controversies relating to the effectiveness of their 
                                                     
 
1
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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programs continue (Ebrahim, 2003a; Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; Najam, 1996). In 
practice, NGOs’ upward accountability to donors and governments is well developed 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Murtaza, 2012; Schmitz, Raggo, & Vijfeijken, 2011), 
whereas accountability to less powerful stakeholders, such as beneficiaries living in 
poverty, is noticeably under-developed (Ebrahim, 2003a; Lindenberg, 2001; 
O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; Schweigert, 2006). Various researchers have noted the 
need for improvement in accountability to beneficiaries (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008) in order to better meet beneficiaries’ needs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a; Najam, 
1996; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Specifically, benefits identified from enhancing 
NGO accountability to beneficiaries include: increasing the poor’s sense of 
ownership of poverty alleviation projects, enhancing their self-esteem and 
confidence, and eliminating the risk of program fraud and inefficiencies (Mango, 
2010; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). However, there is 
limited understanding of what factors underpin NGO accountability to beneficiaries, 
and limited guidance regarding the practical mechanisms that can be employed to 
strengthen this type of accountability, in order to contribute to successful program 
outcomes. 
1  
Unlike other types of NGOs (e.g. emergency help, healthcare service or education), 
NGOs engaging in microenterprise development (MED NGOs) have a strong focus 
on the social and economic development of poor communities through income 
generating activities (Cabraal, Russell, & Singh, 2006; Knack, 2001; Lohmer, 2008; 
Tinker, 2000; Virgil, 2010). Specifically, these NGOs work with the poor to establish 
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microbusinesses (microenterprises2 (MEs)), as a means of establishing additional 
income streams. Further, where these micro businesses are integrated into the local 
business community, valuable social networks are formed. By doing so, MED 
provides an important pathway for the poor to progress out of poverty, with both 
social and economic benefits (Cabraal et al., 2006; Knack, 2001; Lohmer, 2008; 
Tinker, 2000; Virgil, 2010). In addition, some MED NGOs have started to generate 
income from their own activities and use this income source to fund their own MED 
projects (Luke & Chu, 2013), representing a form of financial independence. By 
becoming more financially independent from donors while focusing on generating 
effective and long-term outcomes for poverty alleviation, MED NGOs have strong 
potential to increase their legitimacy and accountability to beneficiaries (Bhatt, 1997; 
LeRoux, 2009; Schmitz et al., 2011). However, the nature of that legitimacy and 
accountability has received only limited attention in the literature. It is necessary to 
understand what forms of legitimacy exist in theory and practice, and how the 
adoption of these forms affects accountability to beneficiaries. 
2  
The objective of this study is to examine the nature of NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries in the context of MED, and identify mechanisms to foster this form of 
accountability. Through an examination of these issues, a conceptual framework is 
developed using legitimacy and stakeholder theories. Further, while a participatory 
approach (involving the active participation of the poor) is identified as central to 
                                                     
 
2
 For the purposes of this study, a microenterprise is defined as a very small business with a self-
employed owner, and up to five employees (Green, Kirkpatrick, & Murinde, 2006; Jurik, 2005; Mead 
& Liedholm, 1998; Midgley, 2008). Such businesses typically have a very small capital investment, 
and in the context of poverty alleviation, are commonly funded by MED programs or microfinance 
programs. MEs are mainly small vendors, traders or small manufacturers (Ghate, Ballon, & Manalo, 
1996; Mead & Liedholm, 1998; Shaw, 2004). 
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NGO accountability to beneficiaries (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), mechanisms to 
effectively facilitate such an approach are scant. A review of the literature on this 
issue (in Chapter Three) helps to build a framework for a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability3, which is used to guide the investigation of this study. 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with NGO senior executives and 
their beneficiaries in two countries where MED programs operate: Bangladesh and 
Indonesia. In addition, observation during the interview process and documentary 
analysis of publicly available data relating to the participating NGOs was also 
undertaken. This study seeks to contribute to the literature on MED NGOs’ 
approaches to gaining legitimacy (from the perspective of donors and beneficiaries, 
being the two key stakeholder groups relevant to this thesis), and how these 
approaches affect management strategies for accountability to beneficiaries. The 
knowledge gained will help to identify mechanisms for, and barriers to, 
strengthening MED NGO accountability to beneficiaries through a participatory 
approach. The findings will potentially provide valuable guidance for more effective 
and sustainable outcomes for MED NGOs’ poverty alleviation programs in practice. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND  
Within NGO accountability, the literature indicates that NGOs typically focus on 
responding to donors’ requirements (‘upward accountability’) while often 
overlooking the needs of beneficiaries (‘downward accountability’) (Agyemang et 
al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hug & Jäger, 2014; Murtaza, 
2012; Najam, 1996; Schmitz et al., 2011; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). This risks leading 
                                                     
 
3
 To simplify the language, the term “beneficiary accountability” is used to refer to “accountability to 
beneficiaries”. 
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NGOs to move away from their core mission and strategies to poverty alleviation in 
order to satisfy donors’ demands, resulting in a focus on performance measures and 
reporting (accountability) to donors (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; O'Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010; Schmitz et al., 2011; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Thus, NGOs’ focus 
can be shifted to short-term quantitative targets, and there is a risk NGOs are simply 
implementing donors’ expectations (Ebrahim, 2003a; Najam, 1996). As a result, 
NGOs’ projects are often not based on the needs of the poor, but rather on donors’ 
values or beliefs, achieving only short-term impacts on poverty alleviation (Andrews, 
2014; Ebrahim, 2003a; Kilby, 2006). Given accountability is a crucial tool for NGOs 
to gain legitimacy (Bovens, 2007; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Lister, 2003), a review 
of legitimacy theory is undertaken. This literature, which typically criticises NGOs’ 
imbalanced approaches to accountability, views NGO legitimacy through an 
institutional lens to investigate how NGOs conform to institutional requirements in 
order to gain organisational legitimacy (Atack, 1999; Doh & Teegen, 2002; 
Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; Ossewaarde, Nijhof, & Heyse, 2008; Sonpar, 
Pazzaglia, & Kornijenko, 2010). Nevertheless, legitimacy theory indicates that 
organisations may have different approaches to gaining organisational legitimacy. 
For example, an institutional or strategic approach to legitimacy can involve 
conforming, selection, and persuasion strategies in order to manage the expectations 
of particular stakeholder groups (Suchman, 1995). These strategies for gaining 
legitimacy subsequently impact on management responses to stakeholder claims 
(Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), including beneficiaries’ 
claims to accountability from NGOs. For dependent stakeholders (i.e. beneficiaries 
lacking power), NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries depends on managers’ goals 
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and perceptions towards these beneficiaries (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Mitchell et al., 
1997). 
 
This study also considers the effects of NGO managers’ perceptions and goals on the 
nature of NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries through a participatory approach. 
This approach is important as it facilitates collaboration and co-operation between 
actors (e.g. poor communities, the private sector companies, local government). 
Further, through this approach, beneficiaries are actively involved in various aspects 
of NGOs’ poverty alleviation programs, rather than simply being passive recipients 
(Brett, 2003; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Based on prior literature, a framework for 
a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability is developed. This framework 
includes mechanisms in the forms of processes and tools (Arnstein, 1969; Bhatt, 
1997; Brett, 2003; Chu & Luke, 2012a; Ebrahim, 2003a; Eversole, 2003; Hammer & 
Lloyd, 2011; Kilby, 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), and barriers relating 
specifically to beneficiaries and NGOs (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Dixon, Ritchie, & 
Siwale, 2006; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). While the 
proposed framework provides a basis for a participatory approach to strengthening 
NGO accountability to beneficiaries, it is necessary to investigate this framework in 
practice, and its impact on sustainable poverty alleviation. 
 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Amongst various stakeholder groups from whom NGOs gain legitimacy and are 
accountable to, donors and beneficiaries are the two primary stakeholder groups 
(Brown & Moore, 2001; Chisolm, 1995; Murtaza, 2012). Establishing legitimacy 
with donors is important for financial support, while establishing legitimacy with 
beneficiaries is important for operational success. Thus, how NGOs establish 
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legitimacy with donors and beneficiaries is important for their ongoing operations. 
Futher, accountability is a crucial tool for establishing ligitimacy (Bovens, 2007; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Lister, 2003). In order to investigate the nature of NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries, this study aims to examine NGOs’ approaches to 
gaining legitimacy from the perspective of donors (through fundraising activities) as 
well as beneficiaries (through facilitating effective program outcomes). The effects 
of these approaches on NGO accountability to beneficiaries are then also studied. 
The five research questions relevant to this study are detailed below.  
 
RQ1: What are non-government organisations’ (NGOs’) approaches to gaining 
legitimacy in the context of microenterprise development (MED)? 
Through investigating NGOs’ fundraising activities and MED support for sustainable 
poverty alleviation, this question aims to gain an understanding, from NGOs’ 
perspectives, of how NGOs’ seek or attempt to gain legitimacy from both donors and 
beneficiaries. Both institutional and strategic approaches to gaining legitimacy are 
considered, involving strategies of conforming, selection, persuasion, or a 
combination of these. The findings on this question will provide a deeper 
understanding of NGO legitimacy, providing a foundation for examining NGOs’ 
approaches to accountability to beneficiaries.  
 
RQ2: How do approaches to gaining legitimacy affect MED NGO managers’ 
perceptions of beneficiary salience and goals towards beneficiaries? 
While approaches to gaining legitimacy affect MED NGO managers’ perceptions of 
beneficiary salience (and vice versa), this question specifically focuses on how these 
approaches affect perceptions of beneficiary salience as this has implications on 
whether a participatory approach is considered important. Addressing this question 
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will help to gain insights into the effects of strategies for gaining legitimacy on 
managers’ goals and perceptions towards beneficiaries, and how powerless 
stakeholders such as beneficiaries can receive NGOs’ attention on accountability 
related issues. The understanding gained will help to identify factors that enhance 
NGO accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
RQ3: To what extent do MED NGO managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience 
and goals towards beneficiaries facilitate a participatory approach in their 
accountability to beneficiaries? 
In addition to the first two research questions, addressing this question will help to 
understand the nature of NGO accountability to beneficiaries. In particular, the way in 
which managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience and goals towards beneficiaries 
facilitate a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability. This form of 
accountability is identified as essential for strengthening accountability and effective 
long-term (sustainable) program outcomes. 
 
RQ4: What mechanisms do NGOs use to facilitate a participatory approach for 
their accountability to beneficiaries in MED, and what are the barriers to these 
mechanisms? 
Using the proposed framework developed from the literature review, this question 
will investigate this framework in the context of NGOs’ practices, and then identify 
mechanisms for, and barriers to, an effective participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability.  
 
RQ5: How does a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability contribute 
to outcomes of NGOs’ MED programs? 
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As MED NGOs commonly aim to achieve sustainable poverty alleviation, this 
question is designed to gain an understanding of how facilitating a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability helps NGOs achieve this ultimate goal. This 
question also helps to understand NGOs’ perceptions of sustainable poverty 
alleviation, and how they interpret this concept. 
 
The context in which these five research questions will be investigated is outlined in 
the next section. 
 
1.4 CONTEXT FOR THIS STUDY 
Bangladesh and Indonesia were selected for this study as they are well known for 
their poverty reduction needs and activities. In 2012, total development aid provided 
by the OECD to Bangladesh and Indonesia was US$2,252 million and US$7,076 
million respectively (OECD, 2014a, 2014b). Economic development initiatives (such 
as MED) are considered a central strategy for poverty alleviation in both countries. 
However, despite the large number of poverty alleviation programs being established 
in both countries, success has been limited (Deen, 2010; Islam & Morgan, 2011). 
 
Bangladesh in particular remains one of the world’s poorest and most densely 
populated countries. In 2012, approximately 43 per cent of its population were 
classified as extremely poor (living on less than $1.25 a day) (AusAID, 2013a; 
World Bank, 2012), with an unstable social and political environment (AusAID, 
2013a; Islam & Morgan, 2011). Further, Bangladesh is ranked as the world’s second 
most vulnerable country to climate change, with extreme weather events (e.g. 
seasonal flooding) (Climate & Development Knowledge Network, 2014). It is also 
considered to have one of the most vulnerable economies in the world due to 
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extremely high population density, a low natural resource base, and its unstable 
social and political environment (AusAID, 2013a; Islam & Morgan, 2011). As a 
result, economic growth prospects are considered extremely unfavourable (Islam & 
Morgan, 2011). 
 
Unlike Bangladesh, Indonesia has a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
(US$3,557 in 2012 compared to US$1,679 for Bangladesh). It has a large and rich 
natural resource base, and is the world’s third-largest democracy (population of 238 
million people) (Nelson, Ziethaml, & Bell, 2013). However, the geography (with 
more than 17,000 islands) also divides the country with various languages and ethnic                                                  
groups4 (Nelson et al., 2013). Further, economic growth has not benefited 
Indonesia’s population consistently, with poverty remaining a challenge. In 2012, 
more than 120 million (approximately 48 per cent) of Indonesia’s population lived 
on less than $2 a day, 44 million of whom (18.7 per cent) were living on less than 
$1.25 a day (AusAID, 2013b). Similar to Bangladesh, microfinance programs in 
Indonesia have reached a large number of the poor in rural areas (Haq, Hoque, & 
Pathan, 2008). 
 
A high level of poverty and a large number of economic development programs 
implemented in these two countries presents a valuable context for the examination 
of MED programs, and the use of accountability mechanisms. Essentially, different 
social and economic factors influence both NGOs’ operations and strategies to 
achieving project outcomes and developing successful accountability mechanisms 
                                                     
 
4
 yet remains the world single-largest concentration of Muslims - 86% of the population (Nelson et al., 
2013) 
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(Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jordan & Tuijl, 2006b). These 
factors can be related to political setting, where government can become a supportive 
actor or a constraint, through regulations, accountability requirements, or 
participation in NGOs’ projects (Choguill, 1996; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jordan & 
Tuijl, 2006a; Murtaza, 2012; Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005). By examining NGO 
activity with respect to MED in these countries, which have made modest progress in 
alleviating poverty, with at times limited success, this study will provide valuable 
insights and understandings into approaches, mechanisms, and barriers within 
NGOs’ practice of accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE 
As noted above, there is a limited understanding of factors affecting NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries, and its mechanisms. By addressing these issues under 
the lens of legitimacy and stakeholder theories in the context of MED NGOs, 
findings from this study will contribute to both the available literature on and 
practices of NGOs. First, the findings will provide an understanding of NGOs’ 
approaches to gaining legitimacy from the perspective of donors and beneficiaries 
and factors underpinning NGOs’ choices. The findings will then help to better 
understand NGOs’ legitimacy in terms of how approaches to gaining legitimacy 
affect their management strategies. 
 
Second, the findings aim to also contribute to the literature on how dependent 
stakeholders (i.e. beneficiaries) can call organisations’ attention to their claims (and 
under what conditions). Third, as accountability can be influenced by mission and 
values of an organisation, investigating managers’ perceptions of beneficiary 
salience and goals towards these beneficiaries will help to gain insights into NGOs’ 
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accountability. Fourth, the findings will uncover mechanisms that enhance NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the findings 
will potentially provide valuable guidance for those funding (donors) and operating 
(NGOs) MED programs in terms of NGO legitimacy, accountability to beneficiaries, 
and effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs. Ultimately the accountability 
mechanisms identified can potentially be used as practical tools to assist NGOs 
engaging not only in MED, but also in other areas of development to strengthen their 
accountability and increase the effectiveness of their operations. These mechanisms 
may assist in achieving more sustainable growth for MEs and more effective poverty 
alleviation outcomes. Poor communities will potentially benefit from increased 
effectiveness within NGOs’ operations, assisting them to progress out of poverty.  
 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
The following chapters of this thesis examine MED NGOs’ approaches to gaining 
legitimacy, and facilitating accountability to beneficiaries; involving successes and 
limitations in both theory and practice. Chapter Two reviews the institutional context 
within the NGO sector and the environmental contexts of Bangladesh and Indonesia, 
providing an understanding of the operating environment of the NGOs investigated. 
Next, Chapter Three provides an overview of NGO accountability issues, the 
theoretical perspectives underpinning these issues, followed by the development of 
specific research questions. Chapter Four outlines the research design used to 
investigate the actual practices of MED NGOs operating in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia, helping to address the five Research Questions. Chapter Five presents the 
findings (through deductive and inductive analysis) regarding NGOs’ MED support 
for poverty alleviation, providing a background understanding of NGO operations. 
Chapter Six outlines findings regarding NGOs’ strategies for gaining legitimacy, and 
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the effects of these approaches on stakeholder management (focusing specifically on 
donors and beneficiaries) and facilitation of a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability. These findings help to address the first three Research Questions. 
Chapter Seven then highlights findings regarding mechanisms of, and barriers to, a 
participatory approach and their contributions to sustainable poverty alleviation, thus 
addressing the last two Research Questions of the study. Chapter Eight reflects on 
findings and discusses these in relation to prior literature. Last, Chapter Nine 
presents the conclusions of the study, highlighting significant findings, literature 
gaps, limitations of the study, and areas for further related research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the background and research setting of this study. 
Developing from that background, this chapter provides the institutional context for the 
research. Given NGOs are defined and classified differently in the literature, Section 2.2 
positions MED NGOs, being the focus of this study. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 outline some 
distinct features of MED NGOs and NGOs providing microfinance (MF NGOs), given 
their similarities, and details how these types of NGO are accountable to their 
beneficiaries. As the investigation is conducted in Bangladesh and Indonesia, Section 2.5 
reviews the operating environment of MED NGOs in these countries, providing 
background understanding that may affect NGOs’ accountability practices. 
 
2.2 NGO OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
The not-for-profit sector5 includes a wide range of organisations engaging in, for 
example, advocacy, cultural, religious, social and economic activity, NGOs are a subset 
of organisations within this sector (Vakil, 1997). Definitions of NGO are complex and 
vary in the existing literature, with little consensus on how to describe these 
organisations (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; Gray, Bebbington, & Collison, 2006; O’Dwyer, 
2007; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a; Uphoff, 1996; Vakil, 1997; World Bank, 1998). For 
the purposes of this thesis, NGOs are defined as “self-governing, private, not-for-profit 
                                                     
 
5
 The term not-for-profit is used interchangeably with ‘non-profit’ in the literature (Vakil, 1997). 
However, Vakil (1997) indicates that while the term ‘non-profit’ refers to organisations not engaging 
in any profit-oriented activities, the term “not-for-profit” refers to those engaging in profit activities 
but these activities are undertaken for social purposes with profit principally reinvested in the business 
(such as MED NGOs).   
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organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people” 
(Vakil, 1997, p. 2060). As such, NGOs are typically characterised as intermediaries 
between donors (providing resources in the form of time and money) and beneficiaries 
(receiving support directly or indirectly from NGOs) (Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Funds provided to NGOs are often from three sources: 
government, corporate, and civil society (Bendell & Cox, 2006). More recently some 
NGOs have begun generating their own funds by establishing social enterprises 6(Islam & 
Morgan, 2011; Luke & Chu, 2013). NGOs use these funds to “pursue activities to relieve 
suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social 
services, or undertake community development” (Malena, 1995, p. 13). Given the range 
of stakeholders providing resource and the services provided with these funds, NGO 
accountability is increasingly required. 
 
Essentially, the purpose of NGOs is to serve marginalised groups’ (such as the poor) 
needs, which are overlooked  or not addressed appropriately by the private and public 
sectors (Ossewaarde et al., 2008; Simsa, 2003). Compared to these sectors, NGOs’ 
operations are described as being less bureaucratic, more innovative and trustworthy, 
and more in touch with the poor’s conditions and constraints (Baruah, 2010; Ebrahim, 
2009; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Michael, 2004). Assuming these taken-for-granted values, 
in theory NGOs’ operations combine the positive qualities of businesses and 
governments (Ebrahim, 2009; Evers, 2005). They share the public mission associated 
with governments, but are not typically profit-driven like private sector firms (Gauri & 
Galef, 2005). Reflective of their complex nature, NGOs can diversify their operations 
                                                     
 
6
 Business established for a social purpose which trades to support its mission (Luke & Chu, 2013) 
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across multiple sectors (e.g. focusing on economic development for poverty alleviation) 
while maintaining their social mission and values (Shaw & Allen, 2006). This 
diversification is particularly important in the context of NGOs engaging in 
microfinance or MED for poverty alleviation (Brett, 2003; Janvry & Sadoulet, 2009).  
 
NGOs can operate at community, national or international levels (Malena, 1995; Mercer, 
2002; Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005; Vakil, 1997), where  
  community-based NGOs are those serving a specific population in a specific 
geographic area,  
  national (or ‘local’) NGOs (LNGOs) are those operating in the country in 
which they were established, and 
  international NGOs (INGOs) are those having their head office in one country, 
and operating in other countries.   
Compared to community-based NGOs, national and international NGOs are usually 
more structured and undertake a wider range of activities across larger various 
geographic areas. Typically, they are required to register with the relevant government 
authorities, and comply with certain requirements relating to finance, internal controls, 
regulation, and administration (Michael, 2004). INGOs often partner with or fund 
LNGOs due to restrictions placed by local governments on INGOs, or due to LNGOs’ 
expertise in delivering positive project outcomes in specific local social and economic 
conditions. However, in some cases, such as Bangladesh, INGOs and LNGOs provide 
similar services, working to achieve similar outcomes, and at times, competing for funds 
to undertake poverty related projects (Michael, 2004). Accordingly, this study examines 
the operations of both national and international NGOs focusing on MED, providing 
important insights into their accountability.  
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NGOs are commonly classified into operational and advocacy NGOs (Malena, 1995). 
Operational NGOs aim to fund, design and implement development-related projects, 
whereas advocacy NGOs focus on defending or promoting specific development causes, 
and seeking to influence policies and practices of governments and other bodies. Vakil 
(1997) classifies NGOs into six categories including, welfare, development, 
development education, networking, research, and advocacy. Development NGOs often 
receive the greatest attention from analysts (Vakil, 1997), with their activities aimed at 
facilitating self-sufficiency for poor communities through capacity building (Elliott, 
1987; Korten, 1987; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). These NGOs’ projects are often 
expected to ensure meaningful participation of beneficiaires and promote sustainable 
development of the poor and the local communities in which they live (Michael, 2004; 
Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010).  
 
Two major areas that development NGOs often focus on are providing microfinance to 
poor communities, including credit and financial services (so called MF NGOs), and 
helping poor communities engage in MED (so called MED NGOs). MF NGOs’ core 
business is providing microcredit, often with high interest rates to cover the risks of 
giving loans without collateral (Baruah, 2010; Dash, 2012; Hoque, 2004). MED NGOs 
in this study move beyond providing credit and financial services and are driven by a 
market-based concept aimed at poverty alleviation through training, technical support, 
and market networks to develop sustainable MEs (Chu & Luke, 2012b; Moore, 2004; 
Pati, 2008). By helping the poor engage in MEs, MED NGOs focus on empowering and 
building capacity for the poor through economic and social development (Brown & 
Moore, 2001; Fuller, Howard, & Cummings, 2002; Kantor, 2005; Peredo & Chrisman, 
2006). As explained in Section 1.1, this study focuses on NGOs engaging in MED 
programs due to their potential for sustainable poverty alleviation. Specifically, the aim 
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of this study is to investigate accountability to beneficiaries of these organisations, and 
how such accountability approaches affect MED program outcomes. Figure 2.1 
illustrates MED NGOs as a specific type of development NGO within the non-profit 
sector. 
 
Figure 2.1 The institutional context of MED NGOs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the literature on MED NGOs remains limited and closely aligns with the 
literature on MF NGOs, the next section highlights activities of MF NGOs. This 
helps to distinguish between MF NGOs and MED NGOs, the focus of this study. 
 
2.3 NGOs ENGAGING IN MICROFINANCE 
Microfinance programs7 have played a key role in poverty alleviation (Baruah, 2010; 
Hoque, 2004; Yunus, 1998). These programs commonly provide financial services 
including loans, payment services, and insurance for poor and low income households 
                                                     
 
7
 The terms microcredit and microfinance are used interchangeably in the literature, yet they have 
distinct differences. While microcredit programs mainly focus on providing credit to the poor, 
microfinance programs also provide the poor with other financial services such as savings accounts, 
insurance, and money transfers (Lendwithcare, 2014). 
 
Not-for-profit organisations 
Non-government 
organisations (NGOs) 
 Development NGOs 
MED 
NGOs 
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and their microenterprises. Reliability and accessibility of these financial services help to 
smooth consumption, improve family welfare, and create assets for the poor (Haq et al., 
2008). Through these programs, NGOs can fulfil their social goals by providing the poor 
with safety nets and empowering them (particularly women) through capacity building, 
such that the poor are able to exercise some control over the resources within their 
family and society (Baruah, 2010; Haq et al., 2008). Hundreds of MF NGOs have been 
established, with microfinance programs mushrooming around the world (Baruah, 
2010). The Microcredit Summit Campaign (2013a) reported that as of 2011, 
microfinance institutions had reached approximately 195 million clients, of which 
approximately 124 million were living in extreme poverty. Within Asia, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia have the largest number of microfinance clients, and the highest value of loan 
distribution and savings collection as a proportion of GNP
8
 in the world (Weiss & 
Montgomery, 2005). Based on the success of microfinance programs, the Global 
Microcredit Summit Campaign set two main goals for these programs: reaching 175 
million of the world’s poorest of the poor9, and lifting 100 million families out of 
extreme poverty by 2015 (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2013b).  
 
Despite the success in reach of MF NGOs, various limitations remain. By engaging in 
microfinance, these NGOs expose themselves and the poor to credit risk (Dash, 2012), 
leading to a large number of loan losses for NGOs as a result of over-supply of credit 
and poor credit management (Dash, 2012). The former issue (over-supply of credit) 
usually relates to providing credit without knowing the poor’s needs and constraints. The 
                                                     
 
8
 Gross National Product  
9
 These are people  living in extreme poverty on less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2012) 
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latter issue (poor credit management) is often because as not-for-profit organisations 
operating with a social mission, MF NGOs have high lending costs (in term of managing 
and monitoring loans provided) compared with other for-profit banking or microcredit 
institutions (Dash, 2012). Further, due to the nature of microfinance, MF NGOs are not 
allowed to operate traditional banking services (e.g. requiring collateral from borrowers) 
(Baruah, 2010). For the poor, by taking credit, they are subject to credit risk that may 
expose them to a more vulnerable situation if they fail to repay their loans (Dash, 2012; 
Midgley, 2008; Strier, 2010). Commonly, when taking loans, it is assumed that the poor 
know how to make effective use of these funds (i.e. through income generating 
activities) and how to repay the loans (Baruah, 2010). In practice however, loans to poor 
people may be used not only for income generating activities (investment capital), but 
also immediate consumption purposes (such as paying for daily food, relatives’ funeral 
or wedding), such that the poor may be not able to repay their loans (Baruah, 2010).  
 
Another limitation of microfinance programs is mission drift. The provision of credit to 
the poor is commonly intended for business-related purposes, such that income 
generated from these activities can be used to pay interest and repay the principal. 
However, MF NGOs face challenges of mission drift when they target the non-poor, 
charge high interest rates, and move away from their social mission (Baruah, 2010; 
Dash, 2012; Islam & Morgan, 2011). Haque (2002), in a study on MF NGOs in 
Bangladesh, found that NGOs charged high interest rates (20–30 per cent) on loans 
provided to the poor. Accordingly, MF NGOs have been criticised as operating like 
pure “market” players driven by market forces and principles rather than third sector 
players, focused on a social mission (Baruah, 2010; Dash, 2012). Thus, MF NGOs 
have at times shifted their priority to for-profit activities, rather than aiming to 
achieve social objectives; ultimately drifting away from the very basis of their 
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existence and legitimacy (Baruah, 2010; Dash, 2012; World Bank, 2006). These issues 
raise questions regarding the legitimacy and accountability of MF NGOs (Dash, 
2012). 
 
The sustainability of MF NGOs’ outcomes also raises questions, as their programs often 
aim for immediate poverty alleviation outcomes. MF NGOs’ support enables poor 
people to meet their basic needs through income generating activities but is often unable 
to help them to rise above the subsistence level in the long-term (Hoque, 2004; Islam & 
Morgan, 2011). Research on MF NGOs indicates that microbusinesses often lack market 
information and networks, leading to mis-matches between supply and demand (Baruah, 
2010; Karnani, 2009). When credit becomes accessible, the poor have more 
opportunities to supply goods or services to markets. However, with a small amount of 
credit, in addition to low skill levels and a lack of ability to add value, the poor often 
become micro-traders or supply homogenous products of low quality to markets (Hoque, 
2004; Muhammad, 2006). As a result, markets for their goods and services quickly 
become saturated (Baruah, 2010; Shaw, 2004), such that the poor’s businesses have a 
high possibility of failure (Baruah, 2010; Karnani, 2009), with many closing in their 
early stages (Midgley, 2008). 
 
Given the above challenges, the available literature indicates that microfinance alone is 
unlikely to help poor communities progress out of poverty (Baruah, 2010; Dash, 2012; 
Hoque, 2004). A key reason for this is that poverty has various roots and causes: not 
only material or financial resources, but also social relationships, social status, and the 
control and exercise of power (Ridge & Wright, 2008; Servon & Bates, 1998). As such, 
Muhammad (2006) notes if countries rely solely on microfinance programs to alleviate 
poverty, poverty will certainly persist to keep these programs alive. This issue can be 
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seen in Bangladesh, where a large number of MF NGOs operate, yet it remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world (AusAID, 2013a). The World Bank’s Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) reports that most microfinance clients want to save 
and use their savings rather than taking loans (Baruah, 2010). Poor people not only need 
daily income, they also need economic and social safety nets to progress out of poverty 
in a sustainable way (Bass, Reid, Satterthwaite, & Steele, 2005). The poor have strong 
bonding (networks) within their own communities and rely on informal networks 
(Narayan, 2001). The available literature (Baruah, 2010; Moore, 2004; Pati, 2008; 
Surender & Niekerk, 2008) suggests that to achieve sustainability of MEs established by 
the poor, NGOs should not only provide credit, but also ensure the poor have capabilities 
and basic skills (such as production techniques and general business skills), market 
information and networks within and outside their own communities. In this way, NGOs 
can operate as facilitators helping the poor access markets (Baruah, 2010). Market 
facilitation in addition to social and financial connections can help to achieve success of 
NGOs’ poverty alleviation programs (Nair, 2001). The support helps to develop both 
social and economic aspects of local communities through enhancing those 
communities’ participation (Islam & Morgan, 2011). The communities can then have 
capabilities to continue developing beyond the NGOs’ poverty alleviation programs. The 
support for poverty alleviation is presented in more detail in the following section. 
 
2.4 NGOs ENGAGING IN MED PROGRAMS (MED NGOs) 
MED has been viewed as a sustainable way to poverty alleviation (Choudhury, Hossain, 
& Solaiman, 2008; Green et al., 2006; Strier, 2010; Vargas, 2000). MED programs help 
poor communities engage in business activities, with the aim of poor people generating 
sustainable (long-term) income streams (Virgil, 2010), and accumulating savings as a 
way of building assets and wealth (Cabraal et al., 2006; Lohmer, 2008; Tinker, 2000). 
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MED NGOs have a strong focus on helping the poor engage in MEs and typically offer 
technical support and training to help the poor improve production techniques, 
productivity, and business skills (Bhatt, 1997; Ghate et al., 1996; Jurik, 2005; Tendler & 
Amorim, 1996; Vargas, 2000). Notably, MED NGOs may provide project participants 
with either monetary (financial capital) or non-monetary (livestock or seed plants) credit 
for them to start microbusinesses or production (Chu & Luke, 2012b). Importantly, these 
NGOs also provide MEs and poor communities with other critical support such as 
infrastructure, marketing information, and access to networks (Pati, 2008), and help MEs 
build networks within the community through peer group lending or working, providing 
MEs with access to markets (Baruah, 2010; Chu & Luke, 2012b). Such programs help 
generate self-sufficiency for beneficiaries by continuing to use the knowledge and skills 
provided by NGOs’ programs, to maintain or expand microbusinesses once NGOs’ 
support formally ceases (Brown & Moore, 2001).  
 
Through the above support for MED, NGOs are often considered to demonstrate high 
levels of accountability to beneficiaries, as NGO accountability to poor communities is 
integrated into MED projects (Bhatt, 1997; Schmitz et al., 2011; Virgil, 2010). Strong 
participation by the poor and local communities is important for the long-term 
success of MED programs. Essentially, MED NGOs have to work with the poor to 
identify their needs and provide various forms of support. Therefore, a participatory 
approach emphasising participation of and dialogue with these stakeholders, is 
essential for the success of MED NGOs’ programs, taking into account poor people’s 
needs and constraints (Baruah, 2010; Bhatt, 1997; Chu & Luke, 2012a; O'Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). Under this approach, the poor’s needs 
are addressed in a way that aims to generate community benefits and integrate local 
culture. MED project resources are often combined with the communities’ assets 
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(e.g. networks, resources of households and local businesses); and regional 
economic, social and political structures are involved in an effort to develop 
sustainable poverty alleviation programs (Fuller et al., 2002; Peredo & Chrisman, 
2006).  
 
Weak market information and networks are two major constraints to the development 
of sustainable MEs, such that the poor need to understand basic market needs and 
competition (Kantor, 2005; Nugroho, 2010; Pati, 2008). Within a participatory 
approach to MED, through collaboration and coordination, market networks can be 
built and market information can be accessed (Herman & Renz, 2008). Under this 
approach, MED NGOs typically require MEs to work in groups, and then connect 
these groups with local partners (e.g. non-poor in the community, local businesses, 
local governments) (Chu & Luke, 2012a, 2012b). Given the poor commonly live in 
remote areas with basic infrastructure and limited access to markets, accessing 
market information can help MEs make better business decisions. Further, 
developing market networks can help them avoid being exploited by middlemen 
(Kantor, 2005). This approach provides ‘social glue’, a bridge for MEs and local 
producers, offering a number of opportunities for sustainable social and economic 
development of communities (Islam & Morgan, 2011). Pati (2008) through a survey 
of 200 enterprises in Meghalaya, India indicates that group enterprises (generating 
market networks) are in a relatively better position than sole business traders. 
Further, support through association and collaborative working helps some MEs 
groups develop into larger co-operatives (Luke & Chu, 2013; Warren, 2005). 
Through co-operatives, MEs can become self-sufficient, planning together for 
purchases, production, sales, and credit for example (Baruah, 2010; Luke & Chu, 
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2013). Successful outcomes of MED projects may then be continued and expanded 
in the community, once NGOs support formally ceases (Baruah, 2010).  
 
A participatory approach to MED through collaboration and co-operation is 
considered to help improve the effectiveness of NGOs’ MED programs, 
strengthening their accountability to beneficiaries (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). 
Through this process, trust is built among NGOs, poor communities, and other 
stakeholders (Bhatt, 1997; Chu, 2011; Gauri & Galef, 2005; Islam & Morgan, 2011), 
providing a holistic approach under which connections and interdependency can 
occur (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). Such programs aim to increase interactions 
between different groups, in order to develop social harmony and greater social 
stability, through the poor’s sense of commitment and belonging (Chu & Luke, 
2012b; Fuller et al., 2002). When poor people are able to make decisions themselves, 
they can maximise their capabilities and have a high sense of ownership (Baruah, 
2010). Further, through a participatory process, the development of social as well as 
financial ties between the poor and other actors in communities is facilitated (Baruah, 
2010; Chu & Luke, 2012a; Fuller, et al., 2002; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). 
Therefore, a participatory approach to MED has the potential for building capacity 
for poor communities and providing mechanisms for communities to participate, take 
initiatives, and control of their future. These outcomes help MED achieve a more 
sustainable impact on poverty alleviation, ultimately facilitating NGO accountability 
to beneficiaries.  
 
Through MED programs, NGOs not only aim to develop financial sustainability for 
poor communities within a framework of accountability to beneficiaries, but may 
also respond to calls for their own financial accountability by developing their own 
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income generating activities rather than relying solely on donations. Profits generated 
from these activities (e.g. service fees or profits from NGOs’ own social enterprises) 
have been used to implement poverty alleviation projects (e.g. Luke and Chu (2013) 
regarding MED NGOs in Vietnam. Similarly, other NGOs in Indonesia have 
generated funds by charging fees to group members (Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006). 
These activities reinforce the importance of NGOs’ financial independence and 
accountability through providing effective services such that stakeholders (e.g. the 
poor or private sector companies working with MEs) are willing to pay for NGOs’ 
services. By being financially independent, NGOs’ support for poverty alleviation 
can be tailored to address power imbalances and potential conflicts with other 
stakeholders (e.g. donors and governments with different strategies for poverty 
alleviation) who might question NGOs’ operations or strategies (Peredo, 2001, cited 
by Peredo & Chrisman, 2006; Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006). NGOs are then able to 
pursue their own mission and values, being ‘for’ and ‘with’ the poor – demonstrating 
their accountability to beneficiaries (O’Dwyer, 2005). 
 
As mentioned in Section 1.4, this study focuses on MED NGOs operating in 
Bangladesh and Indonesia. The next section presents an overview of the local context 
of MED NGOs operating in these countries.  
     
2.5 UNDERSTADING THE NGO SECTOR IN BANGLADESH AND 
INDONESIA 
This section presents an overview of the NGO sector in each country, examining the 
operating environment, NGO activities, as well as challenges and opportunities.  
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2.5.1 Overview of the NGO sector in Bangladesh 
a. Operating environment 
In 2006 Muhammad Yunus, the pioneer of microcredit and founder of the Grameen 
Bank, won the Nobel Peace Prize for his innovative approach to poverty alleviation 
(Nobelprize, 2006). Since then, a large number of NGOs have been established, with 
Bangladesh developing one of the largest and most sophisticated NGO sectors in the 
developing world (Gauri & Galef, 2005; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Khan, 2003). 
Fruttero and Gauri (2005) report that over 90% of villages in Bangladesh have at 
least one NGO. The NGO sector has become one of the major job markets in the 
country, particularly for women10 (Stiles, 2002). NGOs are required to register their 
operations with either the government’s NGO Affairs Bureau (a precondition to 
receive international funding), the Directorate of Social Welfare, or the Directorate 
of Women’s Affairs. They are then able to join the Association of Development 
Agencies in Bangladesh (Gauri & Galef, 2005).     
 
The operations of INGOs in Bangladesh have changed in response to the growth of 
LNGOs. These changes reflect INGOs’ high operating costs, constraints in raising 
funds, and ineffective partnerships with LNGOs (Ahmad, 2006). INGOs’ high 
operating costs are often associated with poor planning and bureaucratisation, while 
their relationship with LNGOs has been seen as one of donor-recipient rather than 
partnership (Ahmad, 2006). Stiles (2002) reports a trend that some INGOs have 
withdrawn in recent years or played a secondary role in Bangladesh. Further, the 
                                                     
 
10
 Commonly, NGOs’ projects focus on poor women due to their social and economic disadvantages 
and vulnerability. In order to work closely to the female beneficiaries, NGO staff are often also 
women (Strier, 2010, Yunus, 1998).  
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majority of donors work directly with LNGOs, rather than through INGOs (Stiles, 
2002). Under these conditions, INGOs remaining in Bangladesh tend to co-operate 
with LNGOs, or operate locally with Bangladeshi directors, board members and 
staff. Others have gradually reduced international funding, while maximising the use 
of local resources (Stiles, 2002) and partnering with at least one government ministry 
(Gauri & Galef, 2005). LNGOs tend to take the primary role as implementers, while 
INGOs take a secondary role as project clearing houses (Stiles, 2002). This shift 
potentially impacts accountability practices between these types of NGOs.  
 
b. NGO activities 
Bangladesh has a highly organised, homogenous, and self-funding NGO sector with 
a large number of NGOs (Gauri & Galef, 2005). Following the popularity of the 
Grameen Bank microcredit model, hundreds of millions of dollars have flowed into 
microcredit programs in Bangladesh (Stiles, 2002). Gauri and Galef (2005) through a 
national survey reported that the vast majority of NGOs (approximately 92%) focus 
primarily on credit services. These NGOs generate revenue from service fees rather 
than relying on donors’ funds, and hire paid staff rather than volunteers. As interest 
is the major source of NGOs’ revenue, only a small number of NGOs engage in other 
business activities (e.g. operating canteens) to generate funds supporting their 
poverty alleviation activities (Gauri & Galef, 2005).  
 
Along with providing credit services, NGOs in Bangladesh also have a strong focus 
on MED. NGOs (such as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
World Vision, Oxfam, CARE, and Opportunity Foundation) have introduced some 
creative models for poverty alleviation through microenterprise development 
programs (Remenyi & Quinones, 2000). These NGOs provide MEs with training and 
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appropriate technologies. They then incorporate and build linkages between MEs and 
the private sector and government. This MED model helps NGOs to address market 
challenges faced by MEs (Remenyi & Quinones 2000). Other NGOs also offer jobs 
created from their own businesses (Smillie, 2009), or provide training to women so 
they can provide services (with service fees) to other women in the communities 
(Baruah, 2010). Some NGOs organise women together so that they can operate as 
unions, which helps to increase their power in negotiating wages or requiring better 
working conditions (Baruah, 2010). Other NGOs help MEs (particularly MEs 
operated by women) to work as co-operatives rather than competitors so that they 
can increase their power in purchases, production, and sales (Baruah, 2010). These 
activities provide a valuable context for the investigation of NGOs’ support for 
MED. 
 
c. Challenges and opportunities  
NGOs focusing on community development in Bangladesh play an important role in 
poverty alleviation, yet they have been criticised for creating unfair market 
competition, and being ineffective by generating only short-term outcomes for the 
poor (Stiles, 2002). The former criticism relates to NGOs’ status (i.e. not-for-profit), 
such that they receive subsidies and tax exemptions, which may effectively provide 
their businesses with lower costs of capital and production. While these advantages 
help NGOs reduce costs or have more funds for MED projects, MEs’ overall 
satisfaction with NGOs’ support is quite low due to lack of benefits realised by the 
poor (Stiles, 2002). The latter criticism (i.e. short-term outcomes) reflects low levels 
of community development (as a foundation for sustainable poverty alleviation), 
where group meetings mainly are for collecting money rather than meaningful 
discussions, sharing knowledge or business experience (Islam & Morgan, 2011; 
Chapter 2: Institutional context 
Page 30 
 
Stiles, 2002). Meanwhile, NGOs’ collaborations with local communities and the 
private sector are considered weak (with NGOs often considered as resource 
providers lacking communication skills and networks) (Stiles, 2002). Other issues 
relate to NGOs’ involvement in political issues, corruption, and misuse of funds 
(Islam & Morgan, 2011; Khan, 2003; Stiles, 2002). Thus NGOs lose (or find difficult 
to gain) social trust, participation and support from communities. As a result, when 
implementing projects that require a high level of community participation, such as 
market networks or communication channels, NGOs can experience difficulties 
(Islam & Morgan, 2011). These issues raise questions regarding how NGOs are 
demonstrating accountability for the funds they receive and to those whom they 
serve.  
 
Bangladesh NGOs’ support has also been challenged in terms of program outcomes - 
creating economic and social change. NGOs aim to empower the poor, in particular 
women, by helping them generate income and become independent (socially and 
economically), yet this purpose may not align with specific cultural values (e.g. 
women are dependent on men and married women are commonly not allowed to 
participate in NGOs’ projects without their husbands’ consent) (Stiles, 2002). 
Specifically, NGOs’ support for MED can be considered a threat to Islamic societies, 
particularly in Bangladesh, where local communities are often restricted to these 
cultural values, and thus not willing to participate (Stiles, 2002). Further, by 
engaging in self-funding operations, NGOs can face challenges of balancing 
profitability and social purpose - reaching the poor (Islam & Morgan, 2011; Stiles, 
2002). The extreme poor in Bangladesh face quite severe situations (e.g. no savings 
or land, and social isolation), which means that NGOs often require more time and 
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resources to lift them out of poverty (Gauri & Galef, 2005; Stiles, 2002). Given 
profitability concerns, NGO leaders may have strategies similar to for-profit firms 
(World Bank, 2003). NGO managers and staff thus often make decisions to 
maximise their profits, rather than reach the poorest and generate positive social 
outcomes. Over 15 years, with the development of microcredit and poverty reduction 
programs, there has been very limited progress in term of the percentage of the poor 
lifted out of poverty (Muhammad, 2006; Stiles, 2002). Most NGOs in Bangladesh 
have programmes for social and economic development, but these programs are 
often small in scale, and thus not able to create widespread effects on poverty (Islam 
& Morgan, 2011). These issues lead to concerns regarding effectiveness of these 
organisations in achieving sustainable poverty alleviation, raising questions about 
their legitimacy and accountability (Gauri & Galef, 2005; Islam & Morgan, 2011).  
 
2.5.2 Overview of the NGO sector in Indonesia 
a. Operating environment 
The political setting in Indonesia has changed dramatically since the 1960s, which 
has had a strong impact on the NGO sector. During President Suharto’s time in 
power (1960s-1990s), the authoritarian regime privileged state-led social relations, 
limiting NGOs’ operations. The military held a leading role in governance, and 
groups in civil society were required to respect the state-led ideology and policies 
(Aritonang, Yusran, & Taufik, 2009; Bryant, 2001; Warren, 2005). Within this 
setting, engagement with government agencies generally became critical for NGOs’ 
operations and achievements. However, this raised questions regarding their 
legitimacy and accountability as non-government organisations (Bryant, 2001; 
Warren, 2005). After the collapse of Suharto’s regime and in the wake of the Asian 
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economic crisis (1997-1998), legislation has become less centralised and 
hierarchical, providing more freedom for NGOs’ operations (Warren, 2005). Within 
the new era however, co-operating with the state remains important to NGOs’ 
operations (Warren, 2005). Despite the political and bureaucratic intransigence of 
state agencies, which is common in developing countries, co-operation between 
government and NGOs has improved and progressed (Bryant, 2001). However, this 
closeness does not prevent NGOs from operating independently and challenging 
government policies or practices (Bryant, 2001; Warren, 2005). 
 
It is important to note that the term NGO is generally not used in Indonesia; rather it 
is referred to as LSM (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat - self-reliant group) or LPSM 
(self-reliant community development group) (NGO Regulation Network, 2013). In 
terms of legal structure, foundations or associations are the two major forms of 
NGOs in Indonesia, and are required to register and report to relevant government 
authorities (Aritonang et al., 2009; NGO Regulation Network, 2013). While 
foundations are non-membership legal entities from which members are prohibited 
from receiving a direct or indirect benefit, the reverse applies to associations 
(Council on Foundations, 2014). However, only foundations can be funded by 
foreign entities (Council on Foundations, 2014), and they are the most common form 
of NGO in Indonesia (Aritonang et al., 2009). Further, in Indonesia, local NGOs are 
quite well developed. They build networks internationally to broaden their activities 
and operations across the country (Bryant, 2001; Nugroho, 2010). Through these 
networks, they can exchange ideas, experiences and support with other similar 
organisations at various levels from local to global (Nugroho, 2010). Within the new 
democracy era, establishing an NGO in Indonesia is quite easy. However, this 
environment provides opportunity for collusion and corruption within the sector, 
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which can present challenges for NGO legitimacy and accountability (Aritonang et 
al., 2009).  
 
b. NGO activities 
The two most prominent industries in Indonesia are agriculture and trade, which 
provide wide and rich markets for microenterprise development. While poor farmers 
are dispersed and difficult to reach, there are a large number of poor households 
working as traders in traditional markets (Nelson et al., 2013). In 2010, there were 
approximately 13,450 such markets with 12.6 million traders participating (Nelson et 
al., 2013). These traders are middle-men facilitating market flows between producers 
(such as farmers, herders, and fishermen) and buyers (such as end consumers, 
wholesalers, retailers) (Nelson et al., 2013). In 2010, these traditional markets 
represented approximately 80% of Indonesia’s economy, providing significant 
opportunities for MED (Nelson et al., 2013).  
 
Similar to Bangladesh, NGOs engaging in microfinance in Indonesia have reached a 
large number of poor borrowers in rural areas (Haq et al., 2008). Importantly, in 
Indonesia, NGOs (particularly local NGOs) have long been concerned with rural 
development issues and problems, and played an important role in poverty reduction 
in these areas (Nugroho, 2010). Further, farming and agricultural policies 
implemented through the ‘green revolution’11 in Indonesia in the late 1960s destroyed 
                                                     
 
11
 Due to food scarcity, since the late 1960s to the late 1980s, the Indonesian Government 
implemented programs to enforce agriculture intensification by using high-yielding seeds, subsidised 
fertilizers and irrigation systems. In addition to these programs, national development policy focused 
on industrial development. As a result, small farmers left their farms to work for factories while 
significant farming land was converted into industrial mills. These actions caused severe problems 
hampering Indonesian rural development in recent years (Nugroho, 2010). 
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the majority of rural land. Farmers fell into extreme poverty, earning little in return 
for their labour (Nugroho, 2010; Warren, 2005). To reform and develop rural areas, 
NGOs engage in a process of development, empowerment and improvement of 
livelihoods for poor farmers (Hadiwinata, 2005). Their reforms broadly move 
towards sustainable development for rural areas through training in the use of 
appropriate technology (Nugroho, 2010). For these NGOs, their orientation goes 
beyond food security, to food independence, creating the ability to meet national 
needs without relying on supplies from other countries (Nugroho, 2010). These 
NGOs provide training for farmers, and support for rural home businesses and small 
and medium sized enterprises, which enable NGOs to generate better access to 
markets for poor farmers (Nugroho, 2010). Through NGOs’ assistance, farmers are 
able to learn more about organic and sustainable farming processes, restore soil 
fertility, access microcredit schemes, and trade their products more fairly 
(Hadiwinata, 2005). The support potentially provides poor farmers with a way out of 
the vicious circle of structural poverty (Nugroho, 2010), and provides a valuable 
context for understanding how NGOs strengthen accountability to beneficiaries.  
 
c. Challenges and opportunities 
Unlike NGOs operating in Bangladesh, the majority of NGOs in Indonesia 
(approximately 54%) rely on funds from donors (from international government 
Official Development Assistance or private institutions) (Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 
2006), potentially explaining why foundations are the most common legal form of 
NGOs. NGOs in Indonesia have been criticised for losing the trust of poor 
communities as they tend to centralise power and decision-making, following the 
requirements of government and the private sector rather than the needs of the poor 
(Yamin, 2003). These issues often result in NGOs failing to accommodate grassroots 
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problems and be accountable to those whom they are supposed to serve (Pradjasto & 
Indriaswati, 2006; Warren, 2005). Relying on funds from donors and having limited 
dialogue with local communities, NGOs usually bring models designed and 
developed by outsiders, rather than developing models based on the local conditions 
and capabilities of the poor. As a result, NGOs find it difficult to call for the 
participation of communities and achieve effectiveness of programs (Pradjasto & 
Indriaswati, 2006). 
 
In addressing the above challenges, NGOs have started to view financial 
independence as a way to overcome external influences. As such, some NGOs shift 
from foundations to associations that allow them to generate revenue by charging 
service fees (or annual fees) to their members (ranging from individuals to 
institutions), and become more democratic, as all members are involved in decision 
making (Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006). Through these associations, NGOs can 
become more representative, pursue their values and expand their networks, while 
being accountable to those they serve (Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006). Other NGOs 
collaborate with private sector businesses (through partnerships within co-operatives) 
that can provide independent income sources to fund NGO activities (Warren, 2005). 
These activities help NGOs gain financial independence and provide them with 
opportunities to focus on their mission and values – benefiting the poor, such that 
they can gain trust from and strengthen accountability to poor communities.  
 
2.6 SUMMARY 
MED NGOs’ support for poverty alleviation in Bangladesh and Indonesia face a 
number of challenges. However, they also have strong potential to increase their 
legitimacy and accountability to beneficiaries by addressing these challenges (Bhatt, 
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1997; Moore, 2004; Schmitz et al., 2011). Accordingly, it is necessary to understand 
what forms of MED NGO accountability to beneficiaries exist in theory and practice, 
and whether the nature of that accountability differs among MED NGOs in different 
contexts. A central issue is whether greater accountability to beneficiaries contributes 
to more effective program outcomes (i.e. sustainable poverty alleviation). The 
understanding gained from examining these issues will help to identify both the 
success and constraints within MED NGOs’ accountability mechanisms to 
beneficiaries. Further, the complexity of MED NGOs’ activities (i.e. involving 
multiple actors and co-ordinated actions to help the poor and NGOs themselves 
develop financially sustainable businesses) suggests a more complex accountability 
framework for these types of NGOs. The knowledge gained from investigating the 
operations of MED NGOs in Bangladesh and Indonesia, addressing the research 
questions, will help in understanding the nature, associated issues, and mechanisms 
of beneficiary accountability of MED NGOs. Further, insights from this investigation 
may also assist in understanding these issues in other developing countries, 
particularly those with similar economic, cultural, or environment factors, such as 
having a large number of MEs operating, unstable legal and economic setting, and 
cultural and religious influences. Thus, while the findings may be relevant to other 
regions, generalisation may also potentially be limited by variation in these factors. 
The next chapter reviews NGOs’ operations from the perspectives of legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories, examining the available literature on NGO accountability to the 
poor and the associated issues. 
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CHAPTER 3:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 highlighted that poverty alleviation support provided by MED NGOs has 
strong potential to increase their legitimacy and accountability to beneficiaries, yet 
research on the nature of that legitimacy and accountability remains limited. 
Accordingly, this chapter reviews literature on accountability of the NGO sector and 
underlying theories. Section 3.2 outlines the context of NGO accountability and 
related issues. To gain an understanding of these issues, Section 3.3 presents theories 
that help to explain NGOs’ accountability practices, particularly stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories, providing a background for the investigation of this study. 
Developing from the above sections, Section 3.4 identifies the literature gaps and 
research questions to address these gaps. Section 3.5 summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 CONTEXT OF NGO ACCOUNTABILITY 
NGOs have played important roles in poverty alleviation, and expanded in terms of 
their number and the amount of funds they receive (Jordan & Tuijl, 2006a; Kearns, 
1994). Nevertheless, their project outcomes are not always considered clear or 
effective for their beneficiaries – the poor (Ebrahim, 2003a; Gibelman & Gelman, 
2004; Najam, 1996; O’Dwyer, 2007), which raises issues about their accountability, 
particularly to key stakeholders such as beneficiaries. 
 
Six types of NGO stakeholder are commonly identified in the literature, including 
donors, staff, beneficiaries, governments, public, and other NGOs (Brown & Moore, 
2001; Chisolm, 1995; Murtaza, 2012). Amongst these stakeholders, Ebrahim (2003b) 
identifies three primary external NGO stakeholder groups: (1) funders providing 
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financing for NGOs’ operations, (2) sector regulators including both government 
agencies and self-regulatory groups advocating codes of conduct for the NGO sector, 
and (3) beneficiaries. Beneficiaries involve people who directly (clients) or indirectly 
(communities) participate in and benefit from NGOs’ projects. In terms of NGO 
accountability to these stakeholder groups, Ebrahim (2003a) identifies four main 
dimensions: upward to donors; external to governments as regulators, public and 
other NGOs; downward to beneficiaries; and internal to staff and the organisation. 
However, while upwards and external accountability to donors and government is 
well developed, this is not so for downward accountability to beneficiaries (Ebrahim 
2003a; Najam, 1996). This imbalance is considered in the next sections. 
 
3.2.1 An imbalanced approach to NGO accountability 
Over nearly the last two decades, the literature largely indicates that NGOs have 
imbalanced approaches to accountability, mainly conforming to the requirements of 
donors and governments to secure operational funding and authorisation (upward 
accountability), while overlooking the needs of beneficiaries. This leads to weak 
accountability to this stakeholder group (Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hug & Jäger, 2014; Murtaza, 2012; Najam, 1996; Schmitz et 
al., 2011; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Some key issues underlying this approach are 
considered below. 
 
a. Moving away from core mission and strategies for poverty alleviation 
NGOs are commonly defined as values-based organisations and not-for-profit, thus they 
mainly rely on donors for operational funding. Meanwhile beneficiaries are considered 
as receivers of support from NGOs, relying on their services (Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
Tucker & Parker, 2013; Vakil, 1997). When there are conflicts in demands between 
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donors (or governments) and beneficiaries, donors’ requirements often outweigh 
beneficiaries’, thus limiting NGOs’ capacity to respond to beneficiaries’ needs (Elbers & 
Arts, 2011). This situation reinforces donors and governments as powerful stakeholders 
who can exercise influence over NGOs’ operations. These powerful stakeholders may 
impose conditions on NGOs for dispersing funds or influence NGOs’ strategies, whereas 
beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to do so (Andrews, 2014; Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
Ebrahim, 2003a). The pressure to conform to donors’ requirements may lead NGO 
managers to revise their core mission in order to meet the expectations or desires of 
donors (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hug & Jäger, 2014; O'Brien, 2010; Unerman & 
O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014), thus shifting away from their own values and 
belief systems within which they have their own voice, representing disadvantaged 
people (Ebrahim, 2005; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Jordan, 2005; 
Murtaza, 2012; Ossewaarde et al., 2008; Schmitz et al., 2011).  
 
b. Focusing on reporting and performance measures 
As mentioned above, NGO accountability can have an imbalanced focus on one 
primary stakeholder groups’ claims (e.g. donors), which may distort broader 
organisational accountability by over-emphasising the expectations of one 
stakeholder group (Roberts, 2009). Further, where this group’s expectations 
represent short-term quantitative targets, there is a risk that NGOs’ operations will 
focus on accounting rather than accountability (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Dixon et 
al., 2006; Ebrahim, 2005; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b). This approach to NGO 
accountability often increases the emphasis on reporting, disclosure, and evaluations 
(Ebrahim, 2003a). A passive approach by NGOs in their relationships with donors 
often results in them becoming implementers of donors’ policies, rather than NGOs 
focusing on their accountability to beneficiaries, and listening to beneficiaries’ views 
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(Agyemang et al., 2009; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Hug & Jäger, 2014). For example, 
through recent research on value chain development (VCD) in MED, Hug and Jäger 
(2014) indicate that as donors mainly require quantitative key economic performance 
indicators (e.g. the number of businesses supported and employee growth of these 
MEs), NGOs are indirectly discouraged from building relationships or facilitating 
dialogue with beneficiaries. Notably, when donors have a strong focus on 
quantitative performance data, numbers may be manipulated and fraudulent details 
reported (e.g. numbers and lists of participants) (Rahmani, 2012). Further, when 
funds provided to NGOs are based on their past performance (results) or future 
expected performance, NGOs may not want to assume the risks associated with 
sharing negative results, limiting opportunities for organisational learning (Jacobs & 
Wilford, 2010; Kang, Anderson, & Finnegan, 2012; Keystone, 2006). Donors and 
senior managers may judge success based on how effectively projects are delivered 
compared to initial plans, rather than taking a more flexible and adaptive approach.  
 
c. Applying NGOs’ values and beliefs to beneficiaries 
Weak NGO accountability to beneficiaries is also revealed through providing support 
that is not based on the poor’s needs (Brett, 2003; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Islam & Morgan, 
2011; Kilby, 2006; Najam, 1996; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Researchers highlight 
that NGOs often impose their values or goals on beneficiaries, rather than consult with 
beneficiaries to understand the support that beneficiaries need (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 
2003a; Kilby, 2006). This can be because NGOs follow the requirements of donors, and 
simply deliver what is contractually required (Ebrahim, 2003a; Elbers & Arts, 2011). 
Further, where donors are from the Western world, they often impose what they believe 
or understand to be useful in their local context, which may be unsuitable for local 
developing country contexts (Fernando, 2003; Subramaniam, 2007). As a result, 
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beneficiaries have mentioned that group meetings which are intended to provide support 
and facilitate the exchange of useful information, were not tailored to their needs, 
leading to their lack of interest in participating in NGOs’ programs (Wellens & Jegers, 
2014). Similarly, Andrews (2014, p.101) emphasises that “it remains unclear to what 
extent NGOs will uphold their ideologies of participation, or under which conditions” to 
facilitate meaningful participation so that their projects can meet the needs of 
beneficiaries. 
 
3.2.2 Role of NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
While various challenges regarding NGO accountability are noted above, it is widely 
accepted that accountability to beneficiaries helps NGOs achieve greater 
effectiveness and generate long-term (social and economic) outcomes from their 
poverty alleviation programs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a; Najam, 1996; O'Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010). Programs focusing on accountability to beneficiaries place the 
wellbeing of the poor, their families and communities at the centre of development 
(Dash, 2012; Nugroho, 2010). Through strengthening accountability to beneficiaries, 
NGOs’ programs have the potential to better meet beneficiaries’ needs, increase 
beneficiaries’ sense of ownership of poverty alleviation projects, enhance 
beneficiaries’ self-esteem and confidence, and eliminate the risk of program fraud 
and inefficiencies (Mango, 2010; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 
2014). One way for NGOs to demonstrate accountability to beneficiaries is through 
capacity building for the poor and local communities, including for example skills 
development and improved access to information and resources (Dash, 2012; 
Nugroho, 2010). By focusing on capacity building, NGOs interact with the poor, 
other service providers and authorities such as governments, such that the poor can 
have opportunities to become self-sufficient and independent, rather than relying on 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
Page 42 
 
subsidies and short-term financial support (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Nugroho, 2010). 
The process for strengthening downward accountability helps create an important 
link between the means and the ends of development (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010).  
 
By focusing on accountability to beneficiaries, measurement of NGOs’ performance 
often shifts from efficiency to effectiveness; producing the intended result and 
achieving the intended objective or outcome (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). This shift 
requires NGOs to become “blended value” organisations, generating long-term 
results in terms of economic impact and social change (Dash, 2012), rather than 
emphasising the number of poor people NGOs reach or the amount of credit 
provided (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2013c).  
 
To increase NGO accountability to beneficiaries, some researchers suggest 
downward accountability needs to be a major requirement of donors when dispersing 
funds to NGOs (Bendell & Cox, 2006; Hug & Jäger, 2014). However, Keystone 
(2006) through a web-based survey with 404 individuals from aid organisations (both 
donors and NGOs) in 20 countries, reported that only 26% of donors routinely asked 
NGOs to involve beneficiaries in the design of their performance indicators. Further, 
only 5% of NGOs said that donors showed an interest in discussing beneficiaries’ 
feedback for increasing the effectiveness of NGOs’ programs, thus strengthening 
their downward accountability. These findings show that NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries depends on individual NGOs’ strategies, rather than donors’ 
requirements (Keystone, 2006; Kilby, 2006). However, other research (Knox & 
Gruar, 2007; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014) through 
investigations involving NGO managers indicates that surprisingly there is a 
relatively low managerial perception of the importance of beneficiary accountability, 
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even though these managers acknowledge that beneficiaries are ultimately the people 
NGOs are trying to help. Further, NGO managers’ behaviours are largely affected by 
accountability requirements from various stakeholders and political contexts in 
which NGOs operate (Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Ebrahim, 2009). These issues 
challenge the development of NGO accountability to beneficiaries, and indicate a 
need to investigate the perceptions of NGO managers regarding the potential benefits 
and barriers to the development of effective downward accountability (O'Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007). These issues will be investigated in this study. 
 
3.2.3 Facilitating a participatory approach to NGO accountability 
Within NGO accountability, most scholars agree that NGOs have to account to 
donors for funds received, yet accountability to beneficiaries is also important 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Najam, 1996). 
Strategic stakeholder management not only addresses the expectations of 
stakeholders but also guides these expectations towards an organisation’s mission, 
values, and capabilities for long-term survival (Andrews, 2014; Balser & McClusky, 
2005; Costa, Ramus, & Andreaus, 2011; Roberts & Scapens, 1985). As such, NGOs 
should not be burdened with the imposed rationalities of others, for example funders  
(Bransden, van de Donk, & Putters, 2005). Rather, numerous authors (Ebrahim, 2003a; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Edwards & Sen, 2000; Najam, 1996) argue that as values-
based organisations, NGOs’ accountability should ensure that their activities 
genuinely benefit the poor, and consider whether these activities are appropriate to 
achieve the intended outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate a more 
balanced (or holistic, rights-based, or participatory) approach to NGO accountability 
to ensure participation of beneficiaries who are impacted by NGOs’ programs 
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(Cordery & Baskerville, 2011; Hug & Jäger, 2014; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006; Unerman 
& O'Dwyer, 2010).  
 
Within a participatory approach to accountability, NGOs remain accountable to 
donors through reporting requirements, as donors are typically remote from the poor 
communities (Bendell & Cox, 2006; Marshall, Telofski, Ojiako, & Chipulu, 2012; 
Shaw & Allen, 2006). Yet, NGO accountability shifts to include beneficiaries, 
focusing less on quantitative performance, and more on whether NGOs’ projects 
facilitate beneficiaries’ participation and meet their needs and expectations (Hug & 
Jäger, 2014; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010). Further, the 
flexibility of a participatory approach allows NGOs to have more dialogue with 
beneficiaries and donors (or governments). Through this process, NGOs are able to 
receive beneficiaries’ input (e.g. feedback and complaints) while reporting mistakes 
and learning to donors - without fear of negative consequences (O'Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010). While a participatory approach plays 
an essential role in strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries, a 
comprehensive framework for this approach is limited in the literature.  
 
3.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON NGOs’ OPERATIONS 
As mentioned above, NGOs are defined as dependent, values-based organisations, 
existing to provide support to communities in need. Therefore, legitimacy is important 
for NGOs’ funding, operations and survival (Andrews, 2014; Atack, 1999; Baur & 
Palazzo, 2011; Lister, 2003; Ossewaarde et al., 2008), and accountability is a crucial tool 
for NGOs to establish legitimacy (Bovens, 2007; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Lister, 
2003). Specifically, legitimacy can be established through effective and transparent 
accountability mechanisms, which demonstrate consistency between what NGOs 
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actually do and their goals and objectives (Lewis & Madon, 2004; Slim, 2002; Stewart, 
1984; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). These accountability mechanisms can be both 
financial and social. 
  
While financial accountability can be measured or communicated through financial or 
other reports, measurement and communication of social accountability remains a major 
challenge (Dash, 2012; Durden, 2008). Absence of reporting on social outcomes 
challenges NGO accountability (as a tool to gain legitimacy), particularly to beneficiaries 
requiring demonstration of NGOs’ social accountability in practice. Hence, it is 
necessary to understand the nature of NGO accountability and factors affecting 
stakeholder relationships between NGOs and beneficiaries. Legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories provide valuable lenses for examining the issue of NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries. This examination will help to gain insights into NGOs’ legitimacy 
strategies, and how these and other factors (e.g. beneficiaries’ characteristics as 
stakeholders) affect NGO accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
3.3.1 The concept of and approaches to legitimacy  
The concept of legitimacy has been transformed over time since the works of Weber 
(1947) on functionalism, Parsons (1960) on structural-functional theory, Scott (1987) on 
“open systems” theory, and various researchers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Zucker, 1987) on institutional 
theory. Suchman (1995) subsequently builds on these foundational works to provide a 
comprehensive concept of legitimacy, defining it as a “social contract” referring to “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). An organisation is required to operate in an 
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acceptable or legitimate manner in order to ensure its ongoing operations (Deegan, 
2002). Thus, within this social contract, “an organisation’s survival will be threatened if 
society perceives that the organisation has breached its social contract” (Deegan, 2002, 
p. 293). As such, organisational legitimacy is important as it provides an organisation 
with some assurance of its continuity and credibility, increasing opportunities to obtain 
resources and facilitating its own future development and survival (Deegan, 2002; 
O'Brien, 2010). 
 
The above concepts present organisations within an operating environment involving 
both internal (the organisation itself), and external (the institutional environment) 
dimensions that shape an organisation’s operational arrangements (Scott & Meyer, 
1992). Managers may adopt various ways of demonstrating to society that the 
organisation is attempting to comply with society’s expectations within the social 
contract (i.e. within the cultural environment) (Deegan, 2002). Suchman (1995) suggests 
two distinct approaches to legitimacy: (1) strategic and (2) institutional. The former 
focuses on “a managerial perspective and emphasizes the ways in which organizations 
instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal 
support” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). The latter focuses on “a more detached stance and 
emphasizes the ways in which sector-wide structuration dynamics generate cultural 
pressures that transcend any single organization's purposive control” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
572).  
 
At the organisational level (internal dimension), legitimacy under a strategic approach is 
depicted as an operational resource, which organisations often obtain by balancing 
environmental requirements and organisational goals (Suchman, 1995). Here, legitimacy 
is constructed as “purposive, calculated, and frequently oppositional” with real and 
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tangible outcomes (Suchman, 1995, p. 576), whereby managers provide symbolic 
assurances to gain and maintain access to resources (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Under 
this approach, whenever managers consider that the supply of a particular resource is 
vital to organisational survival, then they will pursue strategies to ensure the continued 
supply of that resource (Clarkson, 1995; Deegan, 2002). In the context of NGOs for 
example, these resources may be donated funds. Strategies to secure this resource may 
involve targeted disclosures, collaborating, or complying with funders (Deegan, 2002). 
Managers’ perceptions have a strong effect on their strategies for pursuing legitimacy 
gaps, and different managers have different views about what society’s expectations, and 
terms of a social contract are, and whether communities perceive the organisation is 
complying with these expectations (Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002). Thus, managers’ 
strategies for pursuing legitimacy gaps are based on their perceptions of whether and 
how society views the organisation’s conduct as acceptable (Deegan, 2002). 
 
Within an NGO context, legitimacy requires NGOs to operate by responding to the 
needs of the poor. Given, however, that NGOs’ funding and continued survival is largely 
dependent on donors, there is a risk that operations (and legitimacy) will be tailored 
towards satisfying their expectations, rather than the needs and expectations of other less 
powerful stakeholders, such as beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 2003a; Najam, 1996). The 
approach of NGOs to gaining legitimacy is thus a strategic choice, embracing and 
responding to particular stakeholders’ demands, for the organisation’s survival (Candler 
& Dumont, 2010). Under this approach, NGOs while strategic at a macro level, by 
conforming to local governments’ goals or donors’ requirements for grants, are rarely 
flexible enough at a grassroots level to respond to the individual needs of poor 
communities (Omona & Mukuye, 2012; Rahmani, 2012).  
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An institutional approach (external dimension) to legitimacy, however, does not depict 
legitimacy as an operational resource, but rather as a set of constitutive beliefs on which 
the organisation is built, run, understood and evaluated (Suchman, 1995). The 
institutional approach downplays both managerial agency and manager-stakeholder 
conflicts, and has been portrayed as a constraint (Suchman, 1995). This is because “no 
organization can completely satisfy all audiences, and no manager can completely step 
outside of the belief system that renders the organization plausible to himself or herself, 
as well as to others” (Suchman, 1995, p. 585). Swidler (1986) emphasises that 
organisations are often challenged by multiple organisational and institutional pressures. 
Thus, incorporating both institutional and strategic approaches helps organisations gain 
legitimacy through their strategies and taken-for-granted institutional belief systems. 
Within this perspective, NGOs can adopt a strategic approach to satisfy donors (for 
securing resources), while also responding to beneficiaries’ needs (whom NGOs exist to 
serve).  
   
Within the above approaches to legitimacy, Suchman (1995, p. 571) identifies three 
primary forms of legitimacy: “pragmatic, based on audience self-interest; moral, based 
on normative approval; and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-
grantedness”. While moral and cognitive legitimacy focus more on institutional 
influences, pragmatic legitimacy rests mainly on responding to organisations’ 
stakeholder interests (Suchman, 1995). These three forms of legitimacy co-exist, and 
when an organisation “moves from the pragmatic to the moral to the cognitive, 
legitimacy becomes more elusive to obtain and more difficult to manipulate, but it also 
becomes more subtle, more profound, and more self-sustaining, once established” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 585). Organisations can gain these three forms through three 
strategies: (a) passively conforming to the requirements of current audiences within a 
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pre-existing institutional regime, (b) selecting audiences which support organisations’ 
current practices, and (c) actively manipulating the “environmental structure by creating 
new audiences and new legitimating beliefs” (Suchman, 1995, p. 587). Suchman (1995) 
suggests that, under a conformity strategy, organisations mainly conform to demands of 
primary stakeholder groups, ideals within their sector, or established models, standards, 
and professionalised operations to respond to stakeholders’ needs. Under a selection 
strategy, organisations may select primary stakeholder groups who value their practices 
or activities so that they can achieve their own overall goals, or try to obtain certification 
or permission for their practices. Under a persuasion strategy12, organisations may need 
to campaign for new projects or identity and promote their image to potential 
stakeholders who may support their activities. They can also persuade potential 
stakeholders to provide support or become involved in new practices or projects by 
demonstrating the success of past projects; by institutionalising their practices, through 
persistence, popularisation, or standardisation, such that these practices become common 
within the sector (Suchman, 1995). 
 
Within the NGO sector, NGOs can also establish legitimacy through legal and moral 
requirements (Atack, 1999; Slim, 2002). NGOs gain legitimacy based on the 
organisation’s legal status according to their registered operations. However, legality 
only contributes a small part to an organisation’s fundamental legitimacy, as NGOs’ 
wider legitimacy is morally and explicitly derived from pursuing their key mission and 
values – improving the life of poor people (organisational legitimacy) (Atack, 1999; 
                                                     
 
12
 Suchman (1995) uses the term “manipulation” for this approach. “Manipulation” can be interpreted 
in a negative way in the context of NGOs, e.g. NGOs manipulate information on programs outcomes, 
or approaches to benefiting beneficiaries. Therefore, for this research, the term “persuasion” is 
considered to be more appropriate.  
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Lister, 2003; Slim, 2002). Being legitimate within legal and moral requirements helps 
NGOs generate significant tangible and intangible resources (Slim, 2002). Tangible 
resources include forms of direct financial (donated funds) or non-financial support that 
NGOs need to operate. Intangible resources include trust, integrity and reputation, which 
are important because they provide a basis for wider public perception of an 
organisation’s operations, in which the public has little or no direct involvement 
(Omona, & Mukuye, 2012; Slim, 2002). Further, an NGO’s legitimacy is strengthened 
through achieving effective performance outcomes (operational legitimacy). Operations 
generating successful performance outcomes and enabling benefits to poor people are 
thus a major source of legitimacy (Ossewaarde, et al., 2008; Slim, 2002).  Proven 
successful performance can transform an NGO from being a morally good idea to being 
a very practical moral pursuit (Lister, 2003; Slim, 2002). This study will use 
organisational and operational legitimacy as key constructs for the investigation of NGO 
legitimacy.  
 
The above theoretical perspectives indicate that approaches to gaining legitimacy affect 
management strategies for responding to stakeholders’ requirements. Responding to 
beneficiaries’ needs, while essential for NGO legitimacy in theory, remains challenging 
in NGOs’ practice. To gain further insight into this issue, a review of stakeholder theory 
is necessary, and is considered in the next section.  
 
3.3.2 Stakeholder theory 
Over the past quarter century, stakeholder theory has been developed, interpreted and 
criticised in the literature (Hasnas, 2013; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). 
Broadly, stakeholder theory is based on “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts” 
(Freeman, 1994, p. 411), and involves three distinct views: descriptive, instrumental, 
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and normative (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). While the descriptive and instrumental 
views mainly focus on management perceptions of obligations (or strategies) to 
particular stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston 1995), the normative view indicates 
that stakeholder management involves not only organisational strategies but also an 
emphasis on ethics (Phillips & Margolis 1999).  
 
Within an instrumental view, Clarkson (1995, p 106) defines stakeholders as 
“persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation 
and its activities, past, present, or future”. This narrow view is drawn from the 
perspective that organisations face resource constraints and tend to favour certain 
stakeholders affecting their financial resources and survival (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Under this view, Clarkson (1995, p.106) indicates that a primary stakeholder group 
(such as donors, governments, and beneficiaries in an NGO context) is “one without 
whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern”. 
As such, the survival and continuing success of organisations are dependent on 
managers’ ability to create sufficient wealth, value, or satisfaction for these primary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). This view emphasises a strategic approach to 
legitimacy focusing on audiences’ interests in order to secure operational resources 
and support, and paying particular attention to those stakeholders perceived as 
powerful.  
 
Within the instrumental perspective, the more important a stakeholder is to the 
organisation, the more effort will be exerted in managing the relationship with that 
stakeholder. Information is a major resource that the organisation can employ to 
manage (or manipulate) the relationship with stakeholders in order to gain their 
support and approval (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; Roberts, 1991). This 
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perspective perhaps explains why in the context of NGOs focused on poverty 
alleviation, formal reporting is an important tool for NGOs to account to powerful 
stakeholders such as donors and governments. However, this is rarely a tool targeted 
towards beneficiaries, given that they are often illiterate (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a). 
As a result, beneficiaries are sometimes overlooked in NGOs’ practice of 
accountability (particularly formal accountability). This is also potentially because 
beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs are viewed as customers without 
purchasing power, as they commonly do not pay for services received (Assad & 
Goddard, 2010). Yet, providing effective program outcomes to beneficiaries is 
essential for NGOs’ survival and operational legitimacy, otherwise NGOs may not 
be able to sustain stakeholder support and their own operations (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996a; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Expressly examining accountability to 
beneficiaries requires a clear understanding of beneficiaries’ characteristics and 
issues related to prioritising their claim to NGO accountability. 
 
Adopting a normative approach, Freeman (1984, p. 46) broadly defines a stakeholder 
in an organisation as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization's objectives”. Stakeholders can have economic or 
non-economic interests in the organisation. Under this definition, actual or potential, 
internal and external individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, societies, and 
even the natural environment are considered as organisations’ stakeholders (Page, 
2002). In an NGO context, donors, governments, and beneficiaries are considered 
NGOs’ primary stakeholders; each of which is central for NGOs’ survival. However, 
given beneficiaries are the key reason for NGOs’ existence, this group is particularly 
relevant. Yet, unlike accountability to donors and governments (to whom NGOs 
often report through formal communication mechanisms), NGO accountability to 
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beneficiaries is often overlooked (Ebrahim, 2003a, Edwards & Hulme, 1996b). 
Accordingly, a more detailed view of stakeholder management is required in an 
NGO context. 
 
Incorporating both instrumental and normative views of stakeholder management, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) indicate that organisations’ attention to stakeholders’ claims 
depends on stakeholder salience. This salience is determined by stakeholder 
attributes, including power, legitimacy, and urgency. Power is related to the extent 
that a stakeholder “has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative 
means, to impose its will in the relationship” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865). Coercive 
power involves the physical resources of force, violence, or restriction. Utilitarian 
power is based on material or financial resources, and normative power is related to 
symbolic or social resources (Etzioni, 1964). Importantly, power is both variable and 
transitory, ranging from non-existent to complete, and can be gained and lost 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Legitimacy (mentioned in Section 3.3.1 at an organisational 
level), as emphasised by Mitchell et al. (1997), is also relevant at the individual or 
stakeholder level. Legitimacy at this level refers to stakeholders’ legitimacy to an 
organisation. Specifically, a stakeholder has legitimacy to an organisation when 
his/her claims are “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). Thus, 
legitimate stakeholders are the ones who really count in the stakeholder-manager 
relationships (Mitchell et al., 1997). Urgency is the degree to which a stakeholder 
can call for immediate attention to the claim or relationship with an organisation, in 
terms of time sensitivity and criticality (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
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When stakeholders hold all three attributes (i.e. legitimacy, power, and urgency), 
they are classified as definitive stakeholders, whose claims receive immediate 
attention from organisations (Mitchell et al., 1997). Advancing the framework of 
stakeholder attributes by Mitchell et al. (1997), Eesley and Lenox (2006) through an 
empirical test on environmental claims of non-salient stakeholders, contend that the 
three attributes arise from both the nature of stakeholders and the nature of their 
claims. As such, an organisation’s response to a stakeholder’s claim depends not 
only on the stakeholder’s attributes, but also the attributes of the claim being made.  
 
When stakeholders gain salience, “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts” 
rests not only on the class of stakeholder, but also on two other elements (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). First, organisations’ goals affect whether managers pay more attention to 
particular classes of stakeholders. Second, managers’ perceptions of stakeholders 
also shape stakeholder salience. Within a normative view, however, managers’ goals 
and perceptions are not to serve the benefits of managers themselves or any 
particular stakeholder groups, but rather the organisation itself through values and 
mission (Hasnas, 2013; Phillips et al., 2003). Managers thus pursue financial and 
social performance within an ethical framework. To establish ethics in business, 
managers are obligated to provide opportunities for dependent stakeholders (who do 
not have all three attributes) to have input into managerial decisions on how the 
organisation pursues performance (Hasnas, 2013; Hendry, 2001).  
 
The theoretical perspectives of legitimacy and stakeholder theories indicate the 
connection between legitimacy approaches, management strategies, and stakeholder 
management. Adopting a blended view of stakeholder theory, including both 
instrumental and normative perspectives, this study argues that NGO legitimacy can 
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be gained through specific approaches to individual or multiple stakeholders within 
an organisation’s cultural environment. The establishment of legitimacy then affects 
an organisation’s ongoing stakeholder management strategies. Even though these 
management strategies influence managers’ goals and perceptions towards the claims 
of particular stakeholder groups, these goals and perceptions should be formed 
within an ethical framework. For the purposes of this study, these theoretical 
perspectives are used as lenses to examine issues related to beneficiaries’ claims of 
accountability from NGOs, which is highlighted in the following sections. 
 
3.3.3 Characteristics of beneficiaries as stakeholders 
Unlike other sectors, stakeholders of NGOs have some unique characteristics 
(particularly donors and beneficiaries), affecting their claims to NGO accountability. 
Donors provide funds for NGOs’ activities which support communities in need. In 
doing so, they are considered to have legitimacy and substantial power over NGOs’ 
operations (Assad & Goddard, 2010). NGOs are accountable to donors for funds 
spent, and it is critical for them to respond to donors’ requirements and expectations 
in a timely manner (Assad & Goddard, 2010). Hence donors are often viewed as 
definitive stakeholders having three stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and 
urgency (Assad & Goddard, 2010). However, while responding to donors’ specific 
requirements may secure ongoing funding, it does not guarantee the achievement of 
NGOs’ mission, goals, or effective program outcomes for other stakeholders, 
particularly beneficiaries (Costa et al., 2011). 
 
Beneficiaries of NGOs are often vulnerable citizens who lack information, ability, 
capacity, or voice to access social and economic resources. This profile is markedly 
different from customers of for-profit organisations (Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
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LeRoux, 2009). Further, beneficiaries commonly do not pay for the NGO services 
they receive (LeRoux, 2009), and are often individuals lacking influence (Assad & 
Goddard, 2010). Therefore, it is likely they do not have power to require NGOs to be 
accountable to them. Yet, beneficiaries are fundamentally legitimate to NGOs’ 
operations, as they are the ultimate reason for NGOs’ existence (Assad & Goddard, 
2010; Bendell & Cox, 2006; LeRoux, 2009). With respect to urgency, there are two 
elements in the context of NGO accountability to beneficiaries: time sensitivity and 
criticality. First, time sensitivity is important as NGOs’ activities affect people’s 
daily lives (Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer, 2007). Second, criticality is important as NGOs 
may risk losing their funding sources if their operational legitimacy (benefiting the 
poor) is questioned (Ebrahim, 2003a; Kovach, Neligan, & Burall, 2003; Najam, 
1996). Urgency can also be an attribute that others can provide for beneficiaries 
(Cordery & Baskerville, 2011). As such, Assad and Goddard (2010) refer to 
beneficiaries as dependent stakeholders (holding legitimacy and urgency), who are 
reliant on other stakeholders or NGO managers to exercise the necessary power to 
support their claims in a timely manner (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Mitchell et al., 
1997), including claims to NGO accountability. 
 
3.3.4 Accountability perspectives 
Accountability is a complex concept, with definitions being viewed and modified 
differently over time, and within different contexts. Edwards and Hulme (1996b, p. 
967) define accountability as “the means by which individuals and organizations 
report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their 
actions”. Focusing on responsibility, researchers (Cornwall, Lucas, & Pasteur, 2000; 
Stewart, 1984; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a) suggest that accountability involves 
both being held responsible by others and taking responsibility for oneself. As such, 
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organisations or individuals engage in actions to balance external (institutional 
requirements and stakeholders’) demands and internal responsibilities. These actions 
continuously shape an organisation’s mission, goals, and performance (Ebrahim, 
2003b; Hammer & Lloyd, 2011).  
 
Other scholars examine accountability in terms of accountability for what, to whom, 
and how (Bakker, 2002; Candler & Dumont, 2010; Ebrahim, 2005; Slim, 2002). 
Addressing these questions requires openness, transparency, and community 
closeness through reporting, involving and responding (Lehman, 2007; Smyth, 
2012). Further, accountability has been considered in different forms (e.g. a virtue 
based on a normative concept, or a mechanism in a narrower and descriptive sense), 
depending on the expectations of and information required by various stakeholders 
(Bovens, 2007, 2010). These forms are based and judged on different sets of norms 
and the compliance of management’s conduct with these norms (Bovens, 2007).  
 
Focusing more on dimensions of accountability, Roberts (1991, p. 356) indicates that 
“accountability is a social practice that seeks to reflect symbolically upon the 
practical interdependence of action; an interdependence that always has both moral 
and strategic dimensions”. Similarly, other research (Brown & Moore, 2001; Costa et 
al., 2011; Dixon et al., 2006; Gray et al., 1996; Roberts, 1991) also suggests that 
accountability is not only a legal requirement, but also a moral order. The moral 
dimension of accountability often arises from personal moral standards with no 
necessary connection to others (Roberts, 1991). Chisolm (1995, p. 141) contends that 
moral order involves “either an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behavior 
or an obligation to disclose information about one’s actions even in the absence of a 
prescribed standard of behavior”. These perspectives are consistent with a normative 
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view of stakeholder management as outlined above, involving not only 
organisational strategies but also ethics in responding to normative stakeholder 
requirements (Hasnas, 2013; Phillips et al., 2003; Phillips & Margolis, 1999). NGOs 
in particular have moral obligations for their operations, recognising that all humans 
have certain basic rights such as access to clean water, shelter, and food. Therefore, 
aid provided to poor people for poverty alleviation is considered a right rather than a 
gift where people should be grateful for what they receive (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 
2010). Consistent with this normative point of view, beneficiaries have rights to 
require NGO accountability.  
 
Aligning with both normative and instrumental views of stakeholder management, 
Roberts (1991) emphasises that the above two dimensions of accountability (legal 
and moral) are not separable; rather each reflects and animates the other. From this 
perspective, Roberts (1991) also suggests two forms of accountability: 
individualising (hierarchical) and socialising. Individualising accountability mainly 
focuses on accounting information to reflect organisational images or performance, 
which others can view or judge from a physical distance; helping to secure 
organisational legitimacy. Meanwhile, socialising accountability acknowledges that 
there are interdependencies between an organisation and other actors. Therefore, a 
relative symmetry of power and interactions between the organisation and other 
actors offers the opportunity for achieving a more complete recognition of 
organisational legitimacy through an organisation’s operations (Roberts, 1991). This 
process involves the engagement of organisational understanding and the challenging 
of other actors’ views and expectations. However, this form of accountability is often 
limited to contexts where there are power imbalances and rely on face-to-face 
interaction. Yet, with a moral organisational focus, socialising forms of 
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accountability can transform organisational accountability in a way that the pursuit of 
strategic objectives can be blended with an ethical framework (Roberts, 1991). 
Roberts (2009) suggests that accountability not only involves showing how 
organisations perform against a pre-determined set of indicators, but also involves 
interactions through dialogue with stakeholders, such that the relevance or accuracy 
of indicators can be understood in context, providing opportunities for organisational 
learning and effectiveness.  
 
Within an NGO context, there are various dimensions of accountability, including 
functional and strategic (Ebrahim 2003a), or social (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). 
Functional accountability is short-term in orientation, focusing on NGO 
accountability to funders for resources, resource use, and immediate impacts 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Edwards & Hulme, 1996a, 1996b; Najam, 1996). While 
functional accountability is dominated by quantitative measurements, social or 
strategic accountability is long-term in orientation, focusing on involvement and 
dialogue with stakeholders for the purpose of sustainable social impacts (Ebrahim, 
2003a, 2005; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). Similar to 
public sector accountability, accountability within the NGO sector often struggles to 
balance social and functional accountability (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; Smyth, 
2012). Effective accountability requires clear goals, transparency in decision-making, 
and reporting through concrete mechanisms, to hold NGOs to account and to 
enhance their legitimacy (Ebrahim, 2009; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Jordan, 2005; 
Lehman, 2007; Ossewaarde et al., 2008). Such accountability considers NGOs’ 
mistakes as organisational learning while requiring NGOs take responsibility for 
their broader and long-term societal impacts through establishing downward 
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accountability regimes as part of their adoption of social accountability (Andrews, 
2014; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; Slim, 2002).  
 
In summary, a review of accountability within legitimacy and stakeholder theories 
suggests that organisational approaches to gaining legitimacy affect NGO managers’ 
goals and perceptions of stakeholders, and thus stakeholder management. However, 
as values-based organisations, goals and perceptions must be aligned with an ethical 
framework. To facilitate accountability to beneficiaries, the theoretical perspectives 
suggest a more balanced approach - emphasising the participation of stakeholders 
including beneficiaries. Under this approach, NGOs gain legitimacy from both 
hierarchical accountability (through responding to requirements and expectations of 
donors or governments); and a socialising accountability (through emphasising 
participation, interaction and dialogue with beneficiaries). This approach potentially 
helps NGOs develop a more holistic approach to accountability involving functional 
and socialising dimensions. These theoretical perspectives are summarised in Figure 
3.1 and used as a background to develop the research questions for this study, which 
are presented in the next section. 
 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical perspectives underpinning NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGO 
managers’ 
goals towards 
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3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS DEVELOPMENT 
Section 1.3 briefly introduced five Research Questions for this study. Based on NGO 
accountability issues and theoretical underpinnings presented in the above sections, this 
section outlines the development of these Research Questions.  
 
3.4.1 Strategies for gaining NGO legitimacy 
As highlighted in Section 3.3.1, there are three primary forms of legitimacy (i.e. 
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive), and organisations may adopt different approaches 
to gaining legitimacy (e.g. institutional and/or strategic) through various strategies of 
conformity, selection, or persuasion (Suchman, 1995). In the context of NGOs, most 
available research views NGO legitimacy through an institutional theory lens to 
investigate how NGOs conform to institutional requirements to gain organisational 
legitimacy (Atack, 1999; Lister, 2003; Ossewaarde et al., 2008; Sonpar et al., 2010). 
Table 3.1 summarises and compares these views, detailing the different forms of or 
approaches to legitimacy for NGOs in general, and legitimacy for MED NGOs based 
on the view proposed in this study. 
Table 3.1 Forms of or approaches to NGO legitimacy 
Authors Context Legitimacy 
views 
Forms of or approaches to NGO 
legitimacy 
Atack (1999) Conceptual, moral 
legitimacy perspective 
Institutional Four criteria of moral legitimacy: 
representativeness, distinctive values, 
effectiveness, and empowerment 
Lister (2003) Two British NGOs 
operating in Guatemala 
Institutional Regulatory, pragmatic, normative, 
and cognitive legitimacy 
Ossewaarde et al. 
(2008) 
Humanitarian INGOs 
operating to support 
tsunami victims the 
Indian Ocean in 2004 
Institutional Normative, regulatory, cognitive and 
output legitimacy 
Doh & Teegen (2002); 
Edwards & Hulme 
(1996b); Hyndman & 
McDonnell (2009) 
Conceptual Institutional Compliance with necessary and 
inevitable taken-for-granted culture  
View proposed by this 
study 
MED NGOs approaches 
to gaining legitimacy 
through institutional and 
strategic lenses 
Institutional 
and strategic 
(Single or combined) approaches to 
legitimacy through conformity, 
selection, persuasion (organisational 
and operational legitimacy) 
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Table 3.1 shows that there is little consensus on what forms of legitimacy exist and 
how NGOs establish legitimacy. Regarding gaining moral legitimacy, Atack (1999) 
identifies four criteria to evaluate NGOs’ operations: representativeness, distinctive 
values, effectiveness, and empowerment. As such, NGOs should operate effectively 
within these value systems to represent and empower the poor. Lister (2003) suggests 
four forms of NGO legitimacy: regulatory, pragmatic, normative, and cognitive. 
Later, Ossewaarde et al. (2008) identify four forms of NGO legitimacy: regulatory, 
normative, cognitive and output legitimacy, emphasising what NGOs produce. 
Similar to the pragmatic form, output legitimacy refers to the need for NGOs to show 
how they actually communicate and symbolise the achievement of their objectives 
(Ossewaarde et al., 2008). Further, to achieve cognitive legitimacy, various 
researchers (Doh & Teegen, 2002; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009) argue that as voluntary organisations, there is a necessary and 
inevitable taken-for-granted culture which NGOs need to comply with to gain such 
legitimacy.  
 
The above views emphasise the institutional requirements that NGOs have to comply 
with in order to gain legitimacy, thus emphasising an institutional approach to 
gaining legitimacy. This limits the understanding of the nature of NGO legitimacy. 
In contrast, the theoretical perspectives indicate that organisations may have a 
strategic approach to gaining legitimacy; through strategies of conformity, selection, 
and persuasion. Sonpar et al. (2010) suggest that legitimacy established via a 
strategic approach (rather than through the adoption of institutionalised values) can 
help to enhance organisational effectiveness by focusing on particular key 
stakeholders. Further, NGOs’ funding structures often affect managerial strategies 
and responsiveness to various stakeholders, such as being responsive to powerful 
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stakeholders to ensure resources for their operations (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Kreutzer, 
2009; Miller-Millesen, 2003). Importantly, to avoid unwanted donor pressure, NGOs 
may adopt a strategic approach through various strategies such as selecting, co-
operating, persuading, or rejecting particular donors (Elbers & Arts, 2011). Thus, this 
study extends previous research on NGO legitimation by explicitly allowing for a 
strategic approach to legitimacy. 
 
By considering both strategic and institutional approaches to gaining legitimacy, 
questions are raised regarding whether NGOs are still legitimate when they operate 
ethically but are ineffective; and whether NGOs may lose organisational legitimacy 
due to being ineffective (i.e. operational legitimacy). As such, this study examines 
NGO legitimacy through both institutional and strategic lenses in order to understand 
NGOs’ strategies for gaining legitimacy at both organisational and operational levels. 
Thus, the first research question addressing this issue is: 
RQ1: What are non-government organisations’ (NGOs’) approaches to gaining 
legitimacy in the context of microenterprise development (MED)? 
 
As highlighted in Section 3.3, the theoretical perspectives of legitimacy and 
stakeholders indicate that approaches to gaining legitimacy affect managers’ 
perceptions of stakeholder salience and goals towards stakeholders. Within the NGO 
context, depending on the purpose of an NGO’s operations, managerial perceptions 
and goals towards beneficiaries differ (Hug & Jäger, 2014; Keystone, 2006). 
Organisations such as development NGOs which consider improving poor people’s 
lives as a goal of development tend to focus on increasing levels of participation and 
involvement by the poor, and view responsiveness to beneficiaries as a tool enabling 
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social capabilities (Keystone, 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). However, NGOs 
which consider themselves as agents of development tend to perceive responsiveness 
to beneficiaries as a process of periodic consultation rather than as a foundation for 
development, through meaningful ongoing engagement and learning (Keystone, 
2006). Therefore, different organisational values and mission affect NGO manager 
goals and perceptions toward prioritising responsiveness to beneficiaries, who as 
dependent stakeholders lacking power can only gain this if NGOs choose to bestow it 
(Assad & Goddard, 2010; Keystone, 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). However, 
an understanding of the relationship between approaches to gaining legitimacy and 
perceptions of beneficiary salience and goals towards beneficiaries is limited. Thus, 
the second research question addressing this issue is: 
RQ2: How do approaches to gaining legitimacy affect MED NGO managers’ 
perceptions of beneficiary salience and goals towards beneficiaries? 
 
3.4.2 Effects of management’s strategies to NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
Organisational culture and structures play an important role in defining behaviours 
and perceptions of managers and staff, and can affect the outcomes of accountability 
to beneficiaries (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Mango, 2010; 
Starling, 2003). Attitudes and beliefs affect people’s behaviours, such that “it is very 
difficult for a person who does not feel respect to behave respectfully on a consistent 
basis” (Mango, 2010, p. 8). In an organisational context, attitudes and beliefs are 
formed by different factors. These factors include the types of activities NGOs 
conduct (Slim, 2002), or social contexts and expectations (e.g. what works in one 
country may not work in others) (Gibelman & Gelman, 2004). However, as 
mentioned in Section 3.2.2, being accountable to beneficiaries is typically an 
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assumption or a normative expectation on NGOs rather than a requirement from 
donors for gaining legitimacy (Hug & Jäger, 2014; Kilby, 2006). Therefore, it is 
assumed NGOs are legitimate on the basis that they are benefiting the poor. This 
perspective is reinforced through the efforts of NGOs’ management in developing an 
organisational culture facilitating accountability to beneficiaries (Hammer & Lloyd, 
2011).  
 
Facilitating effective accountability to beneficiaries is a process that needs to be 
ongoing and embedded in an organisation’s culture, yet this process requires time 
and support from various stakeholders, including support from donors to managers, 
from managers to staff, and from staff to beneficiaries (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; 
Keystone, 2006). Managers have priorities for their operations, such as project plans, 
budgets, efficiency and effectiveness of projects and operations (Jacobs & Wilford, 
2010). Downward accountability needs time as it requires bottom–up decision 
making, which may not align with managers’ priorities and slow down the progress 
of NGOs’ operations (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Mango, 2010). NGO management 
thus needs support from other stakeholders (particularly donors), while NGO staff 
need support from NGO management (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010). NGO managers 
need to be open and supportive, encouraging their staff to engage and spend time 
with beneficiaries, not only in project activities but also project design and 
implementation based on beneficiaries’ needs. Meanwhile, staff need to treat 
beneficiaries with respect, invest time to understand beneficiaries’ points of view, 
and respond to their needs (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; Haq et al., 2008; Mango, 2010). 
While NGOs account to donors for funds received, it is essential for them to guide 
donors’ expectations towards their own mission and values. Further, successful 
accountability practices must be also embedded into organisations’ capabilities, 
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involving procedures, mechanisms, and processes (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; Wellens 
& Jegers, 2014). Importantly, true accountability within an organisation’s culture 
should not be driven by tools and methods, but rather supported by them (Hammer & 
Lloyd, 2011; Keystone, 2006).  
 
Within the above perspectives, as highlighted in Section 3.2.3, a participatory 
approach emphasising participation of and dialogue with beneficiaries is important to 
strengthen NGO accountability to beneficiaries. However, limitations remain (e.g. 
lack of meaningful participation of beneficiaries, demand conflicts, time and 
resource constraints), particularly in situations where NGO staff and their local 
partners do not value accountability to beneficiaries (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). 
While research indicates the importance of NGO managers’ perceptions and goals to 
a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011), 
there is limited understanding of this relationship, particularly in the context of MED 
NGOs. These NGOs are considered to have a mix of characteristics, involving 
traditional NGO traits (e.g. providing support to the poor) and commercial business 
engagement. Accordingly, the third research question is: 
RQ3: To what extent do MED NGO managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience 
and goals towards beneficiaries facilitate a participatory approach in their 
accountability to beneficiaries? 
 
In summary, a range of factors affect NGO accountability to beneficiaries. By 
investigating MED NGOs’ approaches to gaining legitimacy and how these 
approaches affect managers’ goals and perceptions towards beneficiaries, the 
understanding acquired will help to address the underlying issue of NGOs’ 
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accountability to beneficiaries. This knowledge will contribute to understanding what 
MED NGO approaches exist to gain legitimacy and how strategies for gaining 
legitimacy impact on managerial strategies, affecting stakeholder management, 
particularly for dependent stakeholders such as beneficiaries. This knowledge will 
then be used to investigate the mechanisms that NGO managers use to strengthen 
their accountability to beneficiaries, which is considered in the next sections. 
 
3.4.3 Accountability mechanisms in the literature 
The above review highlights that accountability to beneficiaries is required to be 
embedded in an organisation’s culture, driven by processes of interactions with 
beneficiaries, and supported by tools and methods. NGO accountability mechanisms 
have been identified and developed variously in the existing literature, providing a 
mix of tools and processes (Ebrahim, 2003a; Hammer & Lloyd, 2011). Further, the 
literature emphasises the essential role of a participatory approach to NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries (Hug & Jäger, 2014; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), yet 
a comprehensive framework for facilitating effective downward accountability 
remains limited. This section reviews available mechanisms of accountability in the 
literature, and then uses these to develop a framework for NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries.  
 
Within the literature on accountability mechanisms, Ebrahim (2003a) presents a 
framework comprising five NGO accountability mechanisms, including a mix of 
tools and processes. Tools refer to discrete devices or techniques that are used over a 
limited period of time, and can be tangibly documented and repeated. Processes, 
while being generally more multifaceted than tools, less tangible and time-bound, 
emphasise a course of action rather than a distinct end-result (Ebrahim, 2003a). 
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According to Ebrahim (2003a), mechanisms include: (1) reports and disclosure 
statements, (2) performance assessments and evaluations (financial and operational 
reporting), (3) participation, (4) self-regulation, and (5) social audits. These 
mechanisms have been investigated in a range of contexts by various researchers 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Jordan & Tuijl, 2006a; Murtaza, 2012; Nalinakumari & 
MacLean, 2005; Schmitz et al., 2011), who indicate that NGO accountability 
mechanisms are mainly responses to definitive stakeholders (i.e. donors and 
governments), focusing primarily on quantitative outcomes through formal (annual) 
reports, evaluation and assessments (as tools). However, these mechanisms have 
been noted as lacking both involvement from beneficiaries and responsiveness to 
their needs.  
 
As an alternative to accountability mechanisms, Hammer and Lloyd (2011) 
developed and revised a global accountability framework (GAP) across the 
intergovernmental, non-governmental and corporate sectors. The GAP framework 
provides indicators to assess four dimensions of accountability: (1) transparency, (2) 
participation, (3) evaluation, and (4) complaints and response. Indicators for 
transparency evaluate levels at which stakeholders can access information on 
organisational procedures, structures, and assessment processes on a timely basis. 
Participation assesses the activities that organisations enable key stakeholders to be 
involved in (e.g. decision-making processes). Evaluation gauges how organisations 
monitor and review their progress and results against goals and mission, and how 
they learn from this process on an ongoing basis. Complaints and response assess 
how organisations enable stakeholders to raise concerns or complaints regarding an 
organisation's decisions and actions, and ensure that these issues are properly 
reviewed and responded to (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011). A summary of above 
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mechanisms classified as either processes or tools, together with limitations 
identified in the literature is presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 NGO accountability mechanisms and their limitations 
Ebrahim (2003a) Hammer and 
Lloyd (2011) 
Limitations (Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005; Jordan & Tuijl, 
2006a; Agyemang et al., 2009; Schmitz et al., 2011; Murtaza, 
2012 ) 
1.Financial and 
disclosure 
statements (tool) 
1.Transparency Mainly to conform to the requirements of definitive 
stakeholders (e.g. donors) 
 
 Different donors may require different formats of reporting  
 Focus on quantifiable performance indicators 
 Provide little flexibility and scope for NGOs to report views, 
experiences, and feedback on their staff and beneficiaries 
2. Performance 
assessments and 
evaluations (tool) 
2. Evaluation 
3. Participation 
(process) 
3. Participation Mainly to present a symbolic image of involvement 
 Actual project objectives are often decided before any 
participation by poor communities occurs 
 Hierarchical power imbalance (between those giving funds 
and those receiving) 
4. Self-regulation 
  (tool and process) 
4. Complaints 
and response 
 Useful for accountability to beneficiaries, but application is 
limited in practice 
 Remains voluntary=> self-selection bias 
5. Social audits 
(tool and process) 
 
 
a. Reporting and evaluations – a tool for disclosure 
As noted previously, management is deemed to use disclosure tools such as annual 
reports to allay stakeholders’ concerns and shape the organisation’s social image 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Deegan et al., 2002; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). In an 
NGO context, such tools are primarily used for upward and external accountability 
(to donors and governments) (Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; Jordan, 2005; 
Kang et al., 2012). As resource dependent entities, these mechanisms help NGOs 
account for project goals meeting donor priorities, measuring project outcomes, and 
are typically a basis for future funding decisions (Agyemang et al., 2009; Murtaza, 
2012; Schmitz et al., 2011). Information collected is typically for the requirements of 
donors (e.g. amount of money raised and spent, the number of poor people reached) 
(Dixon et al., 2006; Fine, Thayer, & Coghlan, 2000).  Reporting and evaluations 
have become important for organisations’ probity and efficiency (Keystone, 2006; 
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Slim, 2002), yet, they often do not address an NGO’s social performance in terms of 
effectiveness (Benjamin, 2013; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). Therefore, information 
disclosed by the majority of NGOs in financial reports is not to establish legitimacy 
and accountability to beneficiaries, but rather to donors (Benjamin, 2013; Gutierrez-
Nieto, Fuertes-Callen, & Serrano-Cinca, 2008; Kang et al., 2012).  
 
Different donors may require different formats of reporting, assessments and 
evaluations (Agyemang et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2006). These formats often provide 
little flexibility and scope for NGOs to report views and experiences of their staff 
and beneficiaries, as well as feedback on how projects should be adapted and 
delivered more effectively under local conditions in the future (Agyemang et al., 
2009; Burger, 2012). Therefore, reporting is less likely to be used as a tool for 
learning and improving at the field level (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Keystone, 2006).  
 
b. Participation 
Participation is considered a rights-based approach focusing on meaningful 
participation of numerous stakeholders, including beneficiaries, to achieve effective 
and long-term program outcomes (Jordan & Tuijl, 2006b; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 
2010). Under this mechanism, collaboration and co-ordination between NGOs, 
beneficiaries, and other actors within the communities is reinforced (Ebrahim, 2003a; 
Lister, 2000). NGOs potentially become more responsive to the needs of 
beneficiaries (Baur & Schmitz, 2012), such that the poor can become more active in 
decision-making at all levels, and ultimately empowered (Atack, 1999).  
 
Different forms of participation have been developed in the literature, involving 
various dimensions or forms of community involvement. Arnstein (1969) presents a 
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detailed scale of community participation in the context of NGOs, involving a ladder 
of eight rungs. Rungs or levels range from manipulation (the lowest rung) to therapy, 
informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. 
Bhatt (1997) in the context of MED, reclassifies this framework into three types of 
participation: non-participation, tokenism, and participation. In the context of NGOs 
more broadly, Ebrahim (2003a) reviews these rungs to suggest four participation 
levels: information and consultation, partnership, negotiation and bargaining, and 
initiative and full delegation. Focusing on associated power distribution, Brett (2003) 
classifies participation levels from weak to strong, depending on levels of 
consultation regarding clients’ needs and capabilities when designing projects.  
 
While the above research has merit in examining participation, this mechanism is 
predominantly based on conceptual research. Research on the participation 
mechanism in practice has been undertaken (see Church, Saunders, Wanke, Pong, 
Spooner, & Dorgan, 2002; Khavarpour, Rissel, & Butler, 1999; Litva, Coast, 
Donovan, & Eyles, 2002). However, these studies focus on healthcare NGOs and do 
not extend to MED. Further, despite the potential benefits of the participation 
mechanism, implementation of this mechanism in practice is commonly considered 
weak (Awio, Lawrence, & Northcott, 2007; Cheng, 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; Murtaza, 
2012; Najam, 1996; Siddiquee & Faroqi, 2009). Participation with respect to 
beneficiaries mainly represents a symbolic image of involvement (Assad & Goddard, 
2010). As such, participation is impacted by hierarchical management structures and 
decisions, where actual project objectives are often decided before any participation 
by poor communities occurs (Dixon & McGregor, 2011; Ebrahim, 2003a; Jacobs & 
Wilford, 2010; Najam, 1996). Further, as dependent stakeholders, beneficiaries’ 
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relationship with NGOs is influenced by the hierarchical power between those giving 
funds and those receiving (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Thus, 
even where poor people have the opportunity and confidence to engage with NGOs, 
the depth of this engagement is questionable as they inherently lack power, unlike 
others such as chiefs of villages who may talk on their behalf (Andrews, 2014; 
Jacobs & Wilford, 2010). This issue often limits the opportunities and ability for 
poor communities to challenge NGOs’ activities (Awio et al., 2007; Cheng, 2009; 
Dixon et al., 2006; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; Jordan, 2005; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 
2010); or for their feedback to be given and heard (Brett, 2003; Khan, 2003; Kilby, 
2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Accordingly, beneficiaries do not always have 
power to influence projects affecting them; rather they are often passive receivers and 
observers of projects controlled by more powerful actors (Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
Dixon & McGregor, 2011). These issues emphasise the importance of a normative view 
of stakeholder management in NGO accountability to beneficiaries, considering the 
essential role of beneficiaries’ participation in NGO projects.  
 
As outlined in Section 2.4, MED NGOs have a strong focus on calling for the active 
participation of beneficiaries. In the context of MED INGOs in Vietnam, Chu and 
Luke (2012a) find three levels of participation adopted in practice (ranging from 
weak to strong): consulting, partnership, and delegated control. First, NGOs 
consulted with local communities in order to understand the conditions and needs of 
poor communities and local business opportunities, prior to designing projects. They 
then informed the local community once the project design was finalised, and called 
for communities’ involvement. At the partnership level, NGOs helped working 
groups (including both poor and non-poor households) establish MEs and link them 
with the private sector and local authorities (Chu & Luke, 2012a). NGOs therefore 
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acted as facilitators in these connections, effectively building capacity for poor 
communities and strengthening NGOs’ downward accountability (Baur & Schmitz, 
2012; Murtaza, 2012). Last, at the delegated control level, NGOs helped MEs 
gradually assume control within a supported environment. MEs then continued to 
manage and potentially grow their businesses after NGOs’ programs formally ceased 
(Chu & Luke, 2012a). 
 
These three levels potentially help facilitate meaningful participation in a MED 
context. However, these findings were based on observations of practice within 10 
NGOs in one country. Investigation of MED NGO practice more broadly is needed 
to understand the use of the participation mechanism. Table 3.3 summarises the 
levels of participation detailed above, from weakest to strongest within each model. 
Table 3.3 Levels of participation 
Arnstein (1969) - 
NGOs 
Bhatt (1997) - 
MED 
Ebrahim (2003a) - 
NGOs 
Chu and Luke (2012a) - 
MED 
Conceptual base MED context in Vietnam 
1. Manipulation 
 
2. Therapy 
 
3. Informing 
 
4. Consultation 
 
5. Placation 
 
6. Partnership 
 
7. Delegated power 
 
8. Citizen control 
1. Non-participation 
 
2. Tokenism 
 
3. Participation 
 
 
1. Information and 
consultation 
 
2. Partnership 
 
3. Negotiation and 
bargaining 
 
4. Initiative and 
full delegation 
 
 
 
1. Consulting 
 
2. Partnership 
 
3. Delegated control 
 
 
 
 
c. Receiving feedback and providing response 
NGO accountability research commonly acknowledges the importance of 
mechanisms to facilitate beneficiaries’ feedback and NGOs’ response, to prevent 
NGOs’ communication remaining rhetorical and tokenistic (Keystone, 2006; Mango, 
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2010). However, these mechanisms are very limited in practice with mechanisms for 
beneficiaries to provide feedback not well established (Kang et al., 2012), and 
beneficiaries often not aware of any complaint procedures (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
In addition, feedback or complaints from beneficiaries was mainly through surveys 
or questionnaires, which beneficiaries often found too difficult to complete. 
Beneficiaries considered these tools produced a lack of in-depth understanding, with 
NGOs not responding to complaints or not treating the complaints confidentially 
(Hug & Jäger, 2014; Kang et al., 2012; Wellens & Jegers, 2014).  
 
d. Self-regulation and social audit 
Self-regulation and social audit are two mechanisms that help to shape organisational 
behaviour and practice. They inform primary stakeholders about the quality of an 
organisation’s operations (Darnall & Carmin, 2005), and are useful to build 
organisational reputation and legitimacy (Gugerty, 2008; Gugerty, Sidel, & Bies, 
2010). Self-regulation often involves visible codes of conduct through which NGOs 
can obtain some form of compliance assessment or certification and develop valuable 
networks (Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a). Codes of conduct (formal or 
informal) existing within the NGO sector can influence NGOs’ behaviours, 
enhancing NGO accountability to each other and to beneficiaries (Andrews, 2014; 
Lloyd, 2005). Further, self-regulation can assist NGOs to obtain funds, particularly 
from government and other donors (Gugerty et al., 2010). Social audit commonly 
involves a process that enables organisations to evaluate their performance according 
to expectations of stakeholders and communities (Deegan, 2002). In an NGO 
context, this process takes into account stakeholders’ (including beneficiaries’) views 
of an organisation’s goals and values; particularly the impacts of an NGO’s activities 
on beneficiaries’ lives (Agyemang et al., 2009).  
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Despite the potential benefits of self-regulation and social audit to NGO 
accountability (particularly benefits to beneficiaries), their application is limited in 
practice (Agyemang et al., 2009). Self-regulation is commonly adopted by NGOs 
based on their past experience in dealing with donors and government. As such, it is 
unlikely to be used for improving internal governance and management, rather it may 
create pressure through a system of accreditation and certification within the NGO 
sector (Gugerty et al., 2010). Self-regulation and social audit often remains a 
voluntary process, which results in self-selection bias, limiting the effectiveness and 
usefulness of these mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b). Competent and effective 
NGOs have strong incentives to conduct social audits and participate in a self-
regulation schemes, whereas struggling NGOs may have little to gain from revealing 
their underperformance and ineffectiveness (Burger, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003b).  
 
3.4.4 Proposed framework for NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
Based on the above review, mechanisms for NGO accountability include a mix of 
tools and processes, primarily used for NGO accountability to donors and 
governments with limited application to beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Benjamin, 2013). Accordingly, a comprehensive framework of mechanisms for NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries (and barriers to these mechanisms) is necessary for the 
investigation of this study. 
 
a. Mechanisms to facilitate NGO accountability 
Despite comprehensive mechanisms for effective NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries being limited in the literature (particularly within a participatory 
approach), the literature suggests concepts on which these mechanisms can be built. 
Generally, these mechanisms should enhance interactions between NGOs and people 
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that they aim to assist (Hug & Jäger, 2014; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Wellens & 
Jegers, 2014), and provide a tool for NGOs to gain legitimacy and achieve 
effectiveness (Bovens, 2007; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; 
Lister, 2003). Such mechanisms should allow NGOs to gain an understanding of 
local conditions, prioritise the voices of beneficiaries, identify beneficiaries’ needs, 
and assess how these needs can be addressed; ultimately empowering beneficiaries 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2005; Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; Jakimow & Kilby, 
2006; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Further, these 
mechanisms should help to avoid the existing problem of symbolic accountability by 
offering a less formal setting while creating a supportive and encouraging 
environment, so that beneficiaries feel more comfortable participating and providing 
feedback and complaints (Darcy, 2002; Eversole, 2003; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
Importantly, these mechanisms should involve providing information which allows 
the effectiveness of NGOs’ activities to be assessed, while also responding to 
beneficiaries’ feedback (Fowler, 1996; Kang et al., 2012; Leen, 2006; Najam, 1996). 
Thus, NGOs’ development work is effective when activities are “owned” by local 
people and build on their priorities (Ellerman 2005, cited in Jacobs & Wilford, 
2010). Accordingly, under a participatory approach, this study classifies mechanisms 
for NGO accountability to beneficiaries into tools and processes, which are 
summarised in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Proposed mechanisms for NGO downward accountability 
Proposed mechanisms 
Conceptual support from the literature 
 Process Tools 
 Consulting 
 
 Partnership 
 
 Delegated control 
 Disclosure 
statements 
 
 Feedback and 
response 
 
 Social audit  
 
 Self-regulation 
 
 
- Facilitate interactions between NGOs and 
beneficiaries to understand and prioritise 
beneficiaries’ needs (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Ebrahim, 2005; Hammer & Lloyd, 2011; 
Jakimow & Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2006; Lindenberg 
& Bryant, 2001; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010) 
 
- Being less formal, providing more supportive and 
encouraging environment (Darcy, 2002; 
Eversole, 2003; Wellens & Jegers, 2014) 
 
- Exchange information, facilitate feedback and 
responses  (Fowler, 1996; Kang et al., 2012; 
Leen, 2006; Najam, 1996) 
 
Tools include disclosure statements, mechanisms to facilitate feedback and response, 
social audit, and self-regulation. Despite these tools having some limitations to 
facilitate NGO accountability to beneficiaries (as mentioned in Section 3.4.3), they 
are still useful for NGOs to facilitate information exchange with beneficiaries. 
Through disclosure statements (or project reports), beneficiaries are able to access 
information regarding NGO projects (and outcomes) and how they can benefit from 
these projects. Further, NGOs are able to learn and improve their operations through 
receiving beneficiaries’ feedback and responding to the feedback, and strengthen 
their accountability through self-regulation and social audit. Notably, this study 
classifies social audit as a tool, rather than as both a process and a tool (Ebrahim, 
2003a), as social audit is often conducted at certain times rather than on an ongoing 
basic. Processes involve levels of participation, including consulting, partnership, 
and delegated control. Under the proposed framework, rather than being a separate 
mechanism, participation is seen as central to each of the mechanisms, incorporating 
both normative and instrumental approaches to NGO legitimacy and accountability.   
 
b. Limitations of a participatory approach 
Despite the importance of a participatory approach, challenges remain. As noted 
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previously, beneficiaries may not be willing to express concerns, or perceive their 
negotiating position as too weak to express views which differ from NGOs’ goals 
and available resources (Agyemang et al., 2009; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; 
Wellens & Jegers, 2014). They may be afraid to provide feedback or complaints, 
which may upset NGO staff and put benefits received from NGOs at risk (Agyemang 
et al., 2009; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
 
Given NGO beneficiaries typically have low skill levels and are illiterate (Edwards 
& Hulme, 1996a), they may be reluctant to question those delivering support to them 
(Ebrahim, 2003a; Agyemang et al., 2009). Dialogue with beneficiaries may lead to 
different interpretations and assessments between NGOs and beneficiaries (e.g. 
project outcomes may be considered effective in the long-term from NGOs’ 
perspective, but beneficiaries wanting immediate or short-term outcomes may view 
these projects as ineffective (Hug & Jäger, 2014)). Further, when beneficiaries are 
extremely poor, they often work simply to access food on a daily basis, thus they 
may not be available for or interested in extended dialogue with NGOs, often 
perceived as time-consuming without immediate benefits (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 
2010). However, this lack of dialogue hinders NGO accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
Participation of and dialogue with beneficiaries may also be influenced by cultural 
factors (Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Kantor, 2005; Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000). For example, bonding and solidarity within communities will help 
to facilitate a participatory approach; whereas constraints may be faced in 
environments of discrimination or segregation (e.g. between different genders, the 
rich and the poor, where there is lack of social trust, local cultural norms and power 
structures, and negative effects of extreme religious leaders) within communities 
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(Andrews, 2014; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Kantor, 2005; 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
 
In terms of responding to beneficiaries, providing them with information in a 
meaningful manner is also challenging and time-consuming to achieve in practice 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Assad & Goddard, 2010; Dombrowski, 2010; Ebrahim, 
2005; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Therefore, identifying 
what information is important for them, to avoid over-provision (which may be 
costly), or under-provision (resulting in lack of communication), is important 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Dixon et al. (2006) found that NGO staff may 
consider what (and what not) to communicate with beneficiaries in order to secure 
their job and maintain good relationships with beneficiaries. Further, beneficiaries’ 
need for information is different from the demands of donors and external 
stakeholders as they have different purposes and levels of power in their relationship 
with NGOs. Researchers (Dixon et al., 2006; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & 
Jegers, 2014) indicate that accountability to beneficiaries is often informal, 
unspoken, or unrecorded with few formal rules. Another factor (as outlined 
previously) is that downward accountability to beneficiaries is also strongly affected 
by organisational culture and structures (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011). 
 
The above views indicate a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability 
encompasses a broad range of mechanisms, which can be classified into tool and 
processes. Processes involve three levels of participation: consulting, partnership, and 
delegated control (ranging from weak to strong). Tools (incorporated from various 
research) involve: disclosure statements, methods to facilitate feedback, response to 
feedback, social audit, and self-regulation. The involvement of beneficiaries in these 
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mechanisms can range from very informal to formal levels, depending on the 
arrangements NGOs have with beneficiaries (e.g. frequency, type, breadth, depth, and 
extent of topics discussed) (Kilby, 2006). 
 
A participatory approach (presented above) provides an alternative framework for NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries, which has not been examined in practice. Thus, the actual 
benefits and barriers of this framework are unknown. As mentioned previously, the 
implementation and monitoring of this approach are often strongly affected by 
organisations’ goals towards beneficiaries and managers’ perceptions of beneficiary 
salience. Accordingly, the fourth research question to be addressed is: 
RQ4: What mechanisms do NGOs use to facilitate a participatory approach for 
their accountability to beneficiaries in MED, and what are the barriers to these 
mechanisms? 
 
Figure 3.2 summarises the proposed framework of a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability. Importantly, it details both the mechanisms and barriers 
relating to beneficiaries and NGOs, and will be used as a guide for the investigation 
of NGOs’ operations within this study. 
Figure 3.2 Proposed framework of a participatory approach 
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3.4.5 Accountability to beneficiaries and outcomes of NGOs  
The literature indicates that the effectiveness of accountability shapes organisations’ 
performance and achievements (Costa et al., 2011; Erdogan, Sparrowe, Liden, & 
Dunegan, 2004). Accountability requirements affect managers’ behaviours towards 
intended performance outcomes. When managers feel responsible for effectiveness, they 
will focus on performance expectations and efficiency (Erdogan et al., 2004). However, 
accountability can function as a challenge boosting performance, or a threat lowering 
performance through self-protective behaviours (Dombrowski, 2010; Schlenker & 
Weigold, 1989).  
 
In an NGO context, effectiveness is strongly related to organisational responsiveness and 
involves multiple dimensions, which cannot be assessed with a single indicator (Herman 
& Renz, 2008). The effectiveness must involve not only economic or quantitative 
indicators (e.g. surplus, growth, revenues, number of the poor people reached), but also 
responsiveness to judgements on effectiveness or engagement with different stakeholder 
groups (Benjamin, 2013; Herman & Renz, 2008). It is crucial for an organisation’s 
managers to understand primary stakeholders’ expectations and work towards 
responding to and meeting these expectations (Costa et al., 2011; Herman & Renz, 
2008). Designing projects without consulting with local partners and beneficiaries is like 
tailoring a dress for someone without knowing their height, size, taste, and culture 
(Rahmani, 2012). As such, promoting tailored accountability mechanisms that can 
establish rights for beneficiaries and their involvement within NGOs’ operations is 
essential for effective NGO program outcomes (Benjamin, 2013; Kilby, 2006). 
 
Effectiveness within development NGOs’ programs is often depicted as sustainable 
poverty alleviation (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Herman & Renz, 2008). This 
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objective can involve improving NGO performance through organisational learning 
(Ebrahim, 2009). Further, when NGOs focus on accountability for broader social 
outcomes and impacts on beneficiaries, they are better able to promote effectiveness 
of their poverty alleviation programs (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007).   
 
While outcome measurements are less likely to be an effective mechanism for 
strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries (Benjamin, 2013; Ebrahim & 
Rangan, 2014), there is limited research on NGOs’ and beneficiaries’ views of 
effective NGO program outcomes, and the contribution of a participatory approach 
to beneficiary accountability to such outcomes. As such, the final research question 
to be examined is: 
RQ5: How does a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability contribute 
to outcomes of NGOs’ MED programs? 
 
Figure 3.3 summarises the theoretical framework of this study in relation to the five 
research questions. 
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Figure 3.3 Theoretical framework and research questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In summary, a review of legitimacy and stakeholder theories and literature on 
accountability mechanisms indicates relationships between approaches to gaining 
legitimacy, stakeholder management, approaches to accountability to beneficiaries, 
and outcomes of NGOs’ programs. While forms of NGO legitimacy are viewed 
differently, the literature is limited in terms of investigating NGOs’ various 
approaches to gaining legitimacy (i.e. conformity, selection, and persuasion), rather 
than solely conforming to the sectoral requirements. Further, the literature is also 
limited in providing an understanding of how approaches to gaining legitimacy 
impact NGO managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience and goals towards 
beneficiaries, which ultimately affects NGOs’ approaches to enhancing 
RQ4 
RQ5 
RQ4 
RQ1 
Outcomes of 
MED NGOs’ 
programs 
Mechanisms 
 
  
 
MED NGO 
managers’ 
goals towards 
beneficiaries 
 
MED NGO 
managers’ 
perceptions of 
beneficiary 
salience 
RQ2 RQ2 
RQ3 RQ3 
MED NGOs’ 
approaches to 
gaining 
legitimacy 
 
 Institutional 
 Strategic 
 
Participatory 
approach to 
accountability to 
beneficiaries 
Process 
 Consulting 
 Partnership 
 Delegated 
control 
Tools 
 Disclosure 
 Feedback  
 Response 
 Social audit 
 Self-
regulation 
NGO-related 
 Cost 
 Time 
 Demand 
conflicts 
between 
stakeholders 
 Organisational 
culture and 
structure 
Barriers 
 
  
 
Beneficiary-
related 
 Perceived 
weak 
negotiating 
position 
 Low skill 
 Illiteracy 
 Culture 
 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
Page 84 
 
accountability to beneficiaries. While research indicates the importance of NGOs 
being accountable to beneficiaries through a participatory approach, there is a lack of 
understanding regarding the specific mechanisms for this approach. By addressing 
the five research questions in a MED NGO context, this study will address 
legitimacy approaches, stakeholder management, accountability to beneficiaries, and 
program outcomes to understand factors affecting MED NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries. This study will also identify mechanisms for and barriers to a 
participatory approach, to strengthen NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries, and 
consider how these mechanisms contribute to NGOs’ program outcomes. The next 
chapter discusses the research design and methods used to examine the research 
questions. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters set out the scope and purpose of the research. This chapter 
describes the research design used to address the research questions detailed in 
Section 1.3. The literature review highlighted that knowledge about the nature of 
NGO accountability to beneficiaries and mechanisms for strengthening such 
accountability is limited. Therefore, this study incorporates a research design to 
explore these issues. This chapter is organised into seven sections: Section 4.2 
outlines the methodology used to address the research questions; Section 4.3 details 
the interviewees, the characteristics and size of the sample, and how it was selected; 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 provide details of the data collection and data analysis 
processes. The final sections of this chapter outline ethical considerations involved in 
this research (Section 4.6), validity and reliability issues (Section 4.7), and reflect on 
the limitations of the research method (Section 4.8). 
 
4.2 METHODOLOGY  
This section outlines the background to this study against which the research method 
was designed to effectively address the research questions. 
 
4.2.1 Research background 
The literature review indicates that while NGO accountability to beneficiaries is the 
least developed NGO accountability dimension in practice, research investigating 
what factors underpin this phenomenon is scant. While the mechanisms detailed in 
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the literature are mainly used to account to definitive stakeholders (e.g. donors), 
information regarding what mechanisms strengthen NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries is limited. Further, cultural contexts may shape different strategies for 
stakeholder management, affecting NGO accountability to beneficiaries in different 
countries (Boesso & Kumar, 2009). Given limited knowledge about this  
phenomenon is available, this study involves an exploratory process including both 
descriptive and explanatory stages (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001). The 
descriptive stage addresses those questions of “what” and will help to identify factors 
affecting and mechanisms for NGO accountability to beneficiaries. The explanatory 
stage investigates questions of “how” (Punch, 2006), explaining in what way those 
factors and mechanisms affect NGO accountability to beneficiaries and project 
outcomes.  
 
Using an exploratory process, this study was undertaken on the basis that “reality 
exists only in the context of mental framework” (Guba, 1990, p. 25). Therefore, 
realities are multiple; they exist in people’s minds and are constructed based on 
individuals’ social experiences (Creswell, 2009; Guba, 1990). Further, “social 
phenomena do not exist independently of people’s understandings of them, and that 
those understandings play a crucial generative role” (Hammersley, 2007, p. 297). 
Adopting social constructivist ontology, an epistemology that allows the researcher 
to interact with and interpret people’s social construction is important (Brower, 
Abolafia, & Carr, 2000; Guba, 1990). Interaction and interpretation allow the 
researcher to adopt an interpretivist approach uncovering the realities constructed 
and held by participants, within the local and specific contexts that have given them 
meaning (Guba, 1990; Liamputtong, 2009). Within the above ontology and 
epistemology, a qualitative research method allowing the researcher to interact with 
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participants is important (Cavana et al., 2001; Punch, 2006). As such, this study 
adopted a qualitative method, involved semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
NGO senior executives and a small sample of their beneficiaries in two countries 
where MED programs operate with varying success: Bangladesh and Indonesia. In 
addition, observation during the interview process and documentary analysis of 
publicly available data relating to the participating NGOs were also involved. The 
details of the research method are discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.2 Research methods 
As a first step, this study involved a review of publicly available data related to 
NGOs’ activities in general and activities in Bangladesh and Indonesia specifically. 
However, publicly available documents are often formal, designed to create a 
positive impression to the public, yet lacking detail and often not deliberately 
produced for research purposes (Payne & Payne, 2004). Such documents are often 
perceived as lacking credibility, representativeness and meaning, and their role in 
research is mainly to verify findings from other sources (such as interviews) (Payne 
& Payne, 2004). This issue is substantial in the NGO sector, where public reporting 
through websites remains limited (Dumont, 2013; Ebrahim, 2005). Therefore, for 
this study, reviewing publicly available documents mainly served to provide useful 
background information about NGOs’ activities, help identify which NGOs engaged 
in MED13, and to verify data collected from interviews. As such, documents (e.g. 
annual reports, project implementation, evaluations and assessment reports, and other 
related documents available from individual NGO websites) of those NGOs 
                                                     
 
13
 Details of how these NGOs were identified are presented in Section 4.3 – The sample selection. 
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engaging in MED were reviewed. This background information (together with 
knowledge gained from the literature review) was used to design the interview 
protocol. This process, as suggested by Qu and Dumay (2011), helped the researcher 
gain expertise and knowledge regarding the interview topics, and assisted in planning 
and preparing for the interviews. Thus, the researcher was able to understand, 
anticipate, and ask informed questions during the interviews; aiding the flow of the 
conversations and encouraging open and engaging responses from the interviewees, 
resulting in rich data.  
 
As a second step, in-depth interviews were undertaken. In-depth interviews are 
valuable for exploratory research topics where the researcher has little advance 
understanding (Cavana et al., 2001; Punch, 2006). Further, in order to learn how 
people see their world, researchers need to talk to them (Kvale, 2007, cited in 
Liamputtong, 2009). In-depth interviews with a semi-structured format provide 
researchers with opportunities to learn more about participants’ experiences and the 
world in which they live (Liamputtong, 2009; Qu & Dumray, 2011). This is an active 
asking and listening process between the researcher and participant. Therefore, the 
information obtained is particular to the individuals involved, and elicits rich data on 
the topic being investigated (Qu & Dumay, 2011; Wilkinson, Joffe, & Yardley, 
2004). These features of interviews are valuable for obtaining a depth of 
understanding and an inside perspective of participants (Taylor, 2005), allowing the 
researcher to clarify unclear information immediately during the interview (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2011). Ultimately, this method permits the researcher to investigate 
information that cannot be obtained from other sources (Taylor, 2005). The selected 
sample involved MED NGOs (57 in Bangladesh and 31 in Indonesia). Executives of 
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these NGOs were invited to participate in an interview with the researcher. In-depth 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with those executives that agreed to 
participate in the research (22 interviews: 13 in Bangladesh and nine in Indonesia), at 
NGOs’ offices in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Further, with NGOs’ assistance and 
introduction, a small number of beneficiaries who were able to provide feedback on 
NGOs’ MED projects were invited to participate in an interview. Conducting 
interviews with NGOs’ beneficiaries helped gain an understanding of beneficiaries’ 
perceptions of the NGOs’ projects (details of the sample and interview process are 
presented in Sections 4.3 and 4.5).  
 
In addition, observations during the fieldwork provided data supplementing 
documentary analysis and interviews. These observations involved the social and 
economic contexts where NGOs operated and beneficiaries lived (e.g.infrustructure, 
living conditions, community life), and interactions between the researcher and 
interviewees during the interview process. Observation during the interview process 
is important as the researcher holds an active role within the social context being 
studied, not only through questioning and listening, but also watching. Participants 
(e.g. interviewees) may be unaware of certain aspects of their behaviors, and factors 
impacting these behaviors or responses (Ballinger, Yardley, & Payne, 2004). 
Through observation, the researcher is able to understand participants’ surroundings 
and context. Thus, it is a valuable complementary technique for the interview method 
(Ballinger et al., 2004; Guthrie, 2010). These observations helped to better 
understand interviewees’ stories in context, giving them meaning through 
circumstance and providing rich and in-depth understanding (Alvesson, 2003; 
Fetterman, 1998). This data source thus supports the data analysis process (Alvesson, 
2003; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Payne & Payne, 2004).  
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By using three different data sources and mixed methods, this study was designed to 
generate triangulation of data, thus increasing reliability of the data collected. Further 
details of this process are presented in Data Analysis (Section 4.6).  
 
4.3 THE SAMPLE SELECTION 
As highlighted in Section 2.2 and Figure 2.1, this study focuses on MED NGOs 
operating in Bangladesh and Indonesia. The MED NGO sample selection process is 
summarised in Figure 4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1 MED NGO sample selection process 
 
The latest directory of NGOs operating in each country is listed on the website of 
Directory of Development Organisations (2011)14. Local and international NGOs 
focusing on microfinance and microenterprise development were identified in this 
directory. Based on this list, the most recent annual report available and other 
publicly available documents of these NGOs were reviewed briefly to gain an 
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 This was the most recent directory at the time of data collection 
Directory of development organisations operating in 
Bangladesh and Indonesia (edition 2011) 
Selected 57 and 31 NGOs in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia respectively (NGOs providing publicly 
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(13 in Bangladesh and 
nine in Indonesia) 
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understanding of their operations and to confirm whether or not they engaged in 
MED. Those NGOs which indicated they engaged in MED became the sample 
frame. Adopting a purposive sampling approach, all NGOs engaging in MED (that 
provided publicly available data in English on their websites), and had offices in the 
capital of Dhaka (Bangladesh) or Jakarta (Indonesia) were invited to participate15. 
There were 57 such organisations operating in Bangladesh and 31 in Indonesia as at 
2011. NGOs’ contact details were obtained either from the directory or from their 
websites. Interview invitations were sent through e-mail to a senior executive in each 
of these MED NGOs. Senior executives of 27 NGOs (13 in Bangladesh and 14 in 
Indonesia, including local and international NGOs) accepted the invitations. 
Unfortunately, prior to conducting the interviews, five NGOs in Indonesia could not 
proceed as scheduled due to work conflicts (two), changed operations (two) or 
closure (one). As a result, the number of interviews conducted with NGOs was 22 
(13 in Bangladesh and nine in Indonesia), representing response rates of 23 and 29 
per cent in Bangladesh and Indonesia respectively. This sample size was sufficiently 
large to allow the researcher to obtain a depth and breadth of understanding 
regarding the range of activities for MED, barriers, and accountability mechanisms. 
The senior executives (who participated in the interviews) were project managers, 
senior advisers, directors or staff nominated by directors, and were able to provide 
detailed information about the NGOs’ focus and activities. Gilchrist (1992) indicates 
that interviews conducted with key informants of organisations provide valuable 
insights as they have specialised knowledge, status and communication skills which 
                                                     
 
15
 This was because the majority of NGOs had offices in these cities. Having all interviews in one 
place helped the researcher to manage costs and time, while still maintaining a sufficient sample size 
and a rich variety of MED NGOs. 
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researchers cannot access from other sources. Subsequent contact was then made by 
e-mail or phone to confirm NGO executives’ participation, discuss detailed 
information about the interview, and confirm interview arrangements.  
 
Notably, during the interview process, one NGO was found to be operating as a 
donor (‘donor NGO’) providing funds to the Indonesian Government (which then 
funded MED NGO projects). Data collected from this NGO was treated as donor 
NGO data, providing donor perspectives on MED NGOs’ support. Further, data from 
one interview with an NGO operating in Bangladesh was removed from the dataset 
as it became apparent during the interview that the NGO did not focus on MED 
(however this was not consistent with the details on their website). Of the 20 
interviews conducted with MED NGOs, seven interviews were conducted with more 
than one executive at the request of the NGOs. In total, the interviews with NGOs 
involved 34 executives (23 in Bangladesh, 11 in Indonesia).  
 
While the primary focus of the research was examining accountability mechanisms 
from an NGO operational perspective, with the contacts and support of four 
participating NGOs (two in Bangladesh, two in Indonesia), 10 interviews (six in 
Bangladesh and four in Indonesia) were also conducted with NGO beneficiaries. 
These interviews involved a small sample of individuals and groups of beneficiaries, 
and provided a valuable grassroots perspective of MED programs. A summary of the 
interview participants is detailed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of interview participants 
MED NGOs Number of 
executives 
interviewed 
Beneficiaries 
No. Local Int’l16 
Number of 
interviews 
Number of beneficiaries 
interviewed 
Bangladesh 
1   1 3 3 (2 groupsa, 1 individual) 
2   2   
3   1   
4   5 3 3 (individuals) 
5   1   
6   1   
7   5   
8   1   
9   1   
10   1   
11   2   
12   2   
∑ 6 6 23 6 6 
Indonesia 
1   2   
2   1   
3  
 
3 
2 3 (a group of 2, 1 
individual) 
4   1   
5   1   
6   1   
7   1 2 2 (individuals) 
8   1   
∑ 2 6 11 4 5 
Total 
20 8 12 34 10 11 
a
 While these groups each involved approximately 15-20 people, 1 beneficiary in each group 
predominantly spoke on behalf of the group. 
 
Before conducting interviews, the interview protocols were designed (separately for 
NGOs and beneficiaries), which is considered in the next section. 
 
4.4 PREPARING THE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
The data collected from publicly available sources together with knowledge gained 
from the literature review was used to design the interview protocols. The interview 
protocols were then used as a guide for conducting the interviews (refer Appendixes 
                                                     
 
16
 International 
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1a,b). According to Guthrie (2010), interview guides often have standard 
introductions and conclusions, yet the order of other questions is flexible and 
questions are often open-ended, allowing flexibility to gain a better understanding of 
respondents’ views in a natural flow of discussion. Further, as is the nature of semi-
structured interviews, questions were added to clarify details, probe, or gain a deeper 
understanding of the data retrieved and provided; or otherwise omitted if they were 
not relevant to the NGOs investigated. 
 
Regarding the protocol for conducting interviews with NGOs, the interview 
questions were organised into five main sections to address each of the research 
questions. The first section focused on the background to NGOs’ support of MED 
programs. The second section related to funding sources of participating NGOs, 
addressing the first two research questions. The third section addressed the third 
research question, focusing on stakeholder management strategies of MED NGOs. 
The last two sections addressed the final two research questions, focusing on 
accountability mechanisms for beneficiaries and how these mechanisms contribute to 
outcomes of MED NGOs’ programs. The protocol for conducting interviews with 
beneficiaries was largely consistent with the above protocol17 to gain an 
understanding of beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGOs’ operations and accountability 
mechanisms mentioned by NGOs, providing opportunities for comparison and 
verification. Appendix 2 provides details of the association between the research 
questions and interview questions.  
                                                     
 
17
 but excluded the second section relating to NGOs’ fundraising approaches 
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4.5 DATA COLLECTION 
As mentioned above, data was collected from publicly available sources and in-depth 
interviews. This section outlines how this data was collected from these sources.  
 
4.5.1 Collecting data from publicly available sources 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, this study initially involved data collected from 
publicly available sources. Publicly available annual reports were reviewed in early 
2013, but this review process was limited by the availability and timeliness of the 
data, as these reports were either not provided on some NGOs’ websites (one NGO 
in each country), had little detail (most NGOs), or were quite dated (e.g. 2010 for one 
NGO in Bangladesh). For most NGOs investigated, performance measurement or 
results of projects/programs were often provided briefly in annual reports or project 
summaries, and strongly focused on quantitative performance indicators (e.g. amount 
of money spent, number of people reached). The document review process, while 
generating very limited data for addressing the research questions, provided useful 
background information prior to the interviews and a framework for initial themes, 
for further analysis. Documents reviewed from the NGOs’ websites are summarised 
in Table 4.2 below.   
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Table 4.2 Publicly available documents reviewed 
No. Website information Latest annual 
reports 
Performance 
measures/ 
results or 
project 
reports 
News or 
success 
stories 
Type 
of 
NGO 
Website 
level 
(National 
or Int’l)18 
Mission 
and goals 
statement, 
and 
history 
Approaches 
and 
programs 
Bangladesh 
1 Int’l National    International 
report (2013), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Bangladesh 
A separate 
report in 2010 
 
2 Int’l Int’l   International 
report (2012), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Bangladesh 
Annual report Not 
available 
3 Local National   2010 Annual report  
4 Local National   2014 Annual report  
5 Local National   Not available Project 
summary 
 
6 Local National   2014 Project 
summary 
 
7 Local National   2013 Annual report  
8 Int’l National   International 
report (2012), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Bangladesh 
Project 
summary 
 
9 Int’l Int’l   Asia report 
(2014), including 
Bangladesh 
Annual report  
10 Int’l National   International 
report (2014), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Bangladesh 
Annual report 
and project 
summary 
 
11 Local National   2011 Annual report  
12 Int’l Int’l   International 
report (2014), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Bangladesh 
Not available  
 
 
 
                                                     
 
18
 Some international NGOs may or may not have a separate website for their operations in each 
country. “National” means NGOs had websites for their operations in the country of interest (e.g. 
Bangladesh or Indonesia), while “Int’l” means they only had websites at the international level and 
subsequently described their operations at the national level (where indicated). 
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No. Website information Latest annual 
reports 
Performance 
measures/ 
results or 
project 
reports 
News or 
success 
stories 
Type 
of 
NGO 
Website 
level 
(National 
or Int’l) 
Mission 
and goals 
statement, 
and 
history 
Approaches 
and 
programs 
Indonesia 
1 Int’l National    2011 Annual report  
2 Int’l Int’l   International 
report (2013), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Indonesia 
Annual report Not 
available 
3 Local National   Not available in 
English 
Not available 
in English 
Not 
available 
in 
English 
4 Int’l Int’l   2013 Not available  
5 Int’l Int’l   International 
report (2013), 
briefly mentioned 
operations in 
Indonesia 
Annual report  
6 Int’l National   2011 Annual report  
7 Int’l National   2013 Annual report  
8 Local National   2012 Annual report  
 
4.5.2 Conducting in-depth interviews 
All interviews were conducted in late 2013. Interviews with NGOs were conducted 
in the cities of Dhaka, Bangladesh and Jakarta, Indonesia, where the NGOs’ offices 
were located. Interviews with beneficiaries were conducted in rural areas (up to 100 
kilometres from the main cities of Dhaka and Jakarta, where the NGOs’ projects 
were based. Interview sites, both metropolitan and rural, provided the researcher with 
the opportunity to observe differences in the social and economic conditions of both 
countries (e.g. infrastructure, living conditions). Inquiry during interviews focused on 
NGOs’ current operations. However, responses from interviewees involved 
experience and knowledge based on the NGO’s current and recent past projects, 
providing rich data on MED programs and development within NGOs. 
 
All interviews were conducted by the researcher in English. While interviews with 
NGO senior executives ranged from one and a half hours to three hours each, 
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interviews with beneficiaries ranged from 30 minutes to an hour. Notably, all NGO 
senior executives spoke English, however interviews with beneficiaries were 
arranged with the support of the relevant NGO staff and a local interpreter 
(independent of the NGOs)19. Following Bryman’s (2008) suggestion, all interviews 
were conducted in a quiet or private location convenient for interviewees, enabling 
quality recordings where participants felt comfortable to talk freely (Bryman, 2008). 
Further, as the interviewee’s perspective and the interviewer’s personal style can 
create a unique environment for each interview (Qu & Dumay, 2011; Wilkinson et 
al., 2004), the researcher adopted various techniques to facilitate effective 
discussions that encouraged interviewees to respond openly and share their views 
and experience. For example, this included sitting on the floor for beneficiary 
interviewees, respecting their culture, sharing in or listening to their personal stories, 
and never interrupting or judging their responses or perspectives.  
 
Regarding the interview procedure, Foddy (1993) recommends that interviews 
should be conducted by following the TAP procedure. T represents Topic which is 
provided to respondents in advance so that they know what is being talked about. A 
represents Applicability, meaning that questions are asked only if they are applicable 
to the respondents. P represents Perspective, meaning that questions are adapted to 
respondents’ perspectives in order to obtain insightful answers. Following these 
recommendations, before conducting the interviews, the topic of the research and 
purpose of the interview were outlined to each participant. Before asking open-ended 
questions, yes/no questions were asked to ensure participants had relevant 
                                                     
 
19
 A student from a local university 
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information to provide. Each participant had a different story, so the researcher 
adapted to these differences by asking questions that flowed from and engaged with 
participants’ stories or perspectives (rather than based strictly on the interview 
protocol), yet still making sure all topics that needed to be investigated were 
addressed. Essentially, the researcher covered the same issues with all respondents 
while following the natural flow of the discussion.   
 
All interviews were audio recorded (with permission), and subsequently transcribed. 
Kvale (2007, cited in Liamputthong 2009) recommends that researchers should 
transcribe recordings themselves as the process helps them learn and reflect on their 
interview style, and also helps them to remember what happened during the 
interviews. In addition, by transcribing recordings, researchers become more familiar 
with the interview data, thereby assisting with data analysis. Taking into account this 
recommendation, and time constraints, the researcher transcribed approximately six 
interview recordings with NGO executives. The remaining interview recordings were 
transcribed by external transcribers. These transcripts were reviewed and compared 
by verifying with the audio records and fieldwork notes. Senior executives were 
given the opportunity to review their interview transcript prior to formal data 
analysis, and 12 NGOs (seven Bangladesh and five in Indonesia) chose to do so20. 
Interview transcripts for the 21 NGO and 10 beneficiary interviews generated some 
600 and 70 pages of data respectively. All transcripts were then uploaded to the 
qualitative analysis software program Nvivo for data analysis (considered further in 
                                                     
 
20
 Transcripts of interviews with beneficiaries were prepared by independent interpreters, but were not 
returned to beneficiaries due to pragmatic reasons (difficult to contact via e-mail, illiteracy). 
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Section 4.6). While individual and organisational participants remain anonymous for 
the purpose of this study, the profiles of the MED NGOs participating in this study 
are summarised in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3 Profiles of participating MED NGOs 
MED NGOs 
Mission and goals in poverty alleviation Operations  
No. Local Int’l 
Bangladesh 
1  
 Focusing on helping target participants living in rural areas 
become self-reliant through projects for economic 
development, health, education, and disaster management 
 Operating for over 
40 years 
 > 100 employees 
2  
 Focusing on sustainable economic development through 
working with the private sector, providing the poor with 
economic opportunities, and thus increasing food security 
and earning power 
Operating for over 10 
years 
3 
 
 
Including disadvantaged people in mainstream development 
so that they can obtain equal opportunities and full 
participation 
> 100 employees  
 
4 
 
 
Building capacity for the poor and providing them with 
access to public and private services through education, 
livelihood, health & social justice 
 Operating for over 
50 years  
 > 1,000 employees 
5 
 
 
Achieving sustainable poverty alleviation for the poor and 
excluded people, socially, culturally, politically, financially 
and environmentally  
Operating for over 20 
years 
6 
 
 
Empowering the poor towards socio-economic 
empowerment with the specific target of children, gender, 
environment and climate change needs 
 Operating for over 
30 years  
 > 500 employees 
7 
 
 
Providing support and facilitating a process to encourage 
social acceptance, empowerment and independence of 
disadvantage people so that they can become independent 
and live their life with dignity. 
Operating for over 20 
years 
8  
 Focusing on increasing people's income and employment 
opportunities in specific productive sectors, as well as 
improving their access to basic services including water, 
sanitation and hygiene, and renewable energy 
Operating for less than 
5 years 
9  
 Facilitating sustainable solutions for poverty alleviation 
through long-term cooperation with local players and 
working with a diverse range of public and private partners 
Operating for more 
than 10 years 
10  
 Strengthening young farmers’ groups, particularly young 
women farmers and their communities through facilitating 
linkages with market actors, such that they can increase 
family nutrition and create income generating opportunities 
Operating for over 40 
years 
11 
 
 
Enhancing socio-economic empowerment and livelihood 
security for poor and marginalised people through 
sustainable livelihood development involving people’s 
participation at all levels of the state and society 
 Operating for over 
20 years  
 > 1,000 employees 
12 
 
 
Proving various support (e.g. health, livelihood and 
education services) so that disadvantaged people can have 
the opportunity and access to live independently, and fully 
participate in social and economical mainstream activities 
Operating for less than 
5 years 
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MED NGOs 
Mission and goals in poverty alleviation Operations  
No. Local Int’l 
Indonesia 
1  
 Facilitating partnerships with those in need to achieve 
positive and sustainable change in communities by building 
networks, capacity, and skills at all levels 
Operating for over 20 
years 
2  
 Increasing income for poor people through developing 
agricultural commodity value chains and involving private 
sector agribusinesses  
Operating for less than 
5 years 
3  
 Facilitating good agriculture practices, and strengthening 
institutional equality to help farmers access better markets 
and trade through national and international networks 
Operating for less than 
10 years 
4  
 Providing sustainable social integration to children, youth 
and families out of reach of mainstream services and support 
them to move away from unsafe work and build a 
sustainable future 
Operating for less than 
10 years 
5  
 Promoting gender equality and justice, alleviating poverty 
through sustainable livelihoods, and assisting communities 
and the Government to prepare and respond to natural 
disasters 
Operating for over 50 
years 
6  
 Focusing on increasing people's income and employment 
opportunities in particular product chains through delivering 
advisory services, building networks, and sharing skills and 
knowledge 
 Operating for less 
than 5 years 
 > 20 employees 
7  
 Building prosperous communities where people can enjoy 
peace, justice and happiness, and have social and economic 
security and opportunities 
< 1,000 employees 
8   
Working closely with local communities to create conditions 
that will enable large-scale development to be balanced, 
sustainable, and equitable, which helps to strengthen local 
governance capacity and support local economic 
development 
 Operating for less 
than 20 years 
 > 20 employees 
 
4.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
Once data from in-depth interviews was collected, thematic analysis was used to 
analyse interview transcripts. Thematic analysis can be viewed as a subset or type of 
content analysis. However, content analysis is typically considered “a research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful 
matter) to the contexts of their use’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). This technique is 
often used for quantitative analysis and conducted with a large sample size and 
focuses on “a numerical description of features of a given text” and frequency of 
outcomes, which sometimes removes meaning of texts from their contexts (Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004, p.56). Meanwhile, thematic analysis pays greater attention to the 
qualitative aspects of the data analysed, and is ideal for a small sample size but 
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requires the researcher to stay true to the raw data, and its meaning within a 
particular context of thought (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). This method, while facilitating 
a systematic analysis of content, allows the researcher not only to identify frequency 
of codes, but also understand the meaning of the texts within their contexts (Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004). Themes identified from this process, in addition to observations 
from the interview process, facilitate a more nuanced understanding and 
interpretation of data (Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & Yardley, 2004; Riessman, 2008).  
 
Based on the above perspectives, for this study thematic analysis was considered 
most appropriate to address the research questions, which required the researcher to 
explore and interpret the data collected (with a relatively small sample size). This 
method involved a process of encoding qualitative data based on themes arising from 
the interviews rather than pre-determined categories of analysis. Ultimately it 
allowed the researcher to review the data systematically and communicate the data, 
findings and interpretation of meaning more effectively (Cavana et al., 2001; 
Boyatzis, 1998; Welsh, 2002). Hence, an in-depth and comprehensive understanding 
of NGOs’ support for MED in Bangladesh and Indonesia was obtained. Through a 
process of iterative analysis, increasing sensitivity in interpreting the data and a 
refined understanding of MED and the associated issues were achieved (Boyatzis, 
1998; Riessman, 2008). Furthermore, this analytical method allowed the researcher 
to gain insights into a phenomenon for which little information is available from 
public sources (Cavana et al., 2001; Punch, 2006). Nvivo was adopted to assist with 
thematic analysis, exploring and systematically managing the research materials, and 
facilitating interrogation of the data. Therefore, it helped enhance the quality, rigour, 
and trustworthiness of the findings (Welsh, 2002). 
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The thematic analysis in this research followed the four stages suggested by Boyatzis 
(1998). As a first step, the structure of the interview protocol was used to identify 
general themes or nodes in Nvivo. These themes included approaches to gaining 
legitimacy, managers’ goals and perceptions towards beneficiaries, facilitating a 
participatory approach, mechanisms for and barriers to a participatory approach, and 
implications of a participatory approach for program outcomes. This stage provided a 
basis for comparing the findings with both the literature (Berg, 2009; Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004) and publicly available data, as the interview protocol was designed in 
part from knowledge obtained from these sources. Further, this step also helped to 
check whether data was relevant, thus theoretical constructs were systematically 
evidenced in the data, which helped enhance the validity of the findings (Welsh, 
2002). This stage provided a crucial foundation to make sense of the data analysis, 
and to recognise what was important. It also provided access to discoveries and 
insights generated from the interview data through identification of sub-themes 
(Boeije, 2010; Boyatzis, 1998; Punch, 2006). 
 
In the second and third stages, themes were coded systematically for each transcript 
to maintain consistency. Codes were then developed and refined to capture the 
essence of the data (Boeije, 2010; Boyatzis, 1998; Punch, 2006). Through deductive 
and inductive analysis, themes identified prior to analysis of the interview transcripts 
were refined and new themes emerged with respect to NGOs’ practices (e.g. 
diversifying funding sources, using appropriate terms when refering to beneficiaries, 
variations in the form, scope and purpose of mechanisms used in a participatory 
approach, barriers regarding social contexts). This refining of themes ensured all data 
collected from the interviews was captured, the research questions were addressed, 
and data and findings addressing literature gaps were identified. Text from interview 
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transcripts were allocated to appropriate nodes in Nvivo and each was reviewed to 
ensure correct allocations (adjusted where necessary). This process, while helping to 
ensure the consistency of coding and confirm the final findings, eliminates errors in 
coding, thus helping to strengthen validity of data analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004). 
 
In the fourth stage, the themes were interpreted to identify the underlying meaning of 
the data. This stage allowed the researcher to interpret and construct meaning from 
the data (Boeije, 2010; Boyatzis, 1998; Punch, 2006) regarding MED projects in 
Bangladesh and Indonesia; and to theorise across all transcripts by identifying 
common thematic elements (Riessman, 2008). The number of entries in each node 
was determined to identify dominant approaches of respondents and other related 
issues.  
 
The themes identified from the analysis were also compared (and any unclear issues 
or themes were also verified) with the data collected from publicly available sources, 
and observation during the interview process. Any discrepencies from the three data 
sources were noted where relevant. Comparison and clarification of data from 
various sources and methods provided the researcher with triangulated data, 
increased certainty about the findings and minimised bias (Guba, 1990). Ultimately, 
this strategy helped to increase the reliability of the findings (Ballinger et al., 2004; 
Berg, 2009; Payne & Payne, 2004). 
 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This study was considered to be of low ethical risk as the documents analysed were 
published on the NGOs’ websites, and interviews were only conducted with 
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participants who had given informed consent. Ethics approval was received in 2013 
from the Research Ethics Unit, Office of Research at QUT, (approval number 
1300000242) prior to contacting potential participants. The ethical issues considered 
for this study relate to ensuring, first that participation was voluntary; second, that 
interview data was reported anonymously to respect the privacy and confidentiality 
of the individual and organisational respondents; and third, that analysis of and 
reporting on findings was consistent with the purpose of this study (i.e. helping 
enhance NGO accountability to beneficiaries for effective poverty alleviation 
programs). 
  
4.8 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
This research was designed in a manner intended to maximise reliability and validity. 
Researchers (Boyatzis, 1998; Smith, Atkinson, Clelland, & Veroff, 1992) comment 
that reliability of thematic analysis is established when the researcher can maintain 
consistency in judgment and avoid bias. To maintain this consistency, this research 
used the interview protocol to help guide the analysis, examining the same key issues 
in each interview transcript. The themes were coded based on the processes that 
NGOs used to deliver their support, and the themes identified for each participant 
were compared to those of the other participants to uncover the overall themes and 
structure the findings. Interviews were recorded to enable the production of accurate 
transcripts, assisting the reliability of the data. To avoid bias, the data analysis was 
guided by the process detailed in Section 4.6, and compared across data sources. 
Further, quotes from interviews are presented in the findings, allowing readers to 
form their own assessment of the analysis. Importantly, as interviews with 
beneficiaries relied on NGOs’ introduction and assistance, to increase reliability and 
reduce bias, these interviews were conducted between the researcher, the interpreter, 
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and beneficiaries (excluding NGO staff). During the interviews, observation was also 
used to evaluate whether beneficiaries seemed to freely express their views. 
Anonymity of beneficiaries was also emphasised. In addition, the reliability of the 
research findings was improved by using three data sources: the interviews, the 
archival data, and observation (enabling triangulation), as they provided “a detailed, 
systematic examination and interpretation” of the material in order to identify 
patterns, themes, and biases (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 142).  
 
Regarding validity, the literature (Riessman, 2008; Welsh, 2002) suggests that a 
consistent and logical interpretation of data will increase validity in narrative 
research. The findings of this research are presented in this way, starting from the 
common support for MED NGOs applied in implementing projects. This strategy 
aims to provide readers with a systematic presentation of the findings, linking 
findings meaningfully and coherently to provide plausible, reasoned, and convincing 
explanations. Importantly, activities and processes for implementing MED were 
investigated from the perspectives of not only NGOs, but also beneficiaries, and the 
donor NGO. These multiple perspectives helped to verify the data analysis, further 
strengthen construct validity (Yin, 2009). 
 
4.9 LIMITATIONS 
This study was designed to enhance validity and reliability by using three data 
sources (from various perspectives) and research methods which assisted in gaining 
rich insights into accountability of NGOs engaging in MED. As with any study, a 
number of limitations are relevant. Firstly, this study is limited to MED NGOs 
operating in two developing countries to address specific research questions, and 
may not necessarily be generalisable beyond these organisations or countries. As 
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indicated by various researchers (Corbin & Morse, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 
2011; Taylor, 2005), data collected from interviews is based on participants’ 
perspectives and experiences, rather than observing what they actually did. Further, 
in some cases, participants may not be comfortable or willing to share all their 
experiences on some issues, or may say things they think the researcher wants to hear 
(particularly, beneficiaries) (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Qu & Dumay, 2011). Due 
to language barriers, beneficiaries may not fully express their views, and it was at 
times difficult for the researcher to probe deeply for further information in this 
context. Lastly, respondents had different strategies in their activities for poverty 
alleviation or MED, so they provided differing accounts, and information could not 
always be verified from other sources. Despite these limitations, rich data were 
uncovered with a breadth and depth of data, findings from which are detailed in the 
next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5:  FINDINGS - Organisational 
operations of the NGOs investigated 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before presenting findings to address the research questions, it is useful to present an 
overview of the operations of the MED NGOs investigated, as background for 
understanding NGOs’ strategies for gaining legitimacy and approaches to 
accountability. Accordingly, this chapter summarises the MED NGOs’ operations in 
terms of their organisational goals and support for poverty alleviation (Section 5.2). 
How NGOs facilitate MED projects is presented in Section 5.3, followed by 
beneficiaries’ perspectives regarding NGOs’ MED projects (Section 5.4). The 
findings to address the research questions are then outlined in Chapters Six and 
Seven. As analysis revealed that data collected from interviews was largely 
consistent with data collected from other sources, but much deeper and richer, 
findings and tables presented in the three finding chapters are based on the interview 
data. Where applicable, any issues arising from or discrepancies with data collected 
from publicly available sources and observations are noted.    
 
5.2 ORGANISATIONAL GOALS AND SUPPORT 
 
5.2.1 Organisational goals 
Executives of all 20 MED NGOs indicated that the ultimate objective of their 
operations was alleviating poverty in a sustainable way through economic 
development. Within this objective, the poor were supported to engage in income 
generating activities as a way to earn extra income and accumulate wealth. By 
improving the economic situation of the poor, NGOs aimed to help the poor become 
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economically self-reliant, live with enhanced dignity and participate more in social 
and economic activities, increasing their voice in the community. These goals 
provided NGOs with a foundation for gaining organisational legitimacy.  
…our Bangladesh projects, our ultimate goal: increase income of the poor producers 
or farmers, more production, available technology for their sustainable livelihoods, 
and also…sustainable income success (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
…to make a better situation for the farmer, to make them a better welfare…so they 
can live better than before joining with us…to raise their welfare and sovereignty 
(Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
However, to achieve the above objectives, NGOs had various strategies, as detailed 
in the next sections. 
 
5.2.2 Strategies for achieving the organisational goals 
As the majority of the poor were identified as living in rural or remote areas, 18 out 
of 20 NGOs mainly implemented their projects in these areas. Only two NGOs 
worked with poor communities in urban areas (one local NGO in Bangladesh and 
one international NGO in Indonesia). There were two major forms of support 
provided by NGOs for economic development: (1) livelihood and linkages, and (2) 
value chain development. The livelihood and linkages support focused on providing 
the poor with basic needs (food, basic business skills) for short-term outputs, then 
connecting them with small traders or suppliers so that they could buy in bulk or sell 
extra quantity. Value chain development emphasised the participation of the poor in 
established product chains (e.g. cacao, coffee, potatoes) and market development, 
and often involved large private sector companies. This strategy helped to provide 
the poor with networks and resources in order to be able to continue their businesses 
for sustainable (long-term) outcomes. These forms of support, also detailed in 
NGOs’ publicly available information, are summarised in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Support for MED 
 Bangladesh  (n=12) Indonesia (n=8) Total 
(n=20) Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Livelihood and linkages 7 2 9 1 4 5 14 
2. Value chain development 0 3 3 1 2 3 6 
N.B. Categories are mutually exclusive. Appendix 3 details each NGO’s support for MED. 
 
Fourteen out of 20 NGOs (nine in Bangladesh, five in Indonesia) focused on 
livelihood and linkages for poverty alleviation. These forms of support often targeted 
the extremely poor or poor communities. The extremely poor were helped with 
grants (in the form of equipment, livestock) or credit (with very low or no interest 
rate), and training on basic skills (e.g. personal and microbusiness skills) and 
production techniques. The support helped these poor communities engage in income 
generating activities to earn extra income, achieving household stability (e.g. 
ensuring sufficient food on a day-to-day basis).  
…we started a training centre here with skill training, tailor, cloth dying with 
different experiences. And…we distributed funds to purchase sewing machines and 
blocks, tie-dye dying materials…Then they start up their own shops, they started 
running their own sewing businesses (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
…we do more on empowerment, capacity building. So we provide a lot of skills, 
training, capacity training to improve capacity of the farmers for example. [We 
provide credit and] the interest rate [of]…two or three per cent per month (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
In addition, participants also received other support related to health, education, 
nutrition, etc. By doing this, NGOs facilitated a holistic or integrated approach to 
poverty alleviation, providing the poor with basic social and economic skills and 
support to be lifted out of extreme poverty in a sustainable way.  
We call [them] integrated projects…We support them for adult literacy, health, and 
sometimes…we give them water sanitation [facilities], then microcredit, these four 
things (Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…we take this holistic approach where we try to identify the needs of our 
participants from a variety of perspectives, from economic, educational, health, 
psycho-social, addressing traumas, abuse, medical reasons and so on…And I think 
that really increases highly our chance of success of the reintegration in general and 
of the microenterprise in particular (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
At the extreme poverty level, the focus of NGOs was helping the poor to satisfy their 
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basic needs (food security) and sell any excess quantity of produce (where available) 
at local markets to earn additional income. At this level, beneficiaries were often 
required to work in groups to support each other, and work together. These efforts 
were directed to helping them accumulate savings or achieve a certain level of 
production and business knowledge to establish MEs.  
…so the village people, those who have no ability to link with subdistricts, districts, 
or national markets. They’re just selling at the village level, and with low price [but] 
somehow they’re happy with this (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
For extremely poor people, NGOs emphasised that providing credit at the first stage 
was avoided because it may worsen their situation when they lacked technical skills, 
business skills, information and networks needed to build an effective business.  
We believe if we provide money to them [extreme poor] without safety net 
programs21, then the ultra-poor people will not be able to run his business with the 
borrowed money. Because his stomach is empty, it’s not the time…So, first, [he/she] 
needs the safety net programs, once he or she has got the energy, in that stage we’re 
providing them funds [with interest cost] (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
…for the initial start-up of the business, we haven’t found that [credit is] going to 
help them. We usually take families at the stage that they are so vulnerable in a way 
that giving them an extra debt to deal with is really not something that’s going to 
increase the chances of success (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
When the poor people achieved food security and produced extra quantity, NGOs 
subsequently helped MEs sell the extra quantity through market linkages with small 
local buyers and sellers. These partnerships helped the MEs access resources and 
markets.  
…we’re also linking them [participants] with input actors [suppliers]…from where 
they can get the supply, and services…say veterinary, poultry, pigs, vendors for the 
poultry feed, buy bulk size (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
We help them to choose or find traders who can buy their products. They don’t have 
                                                     
 
21
 These programs were typically provided by the government, such that the extremely poor may 
receive monthly support for basic needs (e.g. rice). 
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access for that because they lack technology, internet, information, they don’t know. 
They have raw material but they don’t have capacity to sell their products (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
 
When capacity was built and networks were formed for the poor, NGOs adopted 
different strategies to helping them out of poverty in a sustainable way. For eight 
NGOs (four in Bangladesh and four in Indonesia), they helped working groups 
develop into federations (in Bangladesh) or co-operatives (in Indonesia). Federations 
were involved in a wide range of social and economic activities and typically did not 
receive government support. Meanwhile, co-operatives were a collective of MEs 
mainly for economic purposes, and often received government support. Initially, in 
order to develop into federations or co-operatives, working groups received funds 
from NGOs as grants or credit. In the case of credit, group members paid interest at 
very low rates to groups. The groups then kept the interest and returned the principal 
to the NGOs. In this way, credit was made available and provided to group members 
by federations or co-operatives, together with organising other activities (e.g. 
production, marketing, sales). By participating in federations or co-operatives, MEs 
were able to access bigger markets and receive financial and non-financial support. 
We help them create a board for the federation, the federation [are] people 
representatives from different groups and they are running their own business…And 
from the beginning, from the 25 women groups, they selected a group chairman, 
cashier, treasurer and also two representatives, board members. They have a 
committee that these ladies22 they can run, that can guide them for future 
sustainability (Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
We develop them [co-operatives] from small groups, microfinance groups…we 
provide the initial fund, and then it’s for them to use up…they pay interest to the 
groups, not to our organisation…they can have [rules] of economic, leadership, 
markets, accessing fund, accessing markets, and then they can sell (Senior Executive 
NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Notably, federations in Bangladesh were often small in size and did not have 
                                                     
 
22
 Most beneficiaries of the NGOs investigated were poor women  
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membership fees. In contrast, co-operatives in Indonesia were typically larger in size 
(e.g. 150 members or more) and members had to pay monthly fees typically used to 
fund the co-operatives’ activities.  
…our co-operatives in Jakarta: 150 is our members, 400 is non-members. Members 
have [to pay] monthly [fees] aside from other voluntary contributions and savings 
(Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Rather than facilitating federations or co-operatives, for MEs having capacity to 
work in value chain development, NGOs selected potential product chains within 
local communities, and then connected producers (MEs) with the private sector.  
…we work with some [input] companies to promote their products [within the 
potential chains]…we selected the companies based on their quality, market share 
and all that. Price is also an issue just to make sure that it is affordable by the 
farmers. We also work with some of the local traders to link them to the farmers 
(Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…we usually look into specific sectors, specific value chains, because then it enables 
us to be much more focused. So when we do that, we also are identifying partners, 
these are private sector firms who have relationships already with farmers, or 
small/micro-entrepreneurs. And so our role is to help facilitate those relationships, to 
make sure they’re beneficial and ‘win-win’ and also sustainable (Senior Executive 
NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Through this partnership arrangement, MEs were provided with opportunities to 
expand their businesses through higher skill development and technical support 
facilitated by NGOs.  
…we train [farmers] about these [techniques], how they will use [them to gain] 
optimal benefits (Senior Executive NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…we help them with the quality of products, how they produce good quality of 
products, how they can comply with the market requirements such as certification, 
quality, or continuity (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
At this stage, for NGOs that did not provide credit, they connected MEs with 
microfinance institutions. 
…we are looking into whether we could introduce, or work with certain banks to 
provide credit facility, loan facility, insurance facility (Senior Executive NGO 9-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…[we are helping] them get access to financial services. So for instance, we’ve 
brought the local credit union into these communities and helped them provide 
training for villagers on how the credit union works, how to join the credit union, 
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how to save money, how to manage the household finances better (Senior Executive 
NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Value chain development was considered important to provide effective long-term 
solutions by facilitating market access for MEs and developing long-term 
commercial relationships. As such, four NGOs (one in Bangladesh, three in 
Indonesia) adopting a livelihood strategy emphasised that value chain development 
would be their future focus. 
…we understand that it [livelihood support] is not enough, because what we do 
mostly go to the production base. But when we think about economic development, 
production aspect is not enough. They need to ensure that they reach the markets, 
their product goes to the markets, and then there are buyers for that, so they will 
raise income. That’s a complete economic development intervention in our terms, so 
that’s why we change the intervention or [strategies]. Now, we think the same with 
other institutions, we’re now starting thinking about value chain development 
(Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
In summary, the findings showed various step-based support for poverty alleviation. 
Commonly, the poor people were helped to gain household stability through food 
security before forming federations, or co-operatives, or partnering with the private 
sector through linkages or value chain development to ensure ongoing development 
of MEs. The support gradually lifted the poor out of poverty through capacity 
building and the involvement of other actors (e.g. private sector companies)23. 
Ultimately the support provided a strong foundation for MED NGOs to establish 
organisational legitimacy (pursuing sustainable poverty alleviation through economic 
development), and a basis for NGOs to gain operational legitimacy through 
facilitating effective MED projects.   
 
                                                     
 
23
 While these companies were operating locally, they included both locally owned businesses and 
international corporations 
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5.3 FACILITATING MED PROJECTS 
As NGOs engaged in various step-based support for MED, they targeted different 
groups of poor people and required them to satisfy certain criterion in order to be 
able to participate in MED projects, revealing a selection strategy for working with 
beneficiaries.  
 
5.3.1 Conditions to participate 
As noted previously, MED NGOs had a strong focus on helping poor people engage 
in MED. However, in order for individuals to participate, the NGOs had certain pre-
requisites or conditions. These conditions played an essential role in facilitating 
effective participation of the poor. Table 5.2 summarises these conditions based on 
findings from interviews. 
Table 5.2 Conditions to participate in NGOs’ projects 
 Bangladesh Indonesia 
Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Ability to work 5 4 9 2 6 8 17 
2. Access to land (owned or leased), 
savings, or materials 
2 5 7 2 2 4 11 
3. Interest in doing businesses 4 2 6 0 3 3 9 
4. Strong commitment 3 1 4 1 2 3 7 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one condition or requirement. 
The majority of NGOs indicated that their project participants must have the ability 
to work or an interest in generating extra income24. In addition, participants engaging 
in agricultural activities (farming, stock rearing, etc.) were required to have a small 
piece of land (or lease land from others), or savings or livestock.  
…if he/she did not do anything and did not involve with any work due to hard 
physical problem25, we did not involve with this person…sorry (Senior Executive 
NGO 12-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
                                                     
 
24
 For NGOs focusing on MED for disabled people (three local NGOs operating in Bangladesh), these 
conditions were still considered essential. 
25 Physical disability 
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If we select the agriculture products, they [must] have some land or they can [lease] 
land for cultivation (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…they [must] have capacity in terms of resources [labour, livestock, or land], and in 
terms of collaborating in a group (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 
2013).  
As such, participants must contribute something in order to be part of the NGOs’ 
projects. This strategy aimed to ensure the poor were actively engaged and 
committed. 
…if always people from outside give the grant money to the [participants], it 
sometimes may not work...families and communities [participants] also have 
obligations to contribute. For example, suppose [we are] giving 5,000 taka 
[70AUD]26, so why the community, or the family members don’t give another 2,500 
taka [35AUD]…otherwise it always be a charity (Senior Executive NGO 12-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Participants were also required to have strong commitment to participate, particularly 
attending frequent meetings or training. This requirement helped groups bond. 
Participants who did not attend were excluded from the NGOs’ projects. 
…he/she actually needs to follow our principles, that is he or she needs to come 
regularly to the group meeting and needs to save regularly (Senior Executive NGO 
11-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…at the beginning, we want to make them be socially bound, because if they do not 
have commitments to their groups, how they commit to the organisation that [they] 
establish later on (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Through these conditions, 10 NGOs (four in Bangladesh, six in Indonesia) 
emphasised that their projects did not provide any contributions to the poor 
communities in the form of charity (i.e. giving without expected returns or 
contributions from the poor).  
…we are a development fund but we are not going to give [beneficiaries] any 
money…only giving money is not the solution. We also told them many time that 
listen if I give you money now, you will have money only for this season, what 
about next season? (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
                                                     
 
26
 Based on the exchange rate 1 AUD=73 BDT in July, 2014. Australian dollar amounts are rounded 
to the nearest 5 dollars for simplicity, e.g. 70AUD, 35AUD. 
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Our experience shows that you can start a business by asking people to initiate by 
themselves, and not allocate or not give the funds to start the business…although 
[we] provide fund to people, we do not give it at the first step of intervention (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
The findings show charitable provision was avoided within the NGOs investigated. 
Rather, these NGOs imposed conditions and required basic contributions from the 
poor (e.g. interest, commitment, labour, or assets) to call for effective, active 
participation; facilitating a sense of ownership. These findings indicate a selection 
approach to beneficiaries for achieving effective program outcomes, which in turn 
impacts on NGOs’ operational legitimacy. The findings also show such outcomes 
play a central role in facilitating a participatory approach within MED projects, 
providing the basis for an investigation of effective mechanisms of this approach, 
and its contribution to outcomes for poverty alleviation. 
 
5.3.2 Project timeframes 
Despite emphasising sustainable (long-term) poverty alleviation, NGOs’ projects 
were limited to specific timeframes. As mentioned above, MED NGOs emphasised 
building capacity for the poor so that they were able to continue MEs once NGOs’ 
projects formally finished, either on their own or as partnerships with groups, 
federations, co-operatives, or the private sector. The common timeframe for NGOs’ 
projects was from 3-5 years. However, four NGOs indicated that their current project 
timeframe was not long enough to achieve financial sustainability for MEs. 
For any sustainable development, any support should be minimum 12 years…But 
[for our current projects]…first one or two years it goes only planning and designing 
and to finding the right track. When we find the right track then our project period is 
over (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
...they [donors] typically have programs that run for two years to five years, very 
short timeframes. And for the development that we’re doing and the impact, it takes 
longer. It really takes quite some time to be able to ground and to institutionalise 
these approaches so that people are really comfortable, familiar with it; they know 
how it works and they're able to do things that improve their lives and livelihoods 
(Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
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Of note, there were two NGOs whose projects lasted up to 10 or 15 years. NGOs’ 
project timeframes are summarised in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Typical project timeframes 
 Bangladesh Indonesia 
Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. 3-5 years 4 3 7 1 4 5 12 
2. Short-term, 1yr 3 0 3 0 3 3 6 
3. 10-15 years 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 
4. Projects need longer timeframe 1 2 3 1 0 1 4 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one project timeframe. 
For long-term projects of 10 to 15 years, NGOs often reserved one to two years for 
transition (handover to the poor) or following up before completely phasing out their 
involvement. By doing so, NGOs had time to build capacity for the poor people and 
ensure they could continue ME activities after the NGOs’ projects finished. 
…we already run six years with them and we support another two years, then we’ll 
move from that area to another area and we support that set up for another two 
years…10 years usually (Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…we have our long term development project, it’s 15 years, we divide into 3: start-
up phase, implementation phase and phase out phase. So, every five years, we do 
evaluation using external consultants to look at the progress of our activities…what 
we call transformation for development (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
The requirements for MED affected project timeframes, yet for NGOs that mainly 
relied on donor funds, the final timeframe, extension or continuation of projects 
relied on agreements with donors. 
It depends on the donor. They would mention, okay, you can apply for minimum 
these number of years, maximum these number of years (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Based on donors’ requirements. Some donors only give budget for three years, okay 
we make a plan for three years…but for USAID they only give us for one year 
(Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
In cases where projects finished, or where donors withdrew or stopped funding, 
project activities typically ended even though these activities were considered 
effective for poverty alleviation and worth continuing. 
…we’re providing that interest [amount] to the beneficiaries, that’s why we totally 
depend on the donor money. If the donors provide us money, we can continue, if 
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they do not provide, we’ll not continue the program (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…the project is just one year, it doesn’t meet the need of [the poor], if [donors] 
please extend this project, the same project for another two or three years even more 
benefit for [the poor]. If donors can arrange funding, they can give us, otherwise, the 
project stops. This is reality…sad (Senior Executive NGO 12-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
Occasionally, if projects were considered worth continuing, NGOs sought other 
donors or used their savings to provide ongoing (financial) support. 
So, if that particular donor is not in a position to continue to support the project then 
that’s where we have been in a position to try and develop proposals and seek other 
donors or other sources of support that can continue those activities going forward, if 
that’s what we feel is necessary (Senior Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 
2013).  
We have another budget to support the programs that need to continue but [have 
formally] finished [based] on the proposal. We have what we call saving money 
(Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Despite funding constraints, NGOs attempted to design projects that provided them 
with enough time to build capacity and networks for the poor people. This effort 
aimed to promote sustainable outcomes for poverty alleviation, helping strengthen 
NGO legitimacy through effective operations and beneficiary accountability through 
participation mechanisms. Despite these efforts, limitations remained, such that when 
NGO projects formally finished, continuation of these activities depended on the 
poor communities, which is considered in the next section. 
 
5.3.3 Continuation of projects 
Thirteen out of 20 NGOs (seven in Bangladesh and six in Indonesia) emphasised that 
once projects formally finished, if the project activities were still benefitting 
beneficiaries, the poor continued these operations. Otherwise, these activities ceased.  
If there are interests still remaining for, like, farmer co-operatives, they will 
continue, because then they can go for a common market. But if that kind of interest 
is not there, they will not continue…and we don’t expect them to continue (Senior 
Executive NGO 6-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…our projects all involve economic growth. So if at the end of the day, a farmer or 
somebody who’s participated in our projects is not making more money, not 
increasing their production, not being more productive, not getting better yields, 
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they’re ultimately not earning more money for those activities, then they will no 
longer continue to participate, nor should they. That’s it (Senior Executive NGO 2-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Further, NGO follow-up of such activity after their projects formally finished was 
very limited and informal. Fourteen out of 20 NGOs (eight in Bangladesh and six in 
Indonesia) indicated that they had local staff occasionally visiting these beneficiaries 
and reporting back to NGOs’ head offices informally, or when donors required.  
We have a core team of staff and they are responsible for following up after 
finishing of the projects. But it’s not very intensive, just if there are problems, big 
problems (Senior Executive NGO 6-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…when the donor is interested for that kind of information [programs’ impact] to be 
gathered six months or one year after the project. For us it happens more informal 
(Senior Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Another six NGOs (four in Bangladesh and two in Indonesia) were quite detached 
from the projects once they formally finished. 
…because it takes a lot of time and resources to do that type of follow-up assessment 
or even monitoring. I think there should be, personally, but unfortunately it’s not 
something that’s standard…We don’t (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
All [our] projects have finished with good reports, finished. There is no contact 
anymore whatsoever with beneficiaries. [NGO] is completely detached from what’s 
happening over there, it’s not in the organisation’s strategy or plan (Senior Executive 
NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
The above findings show NGOs’ programs aimed to enhance accountability to 
beneficiaries through a participatory approach to sustainable poverty alleviation. 
However, NGOs’ involvement was typically limited to their formal project 
timeframes, and continuation of projects was dependent on the poor communities’ 
interests. This indicates a lack of long-term commitment (or resources) and 
evaluation from NGOs, thus challenging the notion of sustainable poverty 
alleviation. Further detail on NGOs’ accountability approaches to beneficiaries is 
outlined in the next chapters. 
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5.4 BENEFICIARIES’ PERSPECTIVES  
The above sections highlight NGOs’ support for MED based on interviews with 
NGO executives. To gain further insights into the support provided, the next sections 
present findings from the perspective of beneficiaries. 
 
5.4.1 Support for income generating activities 
At the time of conducting 10 interviews with beneficiaries, five of them were 
working in groups and linkages (three in Bangladesh and two in Indonesia) while the 
other five beneficiaries were operating MEs within federations (three in Bangladesh) 
and co-operatives (two in Indonesia). Similar to findings from interviews with 
NGOs, beneficiaries indicated that they received various forms of support from 
NGOs (summarised in Table 5.4) so that they could engage in income generating 
activities. 
Table 5.4 Types of support received by beneficiaries 
Description Bangladesh Indonesia Total (n=10) 
1. Skills training (e.g. business) 4 4 8 
2. Credit 6 2 8 
3. Grants or equipment 0 2 2 
4. Training in social skills, health, nutrition, etc. 4 1 5 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often provided more than one form of support. 
Eight beneficiaries indicated that they received basic skills training on agriculture, 
tailoring, trading, money management, etc. so that they used their loans effectively. 
This training was mandatory to participate in NGOs’ projects. 
By taking money we get involved in training activities. There are many other things 
to learn, for example we get training on cow rearing, goat rearing…agriculture 
(Beneficiary 3-Bangladesh, 2013). 
…we have basic education, basic training. Those who want join in co-operative, they 
have to join a basic training first, before they get benefits from co-operative; on 
loans, marketing, and organic products (Beneficiary 2-Indonesia, 2013). 
Beneficiaries also received credit from NGOs (or federations, co-operatives) at 
reduced interest rates (provided they had savings), which helped them earn extra 
income, or grants in the form of equipment and machinery.  
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We have to pay 8% monthly if we have savings and, if we do not have savings, then 
we have to pay 12% interest weekly (Beneficiary 4-Bangladesh, 2013). 
I only received the tools for the business (Beneficiary 2-Indonesia, 2013). 
In addition, beneficiaries acknowledged receiving other training on health, education, 
gender equality, and nutrition. The training helped beneficiaries, particularly women, 
understand the important role of health and education in poverty alleviation, and their 
rights and essential role during this process. 
In addition to loan, we have learned how to take care of children, expectant 
mothers…We have learned about health education (e.g. vaccine)…from [NGO], we 
have learned that it is also a mother’s responsibility to send her children to school 
(Beneficiary 4-Bangladesh, 2013). 
I learn about the balance about genders between males and females, girls and boys 
(Beneficiary 4-Indonesia, 2013). 
 
5.4.2 Conditions to participate 
Consistent with findings from interviews with NGOs, in order to receive NGO 
support, beneficiaries in both countries also indicated that they had to satisfy 
conditions to participate in NGOs’ projects. One of the main conditions was 
depositing savings weekly (e.g. with working groups, federations or co-operatives), 
having labour or land. In addition, seven beneficiaries confirmed that they must have 
interest in doing business, know what kind of business they want to engage in, and 
receive training in that area. 
I have received training on tailoring from [NGO]. Then I took loan of Tk. 3000 
[40AUD] and bought a sewing machine and now I can earn income (Beneficiary 5-
Bangladesh, 2013). 
…I have to complete [training] and then if I want to have a maximum amount of 
500,000 [Rupiah - maximum grant, 50AUD]27, I have to propose a business 
(Beneficiary 4-Indonesia, 2013). 
                                                     
 
27
 Based on the exchange rate 1 AUD=10,000 Rupiah in July, 2014. Australian dollar amounts are 
rounded to the nearest 5 dollars for simplicity, e.g. approximately 50AUD. 
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Beneficiaries must also demonstrate the ability to work; as such they were commonly 
required to be between 15-55 years of age. 
Conditions of enrolment…there is an age limit…18 to 50 years of age (Beneficiary 
1-Bangladesh, 2013). 
Yes there is if I’m not mistaken the age should not exceed 55 years (Beneficiary 2-
Indonesia, 2013). 
Further, they must demonstrate strong commitment by attending regular group 
meetings. 
…[I] have to sign the attendance sheet regularly (Beneficiary 1-Bangladesh, 2013). 
The weekly meeting, that’s one of the mandatory [requirements] (Beneficiary 4-
Indonesia, 2013). 
 
5.4.3 Following up by NGOs 
While beneficiaries were satisfied with NGOs’ support, some were uncertain 
regarding whether NGOs followed up their income generating activities after the 
NGOs’ projects formally ended. This is perhaps because current participants were 
unaware of NGOs’ future processes, or for beneficiaries of projects which had 
formally finished, it was the NGOs’ concern.  
Yes [they checked our current business], some staff visited during Ramadan from 
Philippines…Checked income generating activities every week and took photos 
(Beneficiary 4, Bangladesh, 2013). 
It’s usually done in a group. It’s part of the evaluation process and they go in a group 
and they discuss what do you need and what do I need (Beneficiary 3, Indonesia, 
2013). 
 
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has highlighted goals and operations of the MED NGOs investigated, 
providing a background for the investigation of NGOs’ strategies for gaining 
organisational legitimacy (presented in the next chapter). Within those goals and 
operations, NGOs emphasised the essential role of participation by beneficiaries to 
achieve long-term outcomes and impacts for poverty alleviation (operational 
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legitimacy). Specifically, NGOs focused on building capacity and partnerships (or 
networks) for poor communities so that they were able to continue activities and take 
ownership of their development (i.e. by continuing their MEs, or forming 
partnerships with the private sector, establishing federations or co-operatives). The 
support aimed to provide the poor with capabilities, networks, and resources so that 
they were able to continue their business activities (if they wanted to do so) once 
NGOs’ projects formally finished. To achieve outcomes for MED projects, NGOs 
selected beneficiaries based on conditions and pre-requisites, indicating a selection 
approach to gaining legitimacy from beneficiaries. These findings provide a valuable 
setting for the investigation of a participatory approach through identifying 
mechanisms for enhancing accountability to beneficiaries, and examining how such 
mechanisms contribute to outcomes and impacts (i.e. sustainable poverty 
alleviation). Findings on these issues are considered in the next chapters. 
 
Chapter 6: Findings – Legitimacy and stakeholder management 
Page 125 
 
CHAPTER 6:  FINDINGS – Legitimacy and 
stakeholder management 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Chapter 5, one of the main operational goals of the NGOs investigated 
was helping the poor engage in income generating activities for sustainable poverty 
alleviation. Within this goal, NGOs helped the poor engage in livelihood, linkages or 
VCD, and called on participation of other actors, such as the communities in which 
the poor lived, and the private sector companies. In doing so, the poor and these 
actors had the opportunity to continue working together when NGOs’ projects 
finished. These goals, mission and strategies for MED provided a valuable setting for 
an investigation of how NGOs established legitimacy and enhanced their 
accountability, particularly to beneficiaries.  
 
This chapter presents findings to address the first three research questions of this 
study. Based on interviews with NGO executives, Section 6.2 highlights findings for 
the first question regarding NGOs’ approaches to gaining legitimacy (in particular 
from donors to ensure access to funding). Section 6.3 then examines the effects of 
these approaches on stakeholder management (i.e. managers’ goals and perceptions) 
towards beneficiaries to address the second research question. Findings in response 
to the third research question, regarding to what extent such stakeholder management 
facilitates a participatory approach, enhancing accountability to beneficiaries, are 
presented in Section 6.4. As mentioned in Section 5.1, all tables presented in this 
chapter are based on the interview data. Mechanisms within NGOs’ participatory 
approach and the contribution of this approach to outcomes of NGOs’ MED 
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programs (which address the final two research questions) will be examined in 
Chapter 7. 
  
6.2 APPROACHES TO GAINING LEGITIMACY 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, an organisation can adopt institutional or strategic 
approaches to gaining legitimacy, through three strategies: (a) conforming to the 
requirements of existing audiences within its institutional regime, (b) selecting 
audiences that support its current practices, and (c) persuading new or potential 
audiences that support its new practices or new legitimating beliefs (Suchman, 1995). 
Being perceived as legitimate within organisational and institutional settings helps an 
organisation gain access to operational resources (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; O'Brien, 
2010). As introduced in Section 1.3, this study aims to investigate NGOs’ approaches 
to gaining legitimacy from donors through fundraising activities. For the NGOs 
investigated, legitimacy was gained based on their values and operational goals, and 
affected their approaches to fundraising and MED. The next sections present findings 
on funding aspects, thereby helping to understand NGOs’ strategies for gaining 
legitimacy with donors.  
 
6.2.1 Having various funding sources 
Within the NGOs investigated, three major funding sources were identified including 
funds from donations and contract-based projects and, funds from corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) provided by the private sector, and income from services 
provided by NGOs or social businesses operated by NGOs. Donations were mainly 
from international or local government aid, other NGOs, funding agencies within 
NGO networks, and the public. Similarly, contract-based projects were typically 
funded by donors for specific projects. CSR funding was often provided by large 
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corporations (e.g. at two to five per cent of their profits), predominantly in 
Indonesia28. Service income was earned from NGOs sharing their experiences and 
expertise with other NGOs or governments. Social businesses included interest 
earned from providing microfinance (MF), or profits earned from selling products 
produced by MEs. These findings were consistent with data available on NGOs’ 
websites. However, data collected from interviews provided more detailed insights. 
Table 6.1 summarises the funding sources of NGOs investigated. 
Table 6.1 Funding sources of NGOs 
Funding sources Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
Contracts-
based projects 
and donations 
1. International governments 
or other NGOs 
5 4 9 1 4 5 14 
2. NGOs’ international 
fundraising agencies 
1 3 4 0 3 3 7 
3. Local governments 2 1 3 1 0 1 4 
4. Public donations 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
Private sector 5. CSR 1 0 1 2 2 4 5 
NGOs’ own 
activities 
6. Service income 3 2 5 2 3 5 10 
7. Interest (MFs) 4 1 5 0 1 1 6 
8. Social businesses 4 0 4 1 2 3 7 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one income source. Appendix 
4 provides details of funding sources for individual NGOs. 
 
a. Generating funds from donations and contract-based projects 
Seventeen of the 20 NGOs indicated that they relied on donations and contract-based 
projects, 14 of which emphasised that they received funds from international 
governments or other NGOs, and that this was one of the major funding sources for 
their activities. 
                                                     
 
28
 Indonesian law (Law No 40 of 2007, Article 74) states that “companies that manage or utilise 
natural resources, or that impact natural resources, are required to fulfil social and environmental 
responsibilities” (including CSR). State-owned enterprises are required to allocate two per cent of 
their profit after tax for CSR, however the regulation does not clearly specify the amount of funds 
required by other types of companies for CSR matters (Juniarto & Riyandi, 2012). 
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We are getting funding from other organisations like European Commission, 
Australian Aid…many other organisations (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
…we get funding from a number of governments, from the European Commission, 
institutional funding, international aid money basically. We get funding from big 
foundations (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
…95 per cent we are dependent on foreign donors (Senior Executive NGO 7- 
Bangladesh, local, 2013).   
Of the funds received, NGOs were allowed to allocate a certain percentage for their 
operating and overhead costs. 
When we work with these projects, we have an overhead, there’s 5-7% (Senior 
Executive NGO 6-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…we don’t do things for free of course. So…[when] we develop proposals these are 
very clear to the donors I mean donors have different requirements they understand 
that there are operating cost for implementing agencies (Senior Executive NGO 9-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
International NGOs often had their own international networks and funding agencies, 
which managed fundraising activities globally regardless of the location of NGOs’ 
projects. 
…we are getting funds from [our international funding agency]. [It] is providing 
grant support and also the technical assistance for the programs (Senior Executive 
NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
[We] have been receiving funds mostly within our network, so [we] are part of the 
network of [several] countries…we have our implementing officers…in Asia, 
Africa, and South America. And those that fund us are America (USA) and Canada, 
Korea and Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia and New Zealand, and all countries in 
Europe. So, this was the traditional way of our funding, so country offices or local 
country offices have to seek funds (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
This source of funds was mainly raised by submitting proposals or bidding for 
projects. As such, within NGOs’ expertise, they identified needs of local 
communities and objectives of potential donors, then submitted proposals or project 
bids to these donors. 
…according to our people’s need, we submit that proposal. If we meet their criteria, 
if they [funders] feel that this is a good proposal, they fund it (Senior Executive 
NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
they want to implement a project on the [location] and market approach, so they 
requested different organisations to apply…this is our chance, the experience that we 
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have…we had to do a detailed proposal and we had to submit it to the donors, they 
again review evaluation and finally they selected [us] for the project (Senior 
Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Sometimes we come with a request…we discuss, we agree on the contract, we sign 
the contract, and then we’re fully responsible for respecting it (Senior Executive 
NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
While the majority of NGOs received funds from international aid, only a few of 
them received funds from national governments or the public, and this source of 
funds was relatively modest (i.e. not the NGOs’ primary funding source).  
…we are taking some projects from the government for development (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
We get people who give us money…but really don’t give us any constraints. They're 
like hey, here’s $1000, use it abroad (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Thus findings show that the majority of MED NGOs mainly depended on specific 
governments and other NGOs’ projects for funds, rather than directly raising funds 
from the general public. While NGOs’ operations could be potentially influenced by 
these donors as NGOs need to conform to their demands (indicating an institutional 
response), findings primarily indicated that NGOs adopted a strategic approach 
through selecting or persuading various donors in seeking funding for their 
operations (i.e. through submitting proposals or biding projects aligned with their 
expertise).  
 
b. Generating funds from CSR 
Selection or persuasion strategies for funding were also evident in the way NGOs 
sought funds from the private sector. While CSR was not a commonly recognised 
term for NGOs operating in Bangladesh, half (four) of the NGOs operating in 
Indonesia indicated that they were receiving money from large corporations under 
the CSR scheme, and considered it one of their substantial funding sources. Unlike 
donations, funds from CSR were commonly considered to be an investment for the 
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private sector. Two other NGOs also operating in Indonesia, while not yet receiving 
funds from CSR, showed strong interest in connecting with this source of funding in 
the near future. 
..we also have funding from CSR. This is new. We just started the last two or three 
years. We go to the corporations because we understand that they have a 
commitment to share around 5% of their profit with the community through the CSR 
projects…the corporations right now, what we call the sexy issue, is economic 
development (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
…so they [corporations] fund us to work in these communities, and that provides us 
with our core funding as well as the funding for that particular project. So with that 
as a base, we can go and do other works (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 
2013). 
 
One of the reasons for this strategy was donations becoming increasingly limited due 
to increased competition, while funds from the private sector were available and 
accessible. 
…for our own sustainability, from the government it’s not so easy that we can get 
funding from them, but private companies with their CSR where in Indonesia it’s 
compulsory with big companies, especially those foreign companies (Senior 
Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
Increasingly we’ll diversify our funding away from [our national] government and 
into other donors and to a certain extent private sector (Senior Executive NGO 6-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
As CSR requirements in Indonesia mainly applied to companies managing, utilising, 
or impacting natural resources, co-operating with these companies could create other 
challenges for NGOs. Specifically, these companies may engage in business 
activities causing social and environmental problems which may be inconsistent with 
NGOs’ values, impacting on NGOs’ organisational legitimacy. Thus careful 
selection of CSR partners by NGOs was necessary.    
 
c. Generating funds from NGOs’ own activities  
Rather than relying on funds from donors, NGOs with specific expertise and 
experience (10 out of 20 NGOs, five in each country) generated funds by providing 
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services (e.g. consulting, project management) through contract arrangements to 
other NGOs, governments, or the private sector.  
We also do like short-term consulting, for example if you are working with an NGO 
in Vietnam and you are just starting out and you’re focused on economic 
development but you want to work with value chains or with sectors, and you say 
okay, well how can I get my staff trained and accustomed to this approach, then you 
might hire us [as] agencies (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 
2013). 
 
For example, company who want to get certification and they don’t know how to 
comply with the requirements, we give them consultation so they pay us (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
 
For some NGOs, their beneficiaries sometimes had to pay for services and training 
received. 
…like sometimes we offer training courses to participants, they have to pay to 
receive the training, sometimes we provide expert services and they pay through our 
organisation (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
 
NGOs operating in Bangladesh in particular had a strong focus on generating income 
from their own businesses such as microfinance or social enterprises. This strategy 
was particularly popular with local NGOs (all seven local NGOs investigated), which 
often had limited ability to access international aid. While NGOs engaging in 
microfinance generated income mainly from interest, NGOs engaging in social 
businesses generated income from selling goods.  
 
For five NGOs engaging in microfinance in Bangladesh (two international and three 
local NGOs), the interest rates were applied differently within these organisations. 
Commonly, interest rates for the extremely poor were much lower (or subsidised) 
than those for the less poor; and loans were provided as a part of income generating 
projects so that the poor could start business, but without a large debt burden.  
…we also given them a loan,…fast loan is 2,000 to 3,000 taka [30-40AUD], to start 
simple business, to earn something and to repay that loaned money with 12% 
interest, with 48 weeks instalment…Within the 12%, we’ll keep 6% for [insurance 
of] loan loss, 6% for their benefit [kept in groups] (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
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We’re getting the money from another lending agency…with low interest rate [of 
6%], and we’re providing credit to the communities [at 10% minimum] (Senior 
Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
For NGOs engaging in social enterprises, based on their expertise, they produced 
their own products or operated shops or distribution channels to sell MEs’ products. 
Commonly, these NGOs’ support involved providing training and skills to help MEs 
produce and increase production, then buying and selling MEs’ products through 
NGOs’ distribution channels. These were mainly agricultural products such as rice 
seed, cattle, poultry, textiles, etc. 
Boutique shops, women’s dresses, and also sarees, bed sheets, bed covers, pillow 
covers and other things that our poor people actually work on…we [give] them the 
training, for their skills development, and we are collecting their products and also 
marketing too at one of our outlets (Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
…we have shops, which is one strategy for fundraising. So people give the goods to 
[us] and [we] sell the goods (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
Income generated from these activities was used to pay for staff and fund other NGO 
projects. 
But whatever [we] sell against materials or devices, it is again going back to produce 
more devices or maintaining the staff who are producing the devices (Senior 
Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…a certain proportion is allocated for development, for humanitarian responses, for 
disaster, for campaign and advocacy, and very small amount is for administrative 
cost (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
For these NGOs, engaging in social enterprises constituted a substantial income 
source. 
I think it will be like this: 70-30…We will be able to raise from institutional donors 
50-70%, and 30% would be through our own revenue (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…but essentially [social enterprises] would be our businesses, which means that 
maybe we can eventually aim at a higher rate…maybe we can aim at 75% (Senior 
Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
However, these NGOs also faced constraints as profit generated from these activities 
was not used to improve or expand the social businesses; rather it was used to fund 
Chapter 6: Findings – Legitimacy and stakeholder management 
Page 133 
 
other projects. As a result, it was difficult to grow these activities. 
But a lot of the time, they are not able to sustain. The amount of revenue we have 
from selling our training expertise, we put that in so that our Braille unit can 
continue so that our [machinery] can continue. Because most of our services are for 
free, going to the very poor people (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
While providing services or engaging in social enterprises helped to diversify NGOs’ 
funding sources, seven NGOs (four in Bangladesh and three in Indonesia) noted that 
they did not engage in any income generating activities. They explained that these 
activities were not permitted within their legal form, or not part of their current 
strategies. 
…business is not our target, our main mission is to organise and help the poor…it 
makes imbalance [potential conflict] because it makes profits. It’s better not to 
involve this type of initiative (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
No. We don’t have. We are non-profit, because we also follow the Ministry of Social 
Welfare here in Indonesia (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Although the majority of MED NGOs investigated mainly relied on funds provided 
by a small number of donors (including the private sector), the findings show that 
some NGOs generated funds from various alternative sources, particularly from 
providing services or engaging in social businesses. Through diversifying funding 
sources, NGOs could increase their financial independence and be able to select and 
persuade donors as part of their strategies to establish legitimacy. In order to 
understand these strategies further, the next sections present findings on NGOs’ 
internal strategies for fundraising.      
 
6.2.2 Internal strategies for fundraising 
The above section indicated that NGOs attempted to diversify their funding sources 
through selection or persuasion strategies for gaining legitimacy. These strategies 
were reinforced through NGOs’ internal strategies for fundraising (summarised in 
Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2 Internal strategies for fundraising 
Strategies Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Seeking projects aligned with NGOs’ 
expertise, mission 
4 5 9 2 6 8 17 
2. Promoting previous successful projects 6 3 9 2 2 4 13 
3. Building networks and reputation 4 2 6 2 2 4 10 
4. Diversification of donors and income sources 4 2 6 2 1 3 9 
5. Seeking funds from the private sector 0 0 0 2 4 6 6 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one strategy. 
The majority of NGOs investigated in both countries (17 out of 20) emphasised the 
importance of raising funds from donors whose interests and values aligned with 
NGOs. This was because for these NGOs, maintaining their own mission and 
selecting others to support it were essential. 
…we don’t want to compromise either our approach, our methodology, our beliefs, 
or our mission, just because there’s a project that is something that maybe we could 
win…there’s a little bit of flexibility in there, but we are pretty particular about the 
types of things that we compete for and are interested in, even though maybe there’s 
not a lot of opportunity, you know, we still try to be very focused in what we do 
(Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Because we conduct ‘Go/Not Go’ principle, based on the criteria…[we are] now 
more people-oriented than donor-driven. So even [if] there is a donor, but he’s not 
for the people, we’ll not tap into him (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
This approach helped NGOs establish legitimacy with donors and avoided conflicts 
between NGOs’ needs and mission and those of donors. 
…their end purpose is actually for the social economic development of the poor 
people, and our end purpose is also [that]. So, there is no contradiction between our 
end purposes and their end purposes (Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 
2013).  
…we stick to most of the basic [values], but quite often it’s packaging it up for 
donors, so our approach meets their interests (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
In addition to a selection strategy for gaining legitimacy from donors, many NGOs 
(13 out of 20) adopted a persuasion strategy by promoting their expertise and 
successful outcomes of prior projects. Through this strategy, NGOs advertised their 
operations, increasing the understanding of donors and governments regarding issues 
the NGOs were working on.  
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…we are inviting some people to visit our project, if they find it’s good, then we ask 
them whether they can support or not (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
So the strategy,…we will be maintaining our relationship through our real 
performance (Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…we need to build a track record. So, our focus is getting in some smaller projects 
first, to build a track record in what we’ll be looking at then going after some big 
projects (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
These findings showed a strong sense of internal legitimacy based on NGOs’ beliefs 
and operations. This strategy required NGOs to have good communication and 
documentation systems, so that information was well organised, communicated, and 
available for immediate review or collection.  
…[the documentation system] also is very important. And I think that helps us in 
gathering more information, making sure the tenders and proposals are done on time 
and well (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
We have our own information communication unit, so we generate newsletters, we 
have a website, produce all kinds of publications, so we’re quite strong on 
information communication…you’ve got to let people know what you're doing and, 
kind of communicate with them, especially if you’re trying to raise money. So 
communication skills are quite critical (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 
2013). 
The third most popular strategy indicated by 10 out 20 NGOs was having a good 
managerial reputation and networks for both local and international NGOs. 
…a lot of the relationship building our headquarters has done, like our executive 
director, because he has done so much work in this particular sector his name is 
known and our publications are known and our training is known and so…people 
would reach out to him and say, hey can we hire you for this project or can you do 
this training for us? And so, it was a lot of just personal relationships and his 
network is how we would be competitive for projects (Senior Executive NGO 2-
Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
I think because of my background, I have quite a wide array of contacts, people in 
the development field, and keeping informed about what's going on and constantly 
talking with people (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013).  
Thus, individual NGOs had multiple funding strategies, including diversified donors 
and funding sources. These strategies aimed to assist NGOs to access funds as well 
as secure a level of financial independence for sustainability of their own operations. 
Because in Bangladesh we have many needs. But [donors in] one country [are] 
unable to fulfil that need, that’s why we need to submit [our proposals] in different 
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countries, we need to approach different donors (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…for the sustainability of the organisation we need to get rid of dependency [on] the 
donors, we need to actually generate revenue from our own enterprises, so that’s 
why we are trying to go that way (Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
Further, this strategy helped NGOs implement projects aligned within their mission 
that donors were not interested in funding. 
…definitely being a social enterprise gives us a lot of what we call unrestricted 
money, money we’re free to use wherever we want. So that gives us margin to either 
cover gaps or experiment, try pilot things (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
…again, we’re kind of free from [being dependent on donors’ funds], because we 
have this other source of funding, but many other organisations, they have to work 
with the donor projects, they just kind of swing with the tide, they can get this 
money to do this certain thing so they do it. But we have a very very consistent 
program that we don’t deviate from, and we haven’t had to deviate from, because of 
this source of funding that we have (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 
2013).  
As noted previously, six NGOs operating in Indonesia received funds from large 
corporations through the CSR scheme, and this was reflected in these NGOs’ 
strategy for fundraising. The six NGOs emphasised that this source of funds was 
very important as funds from donations and contract-based projects were declining. 
…it’s going to be a lot of CSR and a lot of approaching and networking with 
companies, as there's not so much institutional money here anymore for NGOs. 
Mostly the big international [aid] institutions, they fund the government directly in 
Indonesia. NGOs don’t get much of that cake. However, there’s a lot of companies 
with big offices, big regional offices in Jakarta, and a lot of them have corporate 
social responsibility programs and so…different place, different strategy (Senior 
Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Thus, NGOs’ internal strategies reinforced selection and persuasion strategies for 
gaining legitimacy. NGOs’ organisational goals and values were used as a basis to 
gain organisational legitimacy, from which they selected and persuaded donors with 
similar views to gain financial support. Diversified funding approaches also helped 
NGOs become more independent from donors, providing them with opportunities to 
focus on their own values and mission rather than working within the constraints 
imposed by donors; indicating the importance of self-identity and integrity of 
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mission and values. 
 
6.2.3 External influences on fundraising 
While four NGOs (two in Bangladesh and two in Indonesia) in this study did not 
mention types of fundraising standards they had to comply with, 16 NGOs indicated 
that there was no particular fundraising standard for the NGO sector. Rather, NGOs 
complied with donors’ requirements on receiving funds and governments’ 
requirements regarding the NGOs’ registration, indicating requirements of 
conformity for gaining institutional legitimacy within an overarching strategic 
approach.  
There is nothing like that, we can receive any amount if that comply with our 
project, our ethics, our fundamental principle (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
I’m not so sure for Indonesia…we are not given any ways of doing it. But generally 
we know that we can fundraise for the good of people (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Table 6.3 summarises NGOs’ responses to external influences on fundraising. 
Table 6.3 External influences on fundraising 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Donors' requirements and criteria 6 4 10 0 0 0 10 
2. Government's requirements 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had to comply with more than one type of 
requirement. 
 
Most NGOs (10 out of 12) operating in Bangladesh, both local and international 
emphasised satisfying donors’ requirements was most important for their fundraising 
activities. Meanwhile, none of the NGOs operating in Indonesia mentioned this. 
Yeah, every donor has a standard. If you need to submit any proposal you have to 
maintain their standards, their format, and their criteria. We need to fulfil these 
criteria, then we can submit (Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 
2013). 
Varies from organisation to organisation, we have particular standards with the 
European Commission that we need to comply [with], to qualify to make the 
applications, similar with [a particular funder], similar with AusAID. Even after 
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once you get the funds, there are many compliance requirements that we need to 
fulfil (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
Some NGOs in both countries also mentioned that they needed to comply with 
government requirements, depending on their legal status. 
…then there are the requirements of the government. There are some specific 
government standards. We need to [have our projects approved by] the NGO Affairs 
Bureau, so they have some compliance requirements and set certain standards. [If] 
you don’t qualify, you can’t do the project (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
We have a legal form…they [the government] know about our activities, our 
competitive [position]…the funding (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 
2013). 
Findings on NGOs’ approaches to fundraising show that while there were still very 
limited standards for fundraising within the NGO sector, NGOs complied with 
donors’ (and government’s) demands. As such, the NGOs had a strong sense 
internally of their values and priorities (internal legitimacy) while gaining support for 
their operations (i.e. financial support from donors, regulatory support from 
government) for external legitimacy. Further, NGOs selectively partnered with 
donors who shared their values, aligning internal and external legitimacy. 
 
6.2.4 Constraints on fundraising activities 
While NGOs’ strategies in fundraising helped them avoid conflicts with donors’ 
needs and requirements, some constraints remained threating NGO legitimacy. These 
constraints, identified from interview data, related to donors, NGO type 
(international or local), and the environmental context. 
 
a. Donor related constraints 
As the majority of NGOs raised funds from donors, they faced various constraints, as 
highlighted in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 Constraints related to donors 
Constraints 
Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Donors prefer working with governments or 
large NGOs 
3 1 4 0 3 3 7 
2. Donors are more interested in other 
development areas 
3 1 4 0 3 3 7 
3. Donors focus more on quantifiable outcomes, 
short-term projects 
3 1 4 1 2 3 7 
4. Donors' focus are different to NGOs’ 2 2 4 0 2 2 6 
5. Donor funds are declining because of GFC29 2 1 3 1 2 3 6 
6. Specific donor requirements inconsistent with 
NGOs’ project plans 
1 1 2 0 1 1 3 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one conflict. 
For seven NGOs (four in Bangladesh and three in Indonesia), their biggest difficulty 
was that donors mainly provided funds directly to governments or worked with large 
NGOs. This was experienced by NGOs operating in both countries. 
They like to give funds to the big organisations who can manage more funds. They 
don’t like to give small funds. So, it’s not always easy to have access to funds…for 
us – like…medium or small kind of organisations (Senior Executive NGO 10-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
…since several past years, funding from the donor offices has come down because 
of change of funding in global, it’s more moving to G to G30 []…big players, 
government, like them. So we are left with self-contracts or on smaller scale (Senior 
Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
Other NGOs indicated that donors were more interested in development other than 
economic development, or other types of beneficiaries rather than those targeted by 
MED NGOs. This was experienced by both international and local NGOs in both 
countries. 
...we say that is our prioritised areas of work, but donors say “no, you know the 
priority areas, or priority list, nothing is mentioned on working with this sector” 
[NGOs’ target beneficiaries]. So, they say, “we don’t know, we sorry, we don’t 
understand, but we’ll think of it, but it’ll take time” (Senior Executive NGO 5-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
 
                                                     
 
29
 Global Financial Crisis 
30
 Government to Government 
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…there are things people don’t like to fund. Generally speaking, it’s easier to find 
money for young children than it is for youth; it’s easier to find money for women 
than it is for men; it’s easier to find money for sick people than it is for drug users. 
There are things people don’t like to hear and don’t like to support (Senior Executive 
NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
Further, while funds became more difficult for NGOs to access, donors often focused 
on quantitative measurement of outcomes or short-term projects.  
Actually donors are more interested [in] numbers. And here from the 
implementation site we have to maintain the quality (Senior Executive NGO 8-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
…because our product in development is really, people always say is intangible, it’s 
difficult to measure [and] see. But when we go to corporations and ask them to 
contribute, what they look, first is the tangible things, this is the constraint (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
…they wanted fast results. They weren’t interested in this institutional strengthening 
stuff, they wanted to see things happening quickly (Senior Executive NGO 8-
Indonesia, local, 2013). 
 
Further, some NGOs indicated that sometimes donors’ focus was slightly different to 
NGOs’, which required NGOs to find a balance or discuss differences with donors. 
But again, economic development activity only fits with the donors who really also 
love to see the result of economic development…there are some [donors] concern 
about environment for example. Sometimes we try to integrate between economic 
development activities with environment (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Further, donors’ funds were noted as declining after the global financial crisis.  
The financial crisis, what action they did, they cut all the funding [for our projects] 
(Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
 
…some people just thinking twice for giving compared [to] when the economy 
[was] good, like before. So this is also another challenge. International NGO is also 
affected by the condition of the global financial market or global economy (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
Only three NGOs (two in Bangladesh, one in Indonesia) indicated that donors’ focus 
was inconsistent with NGOs’ plans. 
…the difficulty might be in some cases…whoever is funding, they would probably 
want to fix a lot of things…that becomes a bit of a problem while developing 
proposals (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…when it comes to these specific implementations, of how, what kind of enterprise 
development projects there are, and how those projects are being developed and 
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designed. Sometimes, this is being dictated by the donors (Senior Executive NGO 2-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
The above constraints relate mainly to limited resources and negative influences 
from donors. These constraints, while limiting NGOs’ fundraising activities from 
donors, encouraged NGOs to operate more effectively and become more financially 
independent, reinforcing a strategic approach to gaining legitimacy through selection 
and persuasion strategies, as detailed above.  
 
b. NGO related constraints 
As donors mainly provided funds through governments, four international NGOs 
indicated that their operations faced more difficulties than local NGOs. Specifically, 
they found it more difficult to access this source of funds as both donors and 
governments often prioritised giving to local NGOs to help build local capacity. 
…there are many different trends within USAID, and currently one of the trends is 
for them to [use] local organisations like local NGOs…for example, in Bangladesh, 
the trend right now for USAID is to ensure that, if it’s a local NGO that has the same 
profile as we do, they would go with the local NGO proposals (Senior Executive 
NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
In addition, the legal frameworks were often strict regarding international NGOs 
raising funds from local communities. 
…this is limited by the policy in each country actually. Let’s say like in Indonesia, 
[we are] not allowed to conduct national fundraising, in-country fund raising, by 
law. So, such kind of approach is not possible for some (Senior Executive NGO 5-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Therefore, international NGOs sometimes had to form partnerships with local NGOs 
for fundraising or establish local organisations. 
 [The local NGO] is implementing operations…because the government of 
Indonesia does not allow international [NGOs] to fundraise, so we need to find the 
local partners [for] that (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
These constraints raise concerns regarding whether international NGOs had to 
compromise their strategies for gaining legitimacy when required to partner with 
local NGOs.  
Chapter 6: Findings – Legitimacy and stakeholder management 
Page 142 
 
c. Context related constraints 
In addition to reduced funds from donors, four (both local and international) NGOs 
indicated that they faced highly competitive fundraising markets not only 
internationally, but also locally.  
There are difficulties because [large] organisations who are working in Bangladesh 
with [NGOs’ target beneficiaries] for any issues, are able to go to meet the donors in 
international seminars [as they have money]. They’re given much funds compared to 
us (Senior Executive NGO 12-Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
 
…the other NGOs who [are working on] the same issues with [us], we have to 
compete with…it’s difficult (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
 
Importantly, in an environment with a high level of corruption (e.g. Bangladesh), 
trust within the communities was low. Thus, convincing people to provide funds to 
NGOs for poverty alleviation became increasingly difficult. 
So because of the corruption and the hunger for money, you know, [this] culture has 
an impact on the non-profit sector also. Here [dishonest] non-profit organisation 
leaders are also thinking how quickly they can make money (Senior Executive NGO 
5-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
 
While NGOs operating in Bangladesh faced corruption, NGOs operating in 
Indonesia found difficulties to raise funds in a country which was relatively more 
socially and economically advanced. 
Indonesia…now is mov[ing] to be a middle-income country. So it means that the 
assistance from the international donors becomes less and less (Senior Executive 
NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
In addition, for NGOs with a Christian ethos, it was more difficult to raise funds 
from local communities with other religious beliefs.  
Previously churches collecting some fund from the public but now they also stopped 
because as a Muslim country, whenever you ask [them] to give us money, they are 
not providing [that], it’s hard (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
 
In summary, findings show that regardless of how MED NGOs selected and 
persuaded donors who shared their mission and values, these NGOs could face 
challenges when conforming to these donors’ requirements. In addition, they also 
Chapter 6: Findings – Legitimacy and stakeholder management 
Page 143 
 
faced other challenges, with respect to NGO type, religion, and environmental 
context, in fundraising from donors, potentially impacting on their strategies for 
gaining financial support and legitimacy from this stakeholder group. 
 
6.3 EFFECTS OF STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT ON BENEFICIARY 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The findings in Section 6.2 show that NGOs in this study generated funds from 
different sources, which helped them become less dependent on donors, while 
maintaining a sense of internal legitimacy with respect to their organisation goals – 
sustainable poverty alleviation. Accordingly, NGOs primarily selected or persuaded 
donors whose interests aligned with NGOs’ own interests. These strategies impacted 
on NGOs’ goals and perceptions towards their key stakeholders (particularly 
beneficiaries), which is presented in the next sections.  
 
6.3.1 Prioritising responsibilities towards beneficiaries 
For the NGOs investigated, there were four major stakeholder groups identified by 
NGO managers, including beneficiaries, donors, government, and the NGOs’ board. 
Table 6.5 presents how NGOs prioritised these key stakeholder groups.  
Table 6.5 Stakeholder group priority 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Four key stakeholder groups are 
important in different ways, levels 
2 3 5 2 2 4 9 
2. Beneficiaries are the most important 3 1 4 0 3 3 7 
3. Donors are the most important 1 1 2 0 1 1 3 
4. NGO board is the most important 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 7 5 12 2 6 8 20 
 
A large proportion of NGOs (9 out of 20) indicated that it was not possible to rank 
the priority of the above four stakeholder groups for their overall operations. These 
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stakeholder groups were important to NGOs in different ways; NGOs had to be 
responsible to them in different contexts and at different levels. 
…we’re responsible to the beneficiaries and the donors, both. Because we are in the 
middle, we need to satisfy beneficiaries and also satisfy the donors…we cannot just 
satisfy only one part…then you will not be surviving as an organisation…Whatever 
you say [to donors] you need to implement in the projects and benefit the 
beneficiaries according to your program approaches (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bagladesh, international, 2013). 
I think all the stakeholders are important…it’s difficult to choose which one is the 
most important since our program aims to [improve] small farmers’ welfare, make 
their living better…So it’s rather hard to choose which one (Senior Executive NGO 
3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Further, being responsible to donors and beneficiaries was considered relative, such 
that being responsible to donors was a short-term objective, while being responsible 
to beneficiaries was a long-term objective. 
I think that there are a lot of organisations in our country [which] want to satisfy the 
donors. But in the long run, if you want to satisfy only the donors, you will disappear 
from the communities (Senior Executive NGO 12-Bagladesh, international, 2013). 
They’re the ones who are paying so they are the ones who you are most responsible 
to in the short-term…[but] all of activities ultimately are looking to benefit the poor. 
And so regardless of the clients, that’s always the end goal. But the question is, how 
do you get to that point. And so that’s where clients and donors are paying or 
supporting us to work together to implement projects to do that (Senior Executive 
NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
However, executives from seven NGOs clearly indicated that beneficiaries were their 
most important stakeholder group. 
To the poor, responsibility to the poor, it should be a must because you are gaining 
money in the name of the poor and you should and must be responsible to the poor 
(Senior Executive NGO 6-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
I think we’ve got a real commitment [to donors], but responsibility to the people 
we’re trying to help. We go into a project, we raise expectations, I think ultimately 
you want to deliver…I think that’s the most important contract, the one with the 
poor and the people we’re trying to help (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Importantly, just three NGOs emphasised that donors were the most important for 
their operations. 
…priority is people, it’s good, but our first priority is donors. Second priority is 
people, and third and last priority is government (Senior Executive NGO 11-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
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The stakeholder that we’re responsible for…very clear…is the donor, that is the 
first. The second is the beneficiaries, the third is like our partners. We’re also 
responsible to the government and we’re also responsible to the public (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Notably, one NGO indicated that the board was the most important. 
I am accountable to the board to inform about, and the board is with me to see what 
we are doing (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Hence the majority of NGOs emphasised the importance of being responsible to both 
donors and beneficiaries. Although beneficiaries theoretically had no direct power to 
require NGOs’ accountability, accountability to beneficiaries was considered 
essential by NGO managers. 
 
6.3.2 Recognising potential importance of beneficiaries  
The above findings indicate NGOs’ awareness of being accountable to beneficiaries. 
The findings presented in this section also show NGOs’ awareness of the potential 
power of beneficiaries. Specifically, 10 out of 20 NGOs (five in Bangladesh and five 
in Indonesia) highlighted that without beneficiaries they would not exist.  
…but the cause for our existence is not for the donor, because the cause is the need. 
The need is the cause. The need is poverty. The need is the human distress (Senior 
Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
But why we’re taking money from the donors? To give some businesses to the[poor] 
community. So, first we are responsible to the community (Senior Executive NGO 
12-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Specifically, NGOs (particularly NGOs operating in Bangladesh) emphasised that 
the term “beneficiary” was neglectful and were strongly against using this term. 
Firstly the term implied “receiving”, however, the poor were viewed as not simply 
receiving support; they were also engaging in NGOs’ projects and contributing to the 
social and economic development of their country. Further, they received credit yet 
they often paid interest. 
Actually, beneficiary is a neglectful word, we cannot say ‘the beneficiary’ to the 
rural people, those who engage in development activities as a 
member…Beneficiaries mean they’re taking something from others...Those who are 
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providing they are the superior, and those who are taking as a beneficiary, they are 
the inferior (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…[using the term] beneficiary was okay but in most cases in Bangladesh the 
moment you use beneficiary it’s somehow, for many people it means as if the project 
has given something directly. Like the beneficiary of a microfinance institution they 
receive credit, beneficiary of X&Y project, that means they have received something 
(Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Importantly, NGOs executives emphasised that the poor had dignity and potential, 
and the term ‘beneficiary’ undermined their capacity and ongoing contribution.  
…because you cannot undermine the people and say poor, because a man or woman 
has huge potential inside him…So I think a person should not be undermined as 
poor people. They are today we say, helpless, tomorrow he will have more things 
and he will be a person [with potential] and contribute to the economy (Senior 
Executive NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
These NGOs preferred the term “development partners”, “participants”, “customers”, 
“target groups” rather than “beneficiary”. However, these terms were not 
consistently perceived as preferable amongst these NGOs. 
…why they’re taking the money, why they’re borrowing the money. They’re 
borrowing the money to work on development issues. So, they’re the development 
partners, not the beneficiaries (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
From our organisation, we think that we are learning from them. They’re also 
learning, so it’s very much vice versa, so we don’t like to see them as target groups 
or beneficiaries – just participants (Senior Executive NGO 10-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
…we can [call] them beneficiaries, that’s not a problem, but we have to bear in mind 
that our ultimate goal is to develop a commercial [product] in Bangladesh. We 
should not expect that these people will…after five years…will [still] be waiting for 
grants and loans. No, they have to develop their potentiality, that’s why we identify 
them as customers (Senior Executive NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Sorry? Beneficiary? I’d rather say target groups, okay? I mean it’s only because of 
the term (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
While terminology for beneficiaries varied within the NGOs, they commonly agreed 
being responsible to beneficiaries was considered most important (particularly for 
NGOs’ long-term objective). Hence, NGOs emphasised the importance of a 
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beneficiary31-driven approach within their projects. Under this approach, NGOs 
responded to the needs of the poor and were more independent from donors in 
decision making for better project outcomes.  
Previously it was just, oh there is funding, let’s do it. So mostly for donors, it was 
very donor driven…it’s good. But now getting more poor people in and others, 
we’re starting to see more specifically what we are really doing…we proclaim 
ourselves as humanitarian, but when we check, actually we’re doing not so much. 
We have been doing good, of course, but we could do more actually (Senior 
Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
…if you stop listening to your beneficiaries…it’s just the most dangerous thing you 
can do, it’s the most slippery slope and then…Who are your donors? They are either 
institutions, what are institutions? They are governments, they are basically 
politicians that try to please their taxpayers. I mean that’s what it is, right, and 
they’re voters, that’s really what they are (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Within this environment, four NGOs (one in Bangladesh and three in Indonesia) also 
considered donors as their partners. 
We see them [donors] as our development partners. But if you look at the target, it’s 
the people…they are very important. Without them, possibly this initiative will not 
go very far (Senior Executive NGO 6-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…we’re partners, donors need development agencies to do the work, so I don’t see it 
as ‘us and them’, it’s how do we work together to implement projects. They need us 
as much as we need them (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Thus, findings show that the strategies for gaining legitimacy (e.g. selection or 
persuasion) and NGOs’ strong sense of internal legitimacy based on their own goals 
and values, affected NGOs’ perceptions and goals towards beneficiaries. 
Accordingly, NGOs emphasised the essential role of beneficiaries to NGOs’ 
existence, and the importance of active participation by beneficiaries to achieving 
effective project outcomes. These perspectives affected NGOs’ approaches to 
accountability to beneficiaries, reinforcing the importance of a participatory 
approach. 
                                                     
 
31
 Although the NGOs investigated were often unsupportive of using the term “beneficiary”, this study 
uses this term as it is commonly recognised in the literature, and refers to those benefiting. 
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6.4 FACILITATING A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
As noted in Chapter Five, NGOs expected participation by beneficiaries in order to 
be part of MED programs. The findings presented in this section show that a 
participatory approach to beneficiary accountability was largely facilitated by the 
NGOs investigated. Importantly, this approach not only involved the poor, but also 
the local communities, and the private and public sectors. All NGOs emphasised the 
essential role of a participatory approach to their programs with various dimensions 
identified, as summarised in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Dimensions of a participatory approach 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Meeting the needs of the poor 7 5 12 2 6 8 20 
2. Facilitating empowerment 5 4 9 2 2 4 13 
3. Providing a transforming process 2 1 3 2 4 6 9 
4. Providing NGOs with opportunities to 
work as facilitators  
7 5 12 2 6 8 19 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one view. 
 
6.4.1 Meeting the poor’s needs and conditions 
All NGOs indicated that it was important that their projects matched the poor’s needs 
and benefited them. Therefore, participation of the poor helped NGOs identify these 
needs and conditions; while enabling the poor to learn about NGOs’ projects and 
become interested in participating. 
…what are the benefits…how she’ll be benefitted in the project, through the project. 
When she feels that it’s good for her, then she joins (Senior Executive 1 NGO-
Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
…when they don’t need this project, they won’t come. If they want this project, they 
come. So, before we provide or establish the project in one region, we have to 
identify what they need, what we can do (Senior Executive 3 NGO-Indonesia, local, 
2013). 
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However, a participatory approach also required input from the poor to make their 
own choices regarding what activity they wanted to engage in based on their needs, 
conditions, and capabilities; within NGOs’ scope and capability.  
So, how we can work there, this is for discussions. We call it participatory action 
research…actions on what are demanded from people, local people, not imposed by 
us (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…an NGO or a development agency tries to come up with a solution, it quite often 
doesn’t work, but I think it comes down to having them, communities you’re trying 
to work with, come up with the solutions and helping them do that, rather than 
enforcing solutions (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
When NGOs’ projects met the needs of the poor, the poor then had more motivation 
to actively participate in these projects and develop their own initiatives for their own 
development. Ultimately, the poor operated their MEs and were affected by them, 
and NGOs were there to assist. This strategy was essential for empowering the poor 
by being accountable for their own development. It was a fundamental step for 
NGOs, demonstrating accountability to beneficiaries as part of a step-approach 
within a participatory process. 
 
6.4.2 Facilitating empowerment 
Thirteen out of 20 NGOs mentioned that through engaging in MEs, participants 
earned extra income and accumulated assets, such that they were economically 
empowered.  
They can spend their money for children’s education, good clothing, for 
entertainment, and sometimes some women are maintaining their family also. They 
can buy some land, develop their house, everything, so the women can contribute for 
this (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…because they’re poor, and they think this is a way to…increase their income. 
That’s the thing that they want to have…economic stability (Senior Executive NGO 
1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
As beneficiaries gradually gained economic power, they had more opportunities to 
participate in social activities and increase their voice within the family and the 
community. 
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[By earning income], their family can respect them, so that they can contribute to 
their family, to themselves, you know (Senior Executive NGO 10-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
 
…we strategise the market development and microenterprise development as a tool 
not only to enable woman to have adequate income for their livelihood, but that is a 
tool for them to influence the personal relationship at their domestic level; as well as 
their social or public level in their communities (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Accordingly, one NGO emphasised the importance of active participation of the poor 
because power was not something to give; rather NGOs considered power was 
something to assume but could only be exercised when people were given 
opportunities to do this by communities, policies and support. Therefore, through the 
empowerment process, NGOs gave the poor opportunities to assume their power. 
Empowerment is not giving power to the people [who have less power], the people 
already have power, but releasing it. Let them do the thing they want to do, but 
giving guideline, values…That’s the definition of empowerment…because they 
don’t realise it, so they don’t have it, because of lack of knowledge, lack of attitude 
(Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Once the poor were empowered socially and economically, they could improve their 
living standards, for which NGOs were accountable. Through this process, the poor’s 
capacity was developed so that they were able to continue operating MEs or work 
with other actors independently (e.g. private sector companies, traders) once NGOs’ 
projects had finished. 
 
6.4.3 Providing a transforming process to develop financial independence and        
sustainability 
Nine NGOs emphasised that a participatory approach provided a transforming 
process within which the poor were able to gain knowledge, experience, and 
networks, so that they became confident and ready to join larger markets or 
businesses, resulting in financial independence and sustainability. 
…now [they] graduate themselves from [workers] to shop owners. We’re helping 
these women who are in the process of transforming themselves from [workers] to 
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entrepreneurs, small shop owners, because they have the skills of how to transform 
[unused items] into resources (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…when we are doing development, the character of effectiveness really helps these 
people change or transform…we always underline the transformation…Why? 
Because what we need is not just to empower them, but they also need to empower 
[themselves] and ensure that the condition is sustained…so that they will sustain 
with the new capacity that they have (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
 
6.4.4 Providing NGOs with opportunities to work as facilitators  
Nineteen out of 20 NGOs emphasised the importance of facilitating participation of 
the poor, such that NGOs worked as facilitators within a participatory approach; not 
as the main actor of poverty alleviation programs. Rather, the first and foremost 
priority was to have active participation of the poor and their communities with 
strong commitment, so that they took initiatives to end their poverty (specific details 
of this process are highlighted in the next chapter). 
It’s not possible to change anything if you don’t [involve] the community, the 
development sector, and the [poor] people and their families, and all that…you need 
to [involve them] to build a society where it’s truly inclusive (Senior Executive 
NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
During the process, it has to be an inclusive approach. You have to include all the 
actors - from farmers, to producers, to traders, to processors, to go out, to interview 
all of them, to have focus group discussions with all of them, and then feedback and 
validate the things you have found. So that, going forward, it’s a participatory 
process for identifying the constraints and identifying opportunities, sustainable 
ways to solve these constraints (Senior Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 
2013).  
…my whole background is participation, so I really understand that methodology 
deeply…so here, I just make sure that we work in that way, that we make sure that 
the poor are attended to…we don’t have an exclusive focus on poverty, we try to 
involve all sectors of the community in the work that we do because we feel it’s 
important that the community as a whole is engaged (Senior Executive NGO 8-
Indonesia, local, 2013). 
As presented in Section 5.2, NGOs’ goals and strategies for MED emphasised the 
involvements of the private and public sectors. This focus was reinforced throughout 
the participatory approach to beneficiary accountability. NGOs highlighted the 
participation of local governments, so that the poor had access to available 
government resources. As such, the government played an important role in poverty 
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alleviation, replicating and continuing the support initiated by NGOs.  
…we think that we can [create] something that can be replicated by different 
initiatives [like the government]…and [we are] working with them as consultant. So, 
[poverty alleviation] should be done by the government as it’s the government’s 
responsibility (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…so our role is to facilitate [development of beneficiaries] with the government 
because this is the role of the government to meet the need of the people. So this is 
always the critical step in development…it will finally affect [the government to] 
continue the support, [and beneficiaries to] continue to participate (Senior Executive 
NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Importantly, emphasising a facilitation role, NGOs, particularly international NGOs 
(eight out of 11 in total for both countries), highlighted the essential role of 
collaboration and co-operation with the private sector. Through this partnership, the 
private sector included service suppliers, input suppliers, traders, and production 
companies helping to provide training, services, inputs, market access and linkages 
for MEs. The strong participation of the poor and these actors helped to achieve more 
effective benefits and outcomes for poverty alleviation that NGOs could not achieve 
alone.  
…we think not only the capital support to them, it’s one factor, but other factors as 
value chain, or linking with other service providers is also essential. So, somehow, 
some services are not ours, but there are other service providers also. They can help 
them [MEs]. So, we just need time to link to them so that they can get the maximum 
benefits, maximum services from other sources also (Senior Executive NGO 4-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…MED has to be done, again, in a way that is not building dependency. All I’m 
saying is that MED is good because demographically that’s where most people are 
at, but it’s also good to the extent that it’s being looked at in the context of 
sustainability, the context of ongoing, what we would call private sector-based 
solutions, not solutions that are coming from the outside and may not continue 
(Senior Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
…what our fundamental belief is really in the end it’s not going to be NGOs that are 
going to drive people out of poverty, it’s going to be the market that’s going to do it. 
So where possible, we believe in taking a market-based approach to our activities 
(Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
A participatory approach thus helped to achieve sustainable ME development 
through empowering the poor. This was because ultimately NGOs could not do 
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everything, and their projects had specific timeframes, so MEs had to work directly 
with market actors. 
…sustainability. So ensuring that once we leave, once our project is completed and 
we’re leaving Bangladesh…the commercial relationships between the market actors, 
specifically with small-scale producers and whoever they’re buying from or selling 
to, have been made stronger. So that, small-scale producers are gaining more in 
income and there are more opportunities (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
…we want the farmers’ sovereignty…Even though we stay to facilitate them but we 
try to help them not depend on us…We try to make them independent. So after some 
training and help from us, we hope that the farmers can be independent and make 
their own market access (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
The above findings show the essential role of a participatory approach throughout 
MED projects to achieving sustainable poverty alleviation. Within this approach, 
NGOs emphasised their role as facilitators, promoting active roles for the poor and 
local communities (local government, local businesses, etc.). As such, NGOs’ 
accountability to beneficiaries involved ensuring beneficiaries were empowered and 
took active roles for their own social and economic development. 
 
6.4.5 Perspectives of donor NGO 
The interview with the donor NGO operating in Indonesia reinforced some key 
constraints identified by MED NGOs, including provision of funds between 
governments which then sub-contracted or worked with NGOs on a project basis. 
…the process is always put-together process, because [as a sector] we are G to 
G…the fund goes through the government because the system [requires] us to do 
that way, unless the project is a direct project that you work on with NGOs (Senior 
Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
The donor NGO also highlighted the trend that donors often wanted to provide funds 
to local NGOs for local capacity building, yet they acknowledged a need for 
international NGOs’ presence, as local NGOs still had very limited experience and 
knowhow in these processes.  
In our projects we will put the local NGO with [the project]…but local NGOs do not 
have experience in working with national government partners or national economy. 
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I see some other government projects which have a link with international NGOs 
(Senior Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
The donor NGO emphasised the importance of a participatory approach involving 
different actors within communities, particularly the private sector through value 
chain development. This approach was considered to facilitate holistic support for 
poverty alleviation. 
It’s not only about increasing production but to take it as a whole package…a 
holistic provisional approach not only through one, like community empowerment, 
that’s it, or microenterprise, but we try to take it from the whole (Senior Executive 
donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
Similar to MED NGOs’ perspectives, the donor NGO emphasised the importance of 
the private sector’s participation to access markets and resources. 
…sustainable economic development, it means that you cannot work alone. You 
have to work with all different parties and to make sure that you are on the same 
page trying to do something. I mean, that’s the basic idea…private sector has a lot to 
offer to the country. They have the technology, they have the money. It’s just a 
matter of how to make them interested in investing to poor people and work with 
poor people (Senior Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Hence, in facilitating sustainable poverty alleviation through economic development, 
it was important to let the markets work with MEs and provide MEs with 
opportunities to grow. 
…it’s not easy but the government starts to acknowledge the importance of working 
with private sectors because they know they could not fulfil all the technology needs 
that poor farmers need. If it’s not a market demand, then they will lose it. And then 
instead of helping them out of poverty, you will draw them to even more poor 
(Senior Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
As such, NGOs generally acted as facilitators of this process.   
The government, the private sectors, so it’s kind of like a mixed support for the 
communities. So, we really…and NGOs are the ones, what we say, a middleman 
who will try to organise, coordinate with those three parties. And the facilitators, 
which are the NGOs, are the ones who link the people to either the market or 
whatever service the farmer groups need. That’s how it works actually in our 
projects (Senior Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented findings regarding NGOs’ strategies for gaining 
legitimacy (and constraints to these strategies) from donors, and the effects of these 
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approaches on managers’ perceptions and goals towards donors. The findings show 
that for the NGOs investigated, gaining legitimacy primarily remains an internally 
oriented process, such that NGOs define the purpose of their operations, then seek 
the support of those (e.g. donors) that have a similar purpose, or persuade potential 
donors by increasing their understanding or awareness of issues that NGOs work on. 
These strategies affect NGO managers’ perceptions towards donors, such that donors 
are considered as partners who help NGOs implement projects benefiting the poor. 
NGOs primarily work with donors who share their views and support their strategies 
for MED. Importantly, these strategies also affect NGO managers’ perceptions and 
goals towards beneficiaries. NGOs consider beneficiaries as development partners 
(or customers, participants); who are the long-term purpose of their operations. 
Within these perceptions (and goals), empowering beneficiaries through facilitating a 
participatory approach (involving active roles by beneficiaries, their communities 
and the private sector) is considered crucial. Such participation assists in achieving 
sustainable outcomes for poverty alleviation programs and demonstrating NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries. The mechanisms for such accountability are 
presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7:  FINDINGS – A participatory 
approach and accountability to beneficiaries 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Six outlined findings addressing the first three research questions on NGOs’ 
strategies for gaining legitimacy from the perspectives of donors, and beneficiary 
management; and the extent to which these strategies facilitated a participatory 
approach to accountability to beneficiaries. This chapter presents findings addressing 
Research Questions Four and Five. Research Question Four examines mechanisms 
NGOs used to facilitate a participatory approach for their accountability to 
beneficiaries in MED, and barriers to these mechanisms. Research Question Five 
investigates how a participatory approach to accountability to beneficiaries 
contributes to MED NGOs’ program outcomes. Specifically, Section 7.2 identifies 
the mechanisms of a participatory approach used to facilitate accountability to 
beneficiaries, including processes (consulting, partnership, delegated control) and 
tools (disclosure statements, feedback and response, social audit, self-regulation). 
Section 7.3 then presents barriers to these mechanisms relating to beneficiaries, 
NGOs, and the environmental context. The contributions of a participatory approach 
to NGOs’ MED program outcomes are highlighted in Section 7.4. A summary of the 
chapter is detailed in Section 7.5. Similar to chapters Five and Six, all tables 
presented in this chapter are based on the interview data.  
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7.2 MECHANISMS OF PARTICIPATORY APPROACH 
Based on the framework proposed in Section 3.4.4 (Figure 3.2), a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability includes processes and tools. Both were 
identified in the findings of this study, as detailed below. 
 
7.2.1 Processes of participation 
As outlined in the literature review (Section 3.4.3), participation involves three major 
levels: consulting, partnership, and delegated control. The findings of this study 
support these levels with evidence considered below. 
  
a. Consulting 
As highlighted in Section 6.4.1, for the NGOs investigated, meeting the needs of the 
poor was considered essential for a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability. For these NGOs, the first step of participation was consulting through 
baseline assessments and discussions with key actors (e.g. local government, local 
businesses, poor communities) to understand the local context, problems, needs, and 
potential solutions for poverty alleviation. A summary of the aims of NGOs’ 
consulting processes is detailed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Aims of consulting processes 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
Understand the local context 1 4 5 1 5 6 11 
Understand the poor communities 7 5 12 2 6 8 20 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one aim. 
Approximately half (11 out of 20) of the NGOs indicated that it was important to 
assess and understand the local context, including social and economical conditions, 
problems and potential solutions, before any intervention. This strategy was 
particularly common for international NGOs (nine out of 11 in total across both 
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countries) because these NGOs had limited experience in and knowledge of the local 
context. 
So typically…we would do a starting study in a country…to look at a number of 
different value chains or sectors. And so we would talk with government officials, 
university professors, people in different industries to get a broad perspective of 
what industries there’s growth potential for…we call that Value Chain Selection 
Process...we try to understand all of the different constraints that all actors face 
(Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…the project is based on the assessment, before we develop the projects we conduct 
the assessments [using] the local people. We hire…consultants [to] analyse the 
context at the local level with the people, and with the government (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
While understanding the local context was particularly important for international 
NGOs, all NGOs investigated highlighted that it was essential for them to consult 
with poor communities in order to know their status, problems, needs, and potential. 
…a community, we can split it into two – one is the group of people who are saying 
that they are marginalised and that they are not being included in mainstream 
society. So what are the reasons there? Why is it like that? The second group is the 
community, the development players where we can see the mainstream (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…there's open meetings, we have these large community meetings where people 
come and they can talk and discuss and identify what their priorities are and that all 
gets kind of decided on and goes into the plan. So, that starting point is really 
important…very wide and inclusive from the beginning (Senior Executive NGO 8-
Indonesia, local, 2013). 
However NGOs noted that the poor’s needs and potentials must align with NGOs’ 
capacity and market needs. 
After [conducting] community consultation, we see whether [what they need] is 
possible for us [to facilitate] or not. If we find that yes we have the possibility we 
can, then we go for that (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
…if we think we can't connect these people to market then we’re not going to help. 
We can improve productivity, but if they can't sell their crops all they’ve done is 
waste money. So it’s a combination of things – looking at where the need is, but 
looking at where we can make a difference (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Thus, a consulting process helped not only NGOs to understand the poor’s needs and the 
local context, but also helped the poor to understand their capabilities and market needs from 
the beginning of MED projects, preparing them both to be accountable for their activities. 
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b. Partnership 
As mentioned in Section 6.4, as part of a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, the “partnership” level emphasised the essential role of empowerment 
and transformation process through collaboration involving various actors. However, 
the types of partnership varied depending on the poverty level and capability of the 
poor communities. Table 7.2 summaries the types of partnership identified in 
practice. 
Table 7.2 Types of partnership 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Partnership within groups 6 3 9 1 4 5 14 
2. Partnership with civil or other not-
for-profit organisations 
4 3 7 0 4 4 11 
3. Partnership with government 3 2 5 2 4 6 11 
4. Partnership with the private sector 2 4 6 2 6 8 14 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often facilitate more than one type of partnership. 
 
Partnership within groups 
The majority of NGOs (14 out of 20) indicated that they required participants to 
work in groups from the start of NGOs’ MED projects. Through groups, NGOs often 
provided support such as training, grants, or credit. Within groups, participants 
collectively worked together to manage sales and purchases, savings, and loan 
repayments, and were accountable to each other. The remaining NGOs did not work 
with participants in groups due to their specific strategies (e.g. focusing on individual 
cases), or did not consider it. 
So, we’re giving [credit or grants] to the individual [groups], but the group members 
are deciding who is getting first priority…they have made their own savings and 
then from their own savings, they are deciding who’s going to take the loan (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…eight girls together – they lease a small piece of land…they’re selling [their 
products] together (Senior Executive NGO 10-Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
 
By buying and selling together, participants had the opportunity to access inputs on 
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more favourable terms and larger markets (economies of scale). 
…if they [participants] start bulking and demanding the service then the private 
sector will be interested…if I [a trader] go there then I will be able to reach 25 
farmers but individually [I] probably have to look for a lot of people individually 
and that would be a higher transaction cost (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
One of the biggest challenges in agriculture is consolidation, especially in a country 
like Indonesia. The smallholder farmers, one of the reasons they don’t get to market 
is because they're not supply consolidated (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
 
Partnership with civil or other NFP organisations 
As NGOs often operated in various regions or countries, accessing local poor 
communities could be challenging. As such, 11 out of 20 NGOs (seven in 
Bangladesh and four in Indonesia) highlighted participation of civil and other NFP 
organisations in their programs because these organisations were close to the 
communities; operating locally and working with the poor on a daily basis. These 
organisations helped NGOs reach the poor communities and assisted NGOs during 
the implementation of MED programs, increasing the effectiveness of project 
outcomes, helping to enhance accountability to beneficiaries. 
We have some other NGOs, partner NGOs, we communicate with them, they 
identified [participants] and they also assess [participants] (Senior Executive NGO 
3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
While local NGOs chose to work with local civil organisations for efficiency 
purposes, international NGOs found that forming this partnership were also required 
by the local government, particularly for NGOs operating in Indonesia.  
Since we are international organisations, we like to work in partnership with the 
local partners…because the local people who developed their [operations] were very 
much linked with the communities…The resilience, the local context, they’re much 
aware…so they know very much what is going on (Senior Executive NGO 10-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
…they’re our partners…because the government of Indonesia does not allow 
international NGOs to…[operate] directly [with the poor], so we need to find the 
local partners…So everything related to implementation will be handled by local 
institutions (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
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The findings showed that NGOs operating in both countries formed partnerships with 
local NGOs either on voluntary (Bangladesh) or compulsory basis (Indonesia). These 
partnerships, while enabling NGOs to comply with the local government’s 
requirement, helped enhance partnerships within communities.  
 
Partnership with government  
Eleven out of 20 NGOs (five in Bangladesh and six in Indonesia) indicated that the 
government often had their own projects for poverty alleviation. By involving local 
government and linking the poor communities with governments’ programs, NGOs 
helped their participants access more resources, training, and skills, and reinforced 
the need for government to become more accountable to their citizens. Further, for 
the extremely poor, they often received some additional support through existing 
government programs. 
Governments are providing some welfare support for affected people or extreme 
poor people, they have some safety net programs (Senior Executive NGO 11-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…we help them [farmer groups] to access funding with the Department of Co-
operatives and also the national insurance (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Importantly, it was noted that NGOs in Bangladesh needed the support and 
involvement of the government directly in NGOs’ MED programs to gain access to 
poor communities. 
…consider a person like me, if I go to the villages and tell the beneficiaries or 
farmers that, please do [NGO’s activities], they won’t believe me because I’m not a 
person meeting them day to day, but the [local government] people, who are actually 
advising them [beneficiaries] for [using] seeds, fertiliser...and other advices, they 
actually believe those [people] (Senior Executive NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 
2013).  
They [local governments] are implementers directly, because they have [a] very 
good acceptability [from the] community, they’re known in all community levels 
(Senior Executive NGO 10-Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
NGOs operating in Indonesia also involved the government as they supported NGOs 
with policies or infrastructure. However, unlike NGOs operating in Bangladesh, 
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these NGOs worked to gain trust and approval from the government, which then 
allowed them to work with local communities.  
So we start thinking about the complete value chain development. We’ll go to the 
government for example to ensure the regulations [support] the system that we have 
started…[also], regulations to protect what we do, or maybe sometimes we need 
support like infrastructure, or something that we don’t have. This is also key (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
…you’ve got to be here and have an agreement with the government, so you're 
actually guarded by the government about which particular areas to some degree you 
work (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
 
Partnership with the private sector 
As highlighted previously, 14 out of 20 NGOs indicated that participation of the 
private sector was important to achieve MED sustainability, providing MEs with 
access to commercial resources and markets. Within this partnership, particularly for 
NGOs focusing on VCD, NGOs did not provide any direct support to MEs. Rather 
they provided training, financial support (e.g. cost-sharing arrangement), and 
business networks indirectly through private sector companies, which reinforced 
community involvement and the poor’s responsibility for their own development. 
…now we are giving [financial, training, technical support] in a different model. 
Earlier we gave it directly to the customers [beneficiaries] and to partners [private 
sector companies]. Now we give it to the partners only, because they will [then] 
provide the technical support and services [to customers]. [By doing so] there is 
maybe a chance that they are managing the issues [together] (Senior Executive NGO 
8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…for the financial things, we support them [private sector companies] depending on 
their demand. Like if they want to identify some new buyers [farmer groups], very 
new, they never did dealings with this buyer or something like that, in that case we 
support them maybe 70% or 75% financial support. We call it cost-sharing (Senior 
Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
However, as this sector was very profit oriented and its partnerships with the poor 
were new, NGOs had a responsibility to ensure benefits to the poor in these 
partnerships, promoting effective outcomes for their projects. As such, NGOs had 
clear criteria for choosing which private sector actors to participate in MED projects. 
First, NGOs’ mission and values needed to be aligned with or supported by these 
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private sector actors (organisations). 
They should agree with our vision, mission, and our programs. If they do not agree 
then we can’t accept them (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
…do [companies] have the same value with you? This is very, very critical…we 
need to do the screening process we call as ethical checks. Although we agreed to 
work together but …if the factories do not pass the ethical check…we just stop the 
partnership (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Further, they must be willing to work with MEs and be able to co-operate with a 
sufficient number of MEs. 
…they have to either buy from or sell to a minimum number of producers…maybe 
they must buy or sell to a minimum of 500 or 1000 producers. And that’s to ensure 
that a larger number of producers could potentially be positively impacted by 
whatever we do with that company…that would be an initial criteria...if not, then we 
won’t work with them (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
I think it just depends on so many different situations, especially because we’re 
susceptible, like market-based approach, we’re quite often, trying to look at big 
numbers of people, so it’s not a tiny little area (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
Importantly, as NGOs provided funds to these actors, they chose actors that had a 
good reputation or good financial records. 
…we selected some traders with good reputation [and] with little bit access to capital 
(Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…you need to check the management capacity. So you need to complete a list of 
questions to measure the management capacity…The second one you need 
to…[check] the financial capacity as well (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
Lastly, in order to provide MEs with viable and sustainable development, NGOs 
required these actors to be willing to improve and expand MEs’ operations.  
…also that they are interested in improving what they are doing with the producers 
they’re buying from or selling to. And also some companies who need some 
support…and they want to invest more for their wholesale and also their export. In 
that case we’ll select this company (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
Throughout the above processes of participation, by consulting with local actors and 
local communities to understand their needs, conditions and context, NGOs avoided 
undertaking projects that did not provide effective outcomes for the communities. 
Further, by involving various actors (including local government, local NGOs, the 
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private sector), NGOs facilitated partnerships between poor communities and these 
actors, and gradually prepared the poor to assume responsibility for their business 
operations and decisions, fostering independence. These processes thus helped to 
promote NGOs’ accountability to their beneficiaries. 
 
c. Delegated control 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, within a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, NGOs help working groups gradually assume control and take 
responsibility for their own development within a supported environment by 
delegating control. Through this process, NGOs prepare groups for a handover stage 
when NGOs completely phase out their involvement and groups are able to continue 
to manage and potentially grow microbusinesses. This level of delegated control was 
supported by the findings of this study, as detailed in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 Success from delegated control 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Business relationships continued and expanded 1 4 5 1 3 4 9 
2. Federation or co-operatives developed 2 1 3 1 3 4 7 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs can have more than one success. 
 
Among the 13 NGOs indicating that their participants took control when MED 
projects formally finished, nine NGOs (five in Bangladesh and four in Indonesia) 
highlighted that poor communities continued developing the businesses further 
through replicating their successes to other poor households or communities, 
involving more people.  
…[since our project finished] they printed some stickers with their mobile phone 
number, and they stick in different areas. And they have their skills how to construct 
this cooking stove. And now, they’re bigger entrepreneurs…They sell [services and 
material] and also construct [cooking stoves] (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
…[since our project finished, the poor communities] have a person in the city who 
provides information about market situation in the city and text to their colleagues, 
Chapter 7: Findings – A participatory approach and accountability to beneficiaries  
Page 165 
 
this is a community to community, this is not doing by [our] staff. But we teach them 
to do that (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
In a more organised and formal collaborative structure, NGOs helped working 
groups develop into federations or co-operatives involving a large number of ME 
groups32. These federations or co-operatives had members (ME group 
representatives) and formed their own management committee (including 
chairperson, secretary, and treasurer). They organised sales, purchases, and 
production together; collected savings from group members and then provided credit 
to members who were in need. At the time of conducting interviews, these 
federations and co-operatives were still operating (even though NGOs’ associated 
project had finished). While success was consistently reported in relation to 
federations in Bangladesh, challenges and failure were noted in relation to co-
operatives in Indonesia (as detailed in Section 7.3 – barriers to a participatory 
approach).     
We call that one Federation. They are managing, making decision, every time [if 
there is] any problem, they advise. Or they communicate with their different 
governments, NGOs, like-minded NGOs to get support (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…they develop some co-operatives to facilitate access to market...And the 
collaboration among the groups is very good because the co-operatives now collect 
[products] from the producers, the members; and they process it, pack it, put it in the 
market (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Hence, the participation process developed to a level of delegated control, such that 
the poor people managed MEs, working directly with other actors and sectors within 
their communities. This arrangement provided the poor with the opportunity to take 
control of their financial situation and continue operating MEs after NGOs’ projects 
finished, enhancing the poor’s and their communities’ accountability to their own 
                                                     
 
32
 As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, the terms federation and co-operative were used in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia respectively. 
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development. However, in helping the poor communities reach this level, several key 
contributing factors were identified, and are highlighted in the next section. 
 
d. Factors contributing to effective participation 
As MED NGOs did not simply provide welfare33 to the poor communities but 
expected them to contribute land, labour, and savings, calling for these communities’ 
participation was not always possible. In order to call for their participation, a 
number of factors emerged from the data to facilitate effective participation. These 
included building trust through working closely with poor communities, using 
successful cases to demonstrate the benefits of NGOs’ projects, and involving local 
people with influence to engage with the poor (e.g. community leaders, and 
participants’ husbands) as detailed in Table 7.4 below. 
Table 7.4 Factors contributing to effective participation 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Close working based on trust 4 3 7 1 5 6 13 
2. Successful example cases 1 4 5 0 5 5 10 
3. Involving people with power/influence 0 4 4 1 3 4 8 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often promoted more than one factor. 
 
The majority of NGOs (seven in Bangladesh and six in Indonesia) emphasised the 
importance of working closely with poor communities through understanding, 
respect, and commitment. This factor helped to build trust from communities; as a 
result, communities were more involved, contributing to the effectiveness of NGO 
accountability mechanisms. 
                                                     
 
33
 Referring to provision of goods or services without expecting anything in return 
Chapter 7: Findings – A participatory approach and accountability to beneficiaries  
Page 167 
 
…we have been working with the poor for a long time. So we have been maintaining 
a very good relationship with the community (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
They are marginalised, they are isolated...[the] trust-based relationship is probably 
the key factor...then you get to know the people really, then you get to know what 
they want. You get to understand them and that’s when you can give them advice 
that’s really based on their opinion and therefore have truly participatory type of 
interaction (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Another factor for encouraging participation was showing the poor communities 
positive results or successful examples from pilot projects or projects in other areas. 
Once you have a few good examples to demonstrate then they are showing interest 
to work on it (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…seeing is believing, so when you see this is happening and [your neighbour] is 
getting benefit, we will also do that. That is the highest motivation factor (Senior 
Executive NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
NGOs also indicated the importance of involving people who have power, 
experience or a voice in communities, such as community leaders, religious leaders, 
elderly or even husbands of female participants. 
…[we also] invite the older farmers to see what is happening in the training because 
young girls…young women are coming. So in training…they’re really sharing 
among themselves, and when the older farmer is going back to the community, he’s 
saying, “Very good learning is going on. Your daughter went there, your wife went 
there, and what I have seen is really nice.” So, [it] is creating positive feelings 
(Senior Executive NGO 10-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…for sustainability of activities [we] need males [participants’ husband] because if 
males do not understand why women are doing this, maybe males [obstruct] them 
(Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
The above findings show that effective processes of a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability relied not only on the willingness of NGOs or the poor to 
facilitate these processes, but also on other relational factors such as trust between 
NGOs and the poor, and involving local people with power or influence. 
    
7.2.2 Tools for facilitating a participatory approach 
Section 3.4.4 proposed tools for facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, including (1) disclosure of information to beneficiaries, mechanisms 
for (2) receiving feedback and (3) responding to it, (4) social audit and (5) self-
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regulation. However, the majority of NGOs investigated indicated that while 
mechanisms for accountability to donors were formal through reporting systems (e.g. 
annual reports, timely monitoring and evaluation reports), mechanisms for 
accountability to beneficiaries were very informal. As such, while the proposed 
framework predicted disclosure, feedback, and response as the first three 
mechanisms, due to the nature of a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, these mechanisms were facilitated through a similar, but less formal 
mechanism of information exchange. 
 
a. Information exchange 
Information exchange involved NGOs providing beneficiaries with information 
directly and indirectly (i.e. access to information), receiving beneficiaries’ feedback 
and complaints, and providing responses through informal channels. Specifically, 16 
out of 20 NGOs (10 in Bangladesh and six in Indonesia) indicated that information 
exchanged with beneficiaries was based on the poor’s needs (in terms of content and 
timing). 
…my team regularly goes to the field, they have very informal discussions…they 
have…some very good links with some of the lead farmers so they’re in touch, 
[from that] of course we get informal feedback (Senior Executive NGO 9-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
We don’t have formalised approaches, so we don’t have necessarily a standard 
saying that we’ll provide this information…we leave it at basic approaches (Senior 
Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Further, information exchange with beneficiaries was directly related to specific 
projects (including processes of involvement, benefits, complaints or feedback etc.), 
or any other information that NGOs felt the poor communities needed, such as 
government programs from which they could benefit.  
According to our proposal, the things we want to confirm, or want to fulfil, we share 
these things [with poor communities]…we give them what are the requirements for 
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them [to participate in and benefit from projects] (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
To the communities, we give them information about changes that happened within 
them…like in local villages in development, we are talking about trying to increase 
the bargaining position of the farmer’s group with the buyers. We monitor the price 
[and communicate] time to time, how much they get (Senior Executive NGO 7-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
In order to exchange information, NGOs used various methods, summarised in Table 
7.5 below.  
 Table 7.5 Methods for information exchange 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often used more than one method. 
 
Most NGOs (11 in Bangladesh and seven in Indonesia) indicated that information 
was given to beneficiaries through training sessions, workshops, group meetings, or 
routine visits. During these sessions, beneficiaries also had the opportunity to provide 
feedback and raise concerns or receive NGOs’ responses. Within this approach, 
information exchange was conducted in a very informal way and local NGO staff 
were essential for providing and receiving information. 
…our staff members have regular meetings, self-help group meetings, other 
meetings – maximum two times, minimum one time a month – where they are able 
to share information [and] provide their feedback to us (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…we do a workshop…we invite everybody including community to hear the result 
of [base-line or monitoring assessments] and then we give feedback…In the 
workshop usually there is always giving and taking of information (Senior Executive 
NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013).   
Less frequently, information was also exchanged through monitoring, assessments or 
evaluation where NGOs could receive feedback (or concerns) from beneficiaries or 
local partners involved in and benefiting from NGO projects.  
 Bangladesh NGOs (n=12) Indonesia NGOs (n=8) 
Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Group meeting, training, local staff 7 4 11 2 5 7 18 
2. Monitoring and evaluation  4 1 5 1 6 7 12 
3. Community information systems 1 3 4 2 3 5 9 
4. Private sector, local partners 1 4 5 1 1 2 7 
5. Phones, internet 1 1 2 1 3 4 6 
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…Project officers can have a monthly visit so they have a chance to speak to the 
project officers, to the partners about: what is their expectation and do they have any 
ideas [for improvements] (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
…we have an evaluation process. In each year, we have consultation meetings with 
different stakeholders [beneficiaries, project managers] (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Importantly, NGOs again emphasised their role as facilitators in information 
exchange, such that active participation of other actors (e.g. the private sector, local 
partners) was central. These actors were trained by NGOs or had their own expertise, 
then directly provided information (e.g. techniques, training) to and received 
feedback or concerns from the poor communities. 
…we don’t want them [beneficiaries] to depend on us…we are now linking [and 
building the capacity of] private sectors, traders to go there and give information 
[about techniques, directly to beneficiaries] (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
…we don’t want to be the one that connects [the one they rely on] with the poor 
because it’s not very economical or sustainable, so we’re quite often a couple of 
steps back…[companies] are part of a project, they're monitored [by us]. 
[Beneficiaries] can get information from these local companies (Senior Executive 
NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
In addition, emails and phone were also used by both NGOs and beneficiaries for 
exchanging information.  
…[internet] is always active every day, provide the news [about projects, meeting, 
training] every day in a mailing list, we also have Facebook, Twitter (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
We have the feedback box. If you have any complaints, any alternative suggestions, 
anything, please drop your opinion in this box or please call this number (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Hence, it can be seen from the findings that most information exchanged within a 
participatory approach to beneficiary accountability was via informal mechanisms, 
and mainly for beneficiaries to understand, participate in, and benefit from NGOs’ 
projects. However, the effectiveness of this tool depended on some contributing 
factors, highlighted below. 
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Factors contributing to effective information exchange 
Given the constraints often associated with poor communities (e.g. low education 
level, lack of access to resources and information), NGOs identified some 
contributing factors that helped them effectively exchange information with these 
communities. Table 7.6 summarises these factors. 
Table 7.6 Factors contributing to effective information exchange 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Meeting the poor's information needs 1 2 3 1 4 5 8 
2. Easy to understand (slow, simple, visual) 2 1 3 1 4 5 8 
3. Good facilitators 2 2 4 1 4 5 9 
4. Positive manner (e.g. encouraging and 
appreciating) 
2 0 2 0 3 3 5 
5. Good infrastructure (mobile networks, 
internet, facilities) 
1 0 1 1 2 3 4 
Nb. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often had more than one contributing factor. 
 
One of the key factors was that information exchanged must be relevant (i.e. needed 
by communities), and thus required active involvement from the poor communities 
in order for NGOs to understand the poor’s needs. 
…before [providing information] we need to assess their needs. What types of 
information they need. Is it for the economical development? Is it for hygiene? Is it 
for education? [Based on] their needs if we provide the information, 100 per cent 
works. If we provide [irrelevant] information, nobody listens (Senior Executive 
NGO 7-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…because they are socially isolated…if you don’t come to them with what they need 
they’re not going to get it (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
Importantly, as poor communities often had a low level of education, information 
was presented and provided slowly and simply (e.g. visually) so that they could 
understand and remember. 
It has to be presented in a way that they can understand it. Simplify the information 
(Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…the way we learn is not the way they learn. They learn much faster if we show 
visual things rather [than words] (Senior Executive NGO 12-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013).  
…If you come to village and share [information with] people, let’s say 20 key 
points, people will forget…you just need to limit, ‘today I just want to talk about this 
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thing,’ only very, very simple (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
Further, the role of facilitators was very important to communicate information. They 
needed to be trusted and known by local communities. In addition, they needed to 
provide a comfortable environment by engaging with and encouraging beneficiaries 
so that they had the confidence and trust to give feedback and raise concerns. 
Most importantly, it brings together two parties to interact at [an] equal level. It’s not 
that I’m the service provider, I am high, and the service recipient is low. When it 
comes to individuals, it’s more like that, but when coming collectively as a group, 
this is our opinion [working groups] and you have to listen...They feel empowered, 
they are sharing their feedback (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…it’s really how you ask it. If someone doesn’t really want feedback, people won’t 
give it too often, so I think it’s making sure that they aren’t scared to give feedback, 
setting the tone or setting the environment that they can give it (Senior Executive 
NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Good infrastructure (mobile phone networks, and internet availability) was also a key 
factor for achieving effective information exchange.  
...our information flow was not very efficient, but now it is very efficient because 
most of the people are now using mobile phones in our country (Senior Executive 
NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
…most of [beneficiaries] we work with in Jakarta spend a lot of their time in internet 
cafés. These are different ways of reaching information [e.g. access to emails, 
NGOs’ websites] so instead of having picture-based materials to give information, 
we might show them where to find information on the internet, completely different 
level of access (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Hence, the findings show that effective information exchange mechanisms required 
strong participation and interaction between beneficiaries and NGOs to provide 
information needed by communities in a manner that was easy for them to 
understand and apply. Further, NGOs facilitated beneficiary engagement with other 
stakeholders (e.g. private sector) to access information. This tool helped strengthen 
NGO accountability to beneficiaries. It is also noted that within the NGOs 
investigated, information exchange with beneficiaries through formal reporting was 
not a common practice; rather, there was a focus on an informal, non-hierarchical, 
educative, empowering processes regarding information exchange.    
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b. Social audit 
Prevalence and forms of social audit 
While social audit was proposed as a potential tool to facilitate beneficiary 
accountability (Section 3.4.4), within the NGOs investigated, only two (both 
operating in Indonesia) acknowledged and understood the term ‘social audit’. The 
large majority (executives from 16 of the NGOs interviewed) expressed an 
understanding of this practice in more general terms such as monitoring, evaluation, 
or review procedures that could be conducted by NGO staff or a third party 
nominated either by donors, NGOs, or government bodies. The frequency of these 
practices was dependant on each NGOs’ project design or requirements (typically 
required by or agreed with donors). The terms monitoring, evaluation, and review 
were neither completely distinct nor used consistently by interviewees. ‘Monitoring’ 
was commonly referred to as a procedure often conducted by the NGOs’ staff during 
the implementation of a project, and the results were intended to help NGOs learn 
from their current practices and improve future project design for better outcomes. 
Both evaluation and review procedures were generally conducted by NGOs’ staff or 
third parties at the end of a project. While evaluation was mainly used to collect data 
regarding the outcomes or effectiveness of an NGO’s project, review practices often 
involved a more comprehensive procedure, encompassing multiple projects or the 
whole NGO’s operations. For example, an executive of one NGO used the term 
‘360-degree review process’ referring to reviewing its whole operations involving 
various projects, operational areas, and stakeholders.  
 
Of the 16 NGOs that adopted monitoring, evaluation or review procedures (rather 
than social audit specifically), typically they considered these procedures similar to 
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social audit, but interpreted and applied them in different ways, with an emphasis on 
impact and final evaluation. 
That is [an] impact evaluation obviously, final evaluation (Senior Executive NGO 4- 
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…it’s the monitoring part, we call it monitoring and evaluation. We never call it 
social audit (Senior Executive NGO 2-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Yeah, like a social impact assessment (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, 
international, 2013).  
The remaining two NGOs (both operating in Bangladesh) did not conduct any form 
of review and considered their social audit practice to be ‘under-developed’ or not 
their key focus. Executives from both NGOs acknowledged it as a systematic 
procedure, distinct from financial audit, indicating some level of awareness regarding 
what a social audit represents.  
No, we have no systematic social audit...but we have a very strong process in 
financial auditing. But we are thinking now about the social audit (Senior Executive 
NGO 11- Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Not yet, not yet…there is a system. The system is an initiative for social review. But 
that is not so strong (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
Further, the two NGOs that acknowledged using the term social audit were 
international and well-known with established operations. Thus, very few of the 
NGOs conducted social audits, however variations of social audits such as 
monitoring, evaluation and review practices were more common. The NGO 
executives’ responses in relation to whether they adopt social audits (or variations 
thereof) are summarised in Table 7.7.  
Table 7.7 Forms of social audit adopted 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Social audit 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
2. Monitoring or Evaluation 3 3 6 1 3 4 10 
3. Review 2 2 4 1 1 2 6 
4. None 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 7 5 12 2 6 8 20 
N.B. Categories are mutually exclusive 
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These findings suggest that within the NGOs investigated, the conduct of social 
audits (or variations thereof) was commonly an internal and informal practice. 
However, social audits were also conducted by third parties and to a lesser extent, 
government, at the request of donors. The main function was to serve NGO staff or 
donors for the purpose of project monitoring, evaluation or review as mechanism for 
accountability to donors and NGOs themselves. 
 
Conducting social audits  
Among the NGOs interviewed, social audits (or variations thereof) were commonly 
conducted using different methods, including focus group discussions, surveys or 
questionnaires, and case studies. These methods were used individually or 
collectively, depending on the NGOs’ purposes. The number of NGOs using these 
methods is summarised in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 Methods for conducting social audit 
 
 
Bangladesh NGOs (n=12) Indonesia NGOs (n=8) 
Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Focus group discussions 5 4 9 2 5 7 16 
2. Surveys or questionnaires 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 
3. Case studies 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Some NGOs adopted more than one method when 
conducting social audits. 
 
As detailed in Table 7.8, NGOs mainly used focus group discussions as a method for 
conducting social audits (or variations thereof), emphasising participation of various 
actors (e.g. beneficiaries, civil and government organisations and local private sector 
businesses) involved in and benefiting from NGOs’ projects. Through this process, 
information was exchanged with beneficiaries and other actors participating in 
NGOs’ projects, providing opportunities for learning and improving and thereby 
strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries. 
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We do FGD34 with the communities, the partners – local organisations – their staff, 
we talk with the government and other local governments to understand what went 
well, what are their suggestions, what they think will be better for their own 
communities (Senior Executive NGO 10- Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…the consultants will visit our programs and they will meet the beneficiaries, visit 
the villages, conduct, interview directly [various] people (Senior Executive NGO 5-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
To effectively address issues identified from social audits (or variations thereof), 
NGOs compared the results from this process with their initial objectives or 
benchmark performance indicators. 
…We have to have some baseline [initial indicators], and after that we compare all 
the baseline things to final things (Senior Executive NGO 2- Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
The results from this process were also used to modify the design of current or future 
projects for more effective outcomes. 
The benefit of course we will get what we call learning…critiques and also 
warning…We will get a lot of information in regards to how we do our 
work…people say, we need to change, what we do in the last five years is not really 
targeting our goals (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Through this user survey, we know where we are. That last [project] we did, we 
conducted [over] last five years, five user surveys. From the first user survey we 
found that our design needed to be modified. We did [this] (Bangladesh Senior 
Executive NGO 8, 2013).  
By conducting social audits, NGOs identified opportunities to be closer to 
beneficiaries, and listen to their needs, feedback, or complaints.  
…you are more people-friendly and people-oriented, you are reaching your targets 
[the poor]. We are here for the benefit of the poor (Senior Executive NGO 6-
Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
Once the social audit (or variations thereof) results were reviewed and verified by 
NGOs’ field staff, findings were then discussed with communities to identify 
required actions, and report back to NGO managers. This process helped NGOs learn 
from beneficiaries’ feedback and complaints, potentially improving current practices 
                                                     
 
34
 Focus group discussion 
Chapter 7: Findings – A participatory approach and accountability to beneficiaries  
Page 177 
 
and achieving more effective program outcomes; reinforcing NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries. 
  
c. Regulations including self-regulation 
The framework proposed in Section 3.4.4 suggests self-regulation within the NGO 
sector is one of the key mechanisms for NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
(requiring organisations to operate within institutional codes of conduct or 
behaviours). While the findings (Section 6.2.3) indicated that NGOs had to comply 
with external regulations (established by donors or governments), their focus was on 
internal (self-) regulation. As such, sixteen of the 20 NGOs (nine in Bangladesh and 
seven in Indonesia) noted that they had internal regulations and rules. These were 
criteria on principles for their own operations, an internal management system 
encompassing human resources, financial management, freedom from conflicts of 
interest, discrimination, and other unethical practices.  
We have policies...at the initial stage we have a constitution...developed by our 
constituencies, and under the constitution, we develop service tools, human resource 
policy, gender policy (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Oh yes, absolutely…we have two things: internal regulations and these are mostly 
admin/HR type of things…to prevent conflicts of interest, and financial 
mismanagement and these kinds of things. Very important (Senior Executive NGO 
4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
These internal regulations ensured NGOs’ management and staff worked within 
codes of conduct or behaviour (consistent with organisational mission and value), 
which helped to strengthen NGO internal accountability.  
…it ensures a security, mental security of the people [staff] those who are working 
with us. It ensures security of the community…if they come to this organisation, 
they will be well behaved and well taken care of (Senior Executive NGO 7-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…the codes of conduct help us to keep what we do…in the line [with] vision and 
mission of [the NGO] (Senior Executive NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
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…actually the code of conduct materialises our values and principles, ensures that 
people who join in the organisation commit to the values and principles of the 
organisation (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
While the framework proposed in Chapter 3 emphasises the importance of regulation 
within the NGO sector, for this study only one MED NGO in Bangladesh highlighted 
that there were microfinance regulations provided by the NGO sector with which 
they had to comply.  
…we are a member of that group HAP [Humanitarian Accountability Partnership] 
standard…These are mostly tools which [we] have to follow (Senior Executive NGO 
6-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
The majority of NGOs indicated that compliance with regulations was mainly to gain 
legitimacy or acceptance from donors and governments. Only two NGOs operating 
in Indonesia emphasised importance of regulations in gaining the trust of and being 
accountable to the poor communities. 
…as the organisation you need to be consistent to the values that you work for, 
otherwise…you lost your point if you cannot show that happens inside the 
organisation (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
The benefit I think, the image of our organisation will be secured…in the 
community (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Hence, findings suggested that regulations were mainly voluntarily, individually 
structured by NGOs themselves or basic regulations required by governments and 
donors. These regulations helped NGOs strengthen their internal accountability to 
their own mission and values – benefiting the poor, and accountability to government 
and donors. Essentially, there were very limited formal regulations within the sector 
which NGOs had to comply with. 
 
7.2.3 Beneficiaries’ perspectives 
As a participatory approach is essential for facilitating NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries, this section considers beneficiaries’ perspectives regarding NGOs’ 
accountability mechanisms, providing insights from a grassroots perspective. 
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a. Processes of participation 
Consultation 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, 10 interviews were conducted with beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries from three interviews (one in Bangladesh, two in Indonesia) indicated 
their satisfaction with NGOs’ projects, noting NGOs investigated the local conditions 
as a first step. 
I found that they were doing good. [NGO] provided sewing training to women, they 
did research on agriculture and they also did research on men of this community 
(Beneficiary 4-Bangladesh, 2013). 
With the village chief, they have a discussion about what their programs are for the 
year, what they do and everything, so they become more open to one another about 
what they’re doing (Beneficiary 3-Indonesia, 2013). 
Other beneficiaries indicated NGOs consulted with them before implementing 
projects: sharing information regarding what the NGO was offering, advising on 
conditions to participate, and benefits available from participating. This information 
often spread quickly within poor communities via local NGO staff, or people within 
the communities. Beneficiaries generally seemed happy with this process as NGOs’ 
projects addressed their needs, particularly beneficiaries in Bangladesh facing harsh 
living conditions in a densely populated environment.  
    
Partnership within groups 
Beneficiaries from both countries acknowledged partnerships within groups. For 
beneficiaries in Bangladesh, this partnership was a key requirement for the poor to 
participate in NGOs’ projects. These groups often had 15-25 members with strong 
working relationships over approximately 10 years. Further, beneficiaries expected 
these groups would continue in the future. 
If we are united, it is easy to tackle any problem…We are together now, we will be 
together in future too (Beneficiary 1-Bangladesh, 2013). 
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[…we have] 29 [members]…If there is any problem, then we can solve the problem 
together (Beneficiary 3-Bangladesh, 2013). 
However, group ties in Indonesia were very weak. Typically groups had few 
members (e.g. five) and forming or joining groups was not a major requirement for 
participation in NGOs’ projects. Yet in some cases beneficiaries belonged to large 
co-operatives of a few hundred people, leading to weak bonding between co-
operative members, raising some concerns about the effectiveness of a participatory 
approach for strengthening accountability to beneficiaries in this context. Limitations 
of this approach are considered in barriers to a participatory approach (Section 7.3). 
[I do] not really [belong to any groups]…probably just meetings, some sort of 
meetings (Beneficiary 1-Indonesia, 2013). 
However, while beneficiaries in Bangladesh were typically at the stage of 
progressing out of poverty through basic income generating activities, beneficiaries 
in Indonesia were more advanced in the poverty alleviation process, starting to 
connect with the private sector to expand their businesses. 
I’m getting more channels from buyers, from abroad, and from outside my original 
markets (Beneficiary 3-Indonesia, 2013). 
Similar to NGOs’ perspectives, findings from interviews with beneficiaries indicated 
the facilitation of a participatory process through consulting and partnership. 
However, partnerships within groups in Bangladesh remained strong, in contrast to 
those in Indonesia. (Findings expanding on this issue are presented in Sections 7.3.3 
and 7.3.4, detailing the contextual barriers to effective participation.) As such, within 
harsh economic conditions with limited opportunities to participate in mainstream 
economic activities, working groups had stronger bonds in Bangladesh, than in the 
more developed context of Indonesia.   
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Delegated control 
As highlighted in Section 7.2.1, groups developed into federations (in Bangladesh) 
and co-operatives (in Indonesia), which continued operating after NGOs’ projects 
finished. These activities were confirmed in the interviews with beneficiaries, with 
three beneficiaries in Bangladesh still working within their federations (commonly 
developed from groups of 20-30 members) and doing business together after NGOs’ 
projects finished. Meanwhile, two beneficiaries in Indonesia were operating MEs and 
working within co-operatives with a large number of members (e.g. 500 members), 
but with less bonding between members. While findings did not reveal problems 
with federations in Bangladesh, beneficiaries indicated that co-operatives in 
Indonesia were not effective, and had a poor reputation in the community.  
…in Indonesia co-operative is not a good name in community…They have a bad 
image because of the past experience: The chairman they always get the benefit first. 
(Beneficiary 3-Indonesia, 2013). 
Findings from interviews with beneficiaries reinforced participatory processes at 
various levels in NGOs’ projects, affecting NGO accountability mechanisms to 
beneficiaries. Noticeably, the delegated control level (where beneficiaries and 
communities took control of projects) was developed differently in each country. 
Success in Bangladesh was contrasted with challenges in Indonesia to facilitate an 
effective participatory approach in a more economically developed context. 
 
b. Tools for facilitating a participatory approach 
Consistent with NGO interview data, beneficiaries indicated that tools for facilitating 
a participatory approach (such as information exchange and social audit) were very 
informal. As self-regulation was conducted within NGOs’ own operations, 
beneficiaries were not questioned about this tool. 
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Information exchange 
Beneficiaries received and accessed information mainly related to governments’ and 
NGOs’ programs, the benefits of these programs, the process of involvement, 
training, etc. Through this mechanism of information exchange, beneficiaries 
provided feedback and complaints. Table 7.9 summarises how beneficiaries 
exchanged information with NGOs, comparing NGO and beneficiary responses. 
Table 7.9 Methods for information exchange 
Description 
NGO (n=20) Beneficiary (n=10) 
Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ 
1. Through group meeting, 
training sessions, local staff 
11 7 18 6 4 10 
2. Through community networks 4 5 9 6 4 10 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Some NGOs or beneficiaries adopted more than one 
method for information exchange. 
Through these mechanisms, all 10 beneficiaries noted that they mainly exchanged 
information via groups, community meetings, or training sessions, which were 
largely consistent with data collected from NGOs. 
…weekly meeting…we have classes and discussion. There is a management 
committee. We have discussion with management committee. Then, we have a 
board meeting every month. In a board meeting, there is a discussion among 22 
members about everything. If there is any problem in any group, then [they’ll] try to 
solve it (Beneficiary 4-Bangladesh, 2013).  
...we use group meeting…it’s an effective way to distribute information (Beneficiary 
3-Indonesia, 2013). 
In addition, NGOs often had local staff living within and working with local 
communities, who became a main source of information for beneficiaries. This was 
also evident during interviews with beneficiaries as the presence of local NGO staff 
was noted in various situations. 
If I need to know anything I just ask them [local staff] (Beneficiary 4-Bangladesh, 
2013). 
Noticeably, in both countries there was strong bonding and close communication 
among people within communities, such that information was easily spread through 
informal community networks. 
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…almost everyone knows about it [NGO projects]…it is easy (Beneficiary 4-
Bangladesh, 2013). 
…generally everyone knows it…from member to member. Like if you want to join 
me, this is the condition…Informally. We use socialisation (Beneficiary 4-Indonesia, 
2013). 
Beneficiaries, while being quite familiar with information exchange, were not so 
when discussing social audit, presented in the next section. 
  
 Social audits 
Among the 10 interviews with beneficiaries, none of them seemed familiar with or 
had an understanding of the term social audit. However, in seven interviews it was 
noted that beneficiaries either participated in monitoring, evaluation, or review 
procedure; or were aware of this practice within their NGO. Further, beneficiaries 
primarily referred to it as an annual requirement in their NGO, to monitor or evaluate 
performance of MEs and projects. However, based on interview data and 
observations, beneficiaries seemed very unfamiliar with this process. They often 
perceived it to be mainly for the purpose of NGOs, keeping records on individual 
MEs or groups, rather than as processes allowing beneficiaries to reflect on NGOs’ 
programs. 
We had discussion about how to perform certain things, how much was the loan 
amount, and how much was the savings (Bangladesh beneficiary 1, 2013).  
 …yeah, it was just about yesterday that [they] had an evaluation (Indonesia 
beneficiary 2, 2013).  
The remaining three interviews with beneficiaries (all based in Bangladesh, all from 
the same NGO), however, did not seem familiar with any of the above procedures, 
raising concerns regarding how NGOs conduct such evaluations, monitoring or 
review requirements, and the extent to which beneficiaries were involved in or 
informed. Table 7.10 summarises the response of beneficiaries compared to NGO 
executives’ responses regarding forms of social audit adopted by the participating 
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NGOs. 
Table 7.10 Forms of social audit: Comparison of findings from NGOs and 
beneficiaries 
 
 
NGO (n=20) Beneficiary (n=10) 
Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ 
1. Social audit 0 2 2 0 0 0 
2. Monitoring or Evaluation 6 4 10 3 4 7 
3. Review 4 2 6 0 0 0 
4. None 2 0 2 3 0 3 
Total 12 8 20 6 4 10 
 
c. Factors contributing to effective participatory approach 
Eight beneficiaries highlighted that one of the key elements to encourage them to 
participate in NGOs’ projects was that these projects met their needs and benefitted 
them. 
…it is good for us…we all benefit…We got many things, come to know many 
information…We come to know vaccination program…Earlier we used to put our 
finger print instead of signature. Now, we can use our own signature…Girls under 
18 years do not get married…As we are educated, girls get better marriage…we are 
also aware about negative meaning of dowry and early marriage (Beneficiary 1-
Bangladesh, 2013).  
…[NGO’ program] is really useful because they train me. I can understand bit by 
bit. And it helps my household (Beneficiary 4-Indonesia, 2013). 
Successful cases or good practices became a very effective way to encourage the 
poor communities to participate. 
People were previously looking for work. Through the co-operative union 
[facilitated by the NGO], we changed our lives. Other people followed us 
(Beneficiary 2-Bangladesh, 2013). 
It’s a matter of perceptions of co-operatives…educating the communities about 
[their] real activity in the community (Beneficiary 3-Indonesia, 2013). 
Involving people with status (either formally or informally) was also useful, such as 
the head of villages, or participants’ husbands. 
They’re [NGOs’ staff] trying to probably…influence the head of the village because 
he’s the public figure in the place, and everyone listen to him (Beneficiary 3-
Indonesia, 2013). 
And there is also an agreement contract, agreement document for the husband if the 
husband agrees with it [for his wife to participate] (Beneficiary 3-Indonesia, 2013). 
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Thus, factors contributing to an effective participatory approach identified by 
beneficiaries were largely consistent with those identified by NGOs. This 
consistency showed that what NGOs were doing to achieve effective program 
outcomes was similar to what beneficiaries’ expected, providing great potential for 
NGOs to promote participation of the poor and strengthen their accountability to 
beneficiaries. 
 
7.2.4 Donor NGO’s perspectives 
A participatory approach was also examined from the perspective of the donor NGO. 
Data collected from this interview provided an additional perspective on NGO 
accountability mechanisms to beneficiaries. Similar to MED NGOs, the donor NGO 
highlighted that the first step of participation - consulting with local communities - 
was also very important for their projects. 
…we talk with them and see what they’ve been doing for a living, which area will 
need to be supported, which area we think that they don’t understand [market 
opportunity]…, and the way they work socially, like, how women are represented in 
the community, the gender balance, women’s [and] men’s roles. How those systems 
work together, so we really need that type of work as our priority during the design 
process (Senior Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Consistent with previous findings, the donor NGO also emphasised the importance 
of facilitating partnerships within groups to facilitate collaboration as a form of 
mutual accountability through various relationships.  
…the driver is community empowerment where we mobilise the community, we 
make the community groups, and then we help them think through how to do a 
business plan, strategy or whatever process they need (Senior Executive donor 
NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
As indicated previously, the donor NGO outlined the essential role of the private 
sector in providing sustainable economic development for poverty alleviation 
through value chain development. Through their involvement, the private and public 
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sectors provided the poor communities with training on production technique and 
resources (e.g. seed) that they required. 
…we try to bring in [the] private sector, some [government] research institutions to 
help them boost their productivity…So, it’s kind of building the public-private 
partnership type of project…we also try to link them with one of the research 
development centres…to provide the seeds (Senior Executive donor NGO-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Regarding tools for facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, the donor NGO indicated that as self-regulation was conducted within 
MED NGOs’ operations, it was not the donor NGO’s concern. Other tools required 
by the donor NGO for facilitating a participatory approach were mainly through 
monitoring or evaluation (rather than social audit) to understand beneficiaries’ 
complaints or receive feedback. 
…we don’t want the community to not trust us so usually the midterm review 
process is very long and tricky because sometimes during the midterm review we 
have to change the design if it doesn’t fit or work (Senior Executive donor NGO-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
This process was also important to demonstrate NGOs were working closely with the 
poor, and helped to build trust. 
…changing the type of activity also means [more] work for the facilitators and 
NGOs to then provide an understanding to the communities to make sure that trust is 
still there so they don’t just suddenly stop and walk away. Normally, communities 
when they get disappointed they just walk away and dismiss the project (Senior 
Executive donor NGO-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
Hence, the findings supported the framework of NGO accountability mechanisms to 
beneficiaries proposed in Chapter 3, including processes and tools. Within the 
participation processes, partnerships between actors could face challenges in a more 
economically developed context, such as Indonesia, where beneficiaries often had 
more options to engage in income generating activities. Further, tools for facilitating 
a participatory approach within the NGOs investigated were very informal and 
required strong interaction between NGOs’ staff and beneficiaries through group 
meetings, training, or routine visits. This framework contributed to success in NGO 
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accountability to beneficiaries through a mutual form of accountability, yet also 
faced a number of constraints, as highlighted in the next section.  
 
7.3 BARRIERS TO A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH 
In the previous sections, a participatory approach appeared to have an essential role 
in facilitating beneficiary accountability within a MED NGO context. However, 
facilitating this approach still faced many constraints related to beneficiaries, donors, 
and the social context, as outlined below. 
 
7.3.1 Beneficiary-related barriers 
Based on interviews with NGOs, a number of beneficiary-related barriers to a 
participatory approach were identified and are summarised Table 7.11 below. 
Table 7.11 Barriers related to beneficiaries 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Low education levels 4 2 6 1 3 4 10 
2. Weak negotiating position 4 2 6 1 3 4 10 
3. Culture  2 3 5 1 3 4 9 
4. Receiving behaviour 1 3 4 1 4 5 9 
5. Low skill levels 3 2 5 1 0 1 6 
6. Other interests/commitments 3 0 3 1 1 2 5 
7. Dispersion of the poor 2 0 2 1 1 2 4 
8. Lack of good management and leadership 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often faced more than one barrier. 
 
Low education levels were often associated with poor communities and sometimes it 
was difficult to convince them to try new methods or learn new knowledge, which 
limited their opportunities for learning and took time to facilitate meaningful 
participation. 
[Beneficiaries] mostly can say: “where to go tell me” [as] they are still not 
experienced. So if I go in [a community] to [call their] participation, they will come 
together, [but] they don’t know anything (Senior Executive NGO 7-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
…when we have a very low education level it’s just harder to come up with ideas, 
with plans. It’s also harder to trust their capacity to suggest an idea, they’re always 
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saying “I’ve never been to school, you’ll have to tell me what to do” (Senior 
Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Within the context of poverty alleviation, given that beneficiaries typically perceived 
that they had a weak negotiating position or wanted to please NGOs, they were often 
not willing to express any criticism (constructive or otherwise) in their feedback or 
negotiation. This issue limited NGOs’ opportunities for learning and improving 
project outcomes. As such, lost opportunities to achieve effective programs outcomes 
impacted on NGOs’ effectiveness. 
…maybe this has been due to years of exclusion, years of isolation, years of not 
being respected of their opinions…some are reluctant to give feedback. Sometimes, 
they will not give you the real feedback (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, 
local, 2013). 
And whether it’s a hierarchy thing too; obviously if the head of the district or 
province said something, it’d be very hard for someone else to go against it (Senior 
Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Cultural and social pressures (e.g. gender inequality, religion, family relationships) 
also hindered the process of effective participation and limited the successful 
outcomes of NGOs’ MED programs. 
…the girls cannot really sell by themselves in the market, because it’s not culturally 
accepted…some cases, what the young girls did they sent their products [through] 
their fathers or brothers to the market…[but] we have lot of complaints that they’re 
not always getting back money from their brothers or fathers (Senior Executive 
NGO 10-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
 
…the culture is women only work in the kitchen. While outside is men, or the 
husbands…This is more challenge. Because [for] example, when we want to make 
workshops or training, there is no woman attending the training, always 
men…but...the one who will apply [the learning] is women (Senior Executive NGO 
3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Within contexts where direct subsidies were provided to poor communities (charity), 
NGOs were often understood as donors who came to give without conditions or 
expectations of beneficiaries committing something in return. In these communities, 
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it was challenging for MED NGOs to call for participation without expectations of 
provision in the form of charity35.  
…because we are working in very remote locations…when there’s flood or any 
situation, people or development NGOs try to go there for [immediate] relief. But we 
are not there for [immediate] relief, so at the level of the target groups we do have 
some challenges in convincing them that we are a development fund but we are not 
going to give you any money…So they have a little bit of expectation that “we will 
get some money” (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…because they always [received] support from NGOs, from government. They [say] 
“okay what do you bring for us?” It’s more challenging when we want them [to 
become] independent, when we want them to fund themselves (Senior Executive 
NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
In addition to low levels of education, the poor communities often had low skill 
levels. Hence, providing them with training on techniques or expecting them to 
expand their businesses or work professionally with the private sector was another 
challenge. This issue limited the effectiveness of partnerships between MEs and the 
private sector within a participatory process. 
…people [need] some technical skill, then finance management skill, so it is a really 
difficult process…then [only] five to 10 per cent people they are trying to [develop 
MEs beyond basic survival](Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…now [we’re] just introducing them with technology, but we see this does not work 
well because [people’s skill to learn the technology] still needs to be increased 
(Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Effective engagement in MED projects required finance, resources, time for 
attending meetings and training. These requirements became burdens when poor 
communities had conflicts or other commitments (e.g. sickness, festivals) such that 
they did not continue, or preferred to spend time on alternative activities to earn 
money for family survival. This issue increased the failure rate of MEs and limited 
the effectiveness of MED projects.   
                                                     
 
35
 As detailed in Chapter 6, to participate in MED projects, the poor were often required to have labor, 
land, saving, or interest with strong commitment before receiving NGOs’ support. 
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…because they’re very much busy with other works, that’s why they’re irregular to 
attend the group meeting (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
…also a lot of their time is spent trying to make ends meet, you know, so they don’t 
have extra time to engage in these kinds of processes, or to say volunteer to be on a 
committee…So there are those kinds of social barriers that you have to work around 
somehow in order to really make an effort for the poor to engage (Senior Executive 
NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
A participatory approach required beneficiaries to work in groups or spend time in 
meetings or training. However, when they lived in remote areas or moved, it was 
difficult for them to work in groups, access information and services, or for NGOs to 
reach them.  
…by definition, in cities, in countries that are rapidly developing, slums are meant to 
be relocated, to be pushed away from the centre…therefore, the communities in 
which we work are essentially very mobile. They are being relocated again and 
again from central areas to outskirts…essentially the business is going to have to 
move when the family will have to move as well (Senior Executive NGO 4-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
NGO executives indicated that partnership was important between beneficiaries and 
it needed strong leadership within groups. When leadership was missing, working 
groups risked collapse. This issue was revealed through the failure of some co-
operatives in Indonesia. 
…six co-operatives that went down…the main reason is the management, not the 
members…the day-to-day management, and lack of good management and good 
governance, accountability… (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
The above barriers limited active and meaningful participation of beneficiaries, 
presenting challenges for NGOs to ensure an effective participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability.  
 
7.3.2 NGO-related barriers 
Besides facing constraints related to beneficiaries, NGOs also faced internal 
organisational barriers. These barriers are summarised in Table 7.12. 
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Table 7.12 Barriers related to NGOs 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs (n=8) 
Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Time 4 4 8 2 1 3 11 
2. Exclusion the extremely poor 3 3 6 1 3 4 10 
3. Communication 2 1 3 2 4 6 9 
4. Capacity 4 1 5 0 4 4 9 
5. Cost 2 3 5 0 1 1 6 
6. Lack of sustainability of 
NGOs’ operations 
3 1 4 0 0 0 4 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often faced more than one barrier. 
 
As outlined above, mechanisms to facilitate a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability remained informal, yet strongly emphasised the participation of 
various actors. Therefore, it took time to convince poor communities to participate in 
each step of the project, become independent, and continue on their own. In addition, 
it took time to build relationships with other actors (e.g. the private sector, civil 
organisations, and governments). When there were time constraints, NGOs had 
limited opportunity to build capacity for poor communities and interact with 
beneficiaries for effective and sustainable outcomes.  
Time is a constraint for our workers in the field. There’s a large number of 
[beneficiaries], so to get feedback from everyone is not always possible (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…that takes a lot of time and a lot effort in the field. And being flexible in the way 
you deliver the information, also to be relevant for them, is difficult…[for example] 
making yourself available at times and in places when people are also available and 
willing to learn, which might mean things like not offering a three-day workshop but 
coming back for half an hour a day over two months (Senior Executive NGO 4-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
As mentioned previously, MED NGOs had some pre-conditions for poor 
communities to participate in their projects (e.g. labour, resources). By doing so, they 
excluded the extremely poor.  
…it was very clear from the very beginning and the donors are well informed that 
we cannot impact the extremely poor. That’s not our target group. And for the 
extreme poor who [are] landless, asset-less, jobless…it’s very difficult to bring them 
to a capacity of where market activity can work (Senior Executive NGO 9-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
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...because we’re focused on the overall community we just don’t have the time and 
the resources right now to go very deeply into the needs of individual poor 
households (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Another constraint was gaps in communication with beneficiaries, where NGO staff 
perceptions were different from those of beneficiaries regarding their needs, 
conditions or evaluation (of projects or activities). This gap limited NGOs’ 
opportunity to understand the most appropriate needs and issues of the poor 
communities, to provide adequate support.  
…when [projects] are being assessed…the [assessment that] they [NGO staff] give 
to their own work is seriously mismatched with the feedback that is given by the 
recipients. When you have a very different [view], [it is difficult to identify issues 
for improving] (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…it’s not easy to identify what they really need…Designing materials that are 
actually adapted to the target group, to their capacity level, that feel relevant to them, 
and not completely disconnected from their reality, that’s difficult (Senior Executive 
NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
As mentioned previously, good facilitators were important for effective participation 
processes, however, NGO staff often lacked this skill due in part to low-paid staff 
(reflecting their limited resources) and high staff turnover. 
…development workers also lack sometimes facilitation skills…or sometimes our 
staff are also very strict…Some staff do not have good [facilitating skills]…they 
lack [ability] to listen to complaints and understand (Senior Executive NGO 5-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
...For example, we recruited one staff, and after three months he finds that he’s 
earning here only 5000Tk [70AUD], while he has an opportunity to work for the 
government factory, 10000Tk [140AUD], why should he stay here (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
Effective participation processes often required time for interaction with poor 
communities and modifications in project design, which increased NGOs’ costs. 
However, costs were viewed as fixed, based on budgets agreed with donors in 
advance. 
The project team is struggling to complete all the activities based on what they 
agreed with the donor and the government. So with that feedback, if we are allowed 
a project revision, we try to build that in. That is limited by budget (Senior Executive 
NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
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For NGOs relying on donors to fund their operations, they faced difficulties 
regarding financial security or sustainability. This was observed in the field where 
some NGOs could not provide interviews as they had closed down, or some NGOs 
were still waiting for donor funds for new projects. 
…more than 50% organisations they [face] difficulties in our country…in terms of 
operational purposes. Basically because their operational efficiency is not 
[competitive], so it’s very difficult (Senior Executive NGO 11-Bangladesh, local, 
2013). 
Therefore, the above findings show that resources were a major challenge for 
facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability. This issue 
reinforced NGOs strategies for gaining legitimacy by diversifying funding sources in 
order to increase resources and financial independence. 
 
7.3.3 Context-related barriers 
As mentioned previously, a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability 
required the involvement of various actors within poor communities. However, it 
could be hindered by various factors in the local environment. 
 
a. Bangladesh 
As highlighted in Section 1.4, Bangladesh remains one of the world’s poorest 
countries with government instability and a high risk of natural disasters. These 
factors were identified by NGOs as major barriers to the effectiveness of a 
participatory approach (an accountability mechanism), as presented in Table 7.13 
below. 
Table 7.13 Factors hindering a participatory approach in Bangladesh 
 Bangladesh (n=12) 
Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Government corruption and bureaucracy 5 3 8 
2. Religious and culture conflict 2 2 4 
3. Harsh geographic conditions 3 1 4 
4. Inadequate infrastructure 3 1 4 
5. Social discrimination 4 0 4 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often faced more than one barrier. 
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The most common constraint (indicated by eight out 12 NGOs operating in 
Bangladesh) was the government corruption in addition to heavy bureaucracy, 
persistent political instability, and a poorly developed regulatory environment, which 
often required more time and resources to facilitate the effectiveness of a 
participatory process. 
…government officers go to these offices [of MEs] and seek grants and bribes and 
[we] suffer many problems...sometimes, [they are like] the burglars (Senior 
Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local 2013). 
…there are some bureaucracy in the government always, NGOs are working in a 
different mindset, so making effective discussions is difficult (Senior Executive 
NGO 8-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
In addition, in a poor Muslim country like Bangladesh, NGOs faced major 
constraints dealing with religious leaders and money-lenders dissuading the poor 
from participating in NGOs’ projects. 
…there are Muslim leaders, sometimes they convince [poor people] not to 
participate in any NGO work [by saying] “[NGOs] convert you [to] Christian” 
(Senior Executive NGO 1-Bangladesh, international, 2013).  
[Money lenders] still exist and they are very much opposed, they try to spread 
rumours “If you go there [NGO] to take loan, you will be no more Muslim, you’ll be 
Christian, these people will take [your property] away” (Senior Executive NGO 6-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Given Bangladesh is subject to harsh geographical conditions with severe natural 
disasters (e.g. floods, cyclones), there were high risks of doing business in these 
areas, which demotivated and dissuaded people from participating in MED projects. 
These challenges were not only demoralising, but had financial implications. 
Then the disaster is a challenge. Because you are doing something then suddenly 
there’s flood. You lose it then again you have to restart (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
If there is disaster occurred, flood…as microfinance borrowers, they can’t pay 
[back] money (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
In addition, the very basic infrastructure limited the poor’s access to services. 
Observed conditions included people travelling in extremely old vehicles, under-
developed roads, and crowded populations. As such, people took a long time to 
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travel short distances36. This issue limited the poor’s participation in NGOs’ projects 
and required more resources and effort to facilitate a participatory approach. 
…the main challenge is the whole geographical distance…in some cases some 
remote areas it requires more than two hours or a day to go to that place. You can 
imagine a farmer who needs seed or whatever pesticide he has to travel every day 
four or five hours up and down to get that. It’s a big challenge for him and that’s also 
a big challenge for us to make sure that these inputs are available (Senior Executive 
NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
Social discrimination towards the poor was also an issue, requiring more resources, 
and effort to build confidence and self-esteem for poor communities. 
Poor people virtually and basically do not have access to information. Because of 
their conditions, these poor people never have access to the formal financial 
sector…they even will not be allowed to enter through the door (Senior Executive 
NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…still there is negative attitude [that they have no capacity, cannot do business, etc.] 
towards [poor] persons in the communities (Senior Executive NGO 12-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
The above factors challenged the effectiveness of a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability. While these factors were not identified for MED NGOs 
operating in Indonesia, other factors were uncovered (presented in the next section). 
 
b. Indonesia 
As introduced in Section 1.4, compared to Bangladesh, Indonesia’s social and 
economic setting appeared to be better developed37. Such development provided poor 
people with more opportunities to participate in mainstream economic activities, yet 
also caused constraints regarding a participatory approach. A summary of the factors 
                                                     
 
36
 Quite often when the researcher travelled by motor vehicle to NGOs’ offices in the city, it could 
take an hour for a distance of approximately 4km, or half a day to travel a distance of 40km from 
Dhaka city to nearby provinces. 
37
 This is based on observation when visiting areas in each country (e.g. infrastructure (roads, 
facilities), street life, visible signs of poverty, such as people regularly searching through public bins 
either for food or recycling opportunities, particularly in Bangladesh), and consistent with social and 
economic data for the relevant countries presented in Section 1.4.  
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is presented in Table 7.14 below.   
Table 7.14 Factors hindering a participatory approach in Indonesia 
 Indonesia (n=8) 
Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Conflict of interests within groups 1 3 4 
2. Lack of access to technology 2 2 4 
3. Lack of government support 1 3 4 
4. Diversity of communities 2 1 3 
5. Requirement to work with local partners for INGOs 0 2 2 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often faced more than one barrier. 
 
Differing levels of participation by beneficiaries in NGOs’ projects were evident. For 
example, executives of several NGOs operating in Indonesia indicated that, within an 
economic environment where the poor have more opportunities to participate in 
mainstream economic activities, there were often conflicts of interest between 
individual beneficiaries with working groups. This resulted in beneficiaries being 
less motivated to participate in groups. This situation, however, was less prevalent in 
Bangladesh where opportunities for the poor were limited, and participation by the 
poor in MED programs was typically more positive, resulting in less conflict within 
groups.  
Manage the conflicts in a group, self-interests, self-motive. So these are the some 
[barriers] in development process (Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 
2013).  
I found that in Indonesia to make them solid as a group is difficult. This is our 
challenge (Senior Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
While NGOs in Indonesia emphasised the importance of communicating with the 
poor through e-mails and telephone, access to these facilities was still very limited 
for the poor.  
…even if you have that information available, they may not have access to 
computers or access to the internet to be able to get that information (Senior 
Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013).  
for example, using cell phones is not really like in Jakarta or in the other areas, they 
still struggle with the connectivity, so we need to find another way (Senior 
Executive NGO 7-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
While corruption was an issue in Bangladesh, the diversity and unstable political 
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environment in Indonesia meant a lack of support from the government for poverty 
alleviation was a constraint for NGOs. This situation limited the effectiveness of 
partnerships with the government to support poor communities. 
…the problem in government is because they’re temporarily there, they have power 
now, but then finished. The system can’t be sustained because of the change of the 
leadership. Every time they change the leader, they change the system, they change 
the strategies (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
…Indonesia [has been] a democracy and decentralised, and these islands all over the 
place38, it’s much more difficult to have the tight level of control [from the 
government] (Senior Executive NGO 8-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
As mentioned in Section 1.4, Indonesia had a better natural resource base and social 
development. Social discrimination towards the poor communities was not evident in 
Indonesia. 
In Indonesia I find a pretty strong community sense where people know people who 
live around them, where people do community activities, pray. They meet, care for 
their neighbour’s children where the parents go to work. They demonstrate against 
political stuff they’re not happy with, they volunteer within programs in their 
communities (Senior Executive NGO 4-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
However, society was very diversified with different cultures and languages, which 
limited the opportunities for learning from NGOs’ programs. 
…Indonesia is a big country and there are so many cultures and sometimes the 
lesson learned in one area cannot be adapted in the other areas (Senior Executive 
NGO 3-Indonesia, local, 2013). 
For international NGOs, working with local partners was a choice in Bangladesh, but 
a requirement in Indonesia. However, the capacity and vision of these partners were 
quite different and typically lower than international NGOs’ expectations. Hence, 
convincing local NGOs to have a shared perspective and deliver projects effectively 
was challenging. 
When we work with the local partners sometimes we find that people who 
implement the work they just focus on the result. Very result and narrow oriented. 
                                                     
 
38
 As noted in Section 1,4, Indonesia is comprised of more than 17,000 islands 
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For them, if I tick the list of activities so it means I achieve things (Senior Executive 
NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Thus, findings show various constraints related to beneficiaries, NGOs, and social 
contexts. These constraints limited NGOs’ capability to facilitate deep and 
meaningful participation by the poor people, communities they were living in, and 
the government within a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability.  
 
7.3.4 Beneficiaries’ perspectives regarding barriers to a participatory approach 
While beneficiaries in Bangladesh indicated satisfaction with and benefit from 
NGOs’ projects, such they did not see any barriers; beneficiaries in Indonesia 
identified several barriers.  
 
First, three beneficiaries indicated that often people in their communities were not 
interested in participating in NGOs’ projects as these projects required them to attend 
meetings, training or other different types of involvement, which were perceived to 
be time-consuming but of little personal benefit. Further, there was an expectation of 
receiving things from NGOs, which was not so in practice. 
…[people in communities ask me] Why do you do such kind of things? What’s in it 
for me? (Beneficiary 1, Indonesia, 2013). 
…they usually don’t want to be in a meeting because they have to congregate in 
meetings out there...in farmer groups, in women entrepreneur groups. It’s a problem 
for them to congregate with others [e.g. for so long]…maybe because they’re busy. 
They have many things to do (Beneficiary 3, Indonesia, 2013). 
In addition, two beneficiaries indicated that people did not want to participate due to 
mandatory savings or fees required to be a member of co-operatives. 
…because of the mandatory savings, they don’t like that (Beneficiary 3, Indonesia, 
2013). 
…they’re afraid that they’re not able to pay their fee because one day their business 
probably won’t have any income (Beneficiary 4, Indonesia, 2013). 
This issue raised concerns regarding the sustainability of MEs, and perhaps related to 
the fact that several co-operatives facilitated by NGOs in Indonesia had failed in the 
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past, creating a bad image within local communities, and loss of trust.  
…[co-operatives’ reputations are] slowly getting better. But, the image is still bad 
(Beneficiary 3, Indonesia, 2013).  
In terms of providing complaints or feedback, one beneficiary indicated that the 
process was biased or confusing, and NGOs lacked a deep understanding of 
beneficiaries’ situations, issues and concerns due to the large size of co-operatives.  
…no-one ever asked this [e.g. one on one interview], instead [co-operatives and 
NGOs used] a questionnaire…[in addition], I’m confused because if I have a 
complaint, who I’m going to complain to; I’m part of the co-operative…it’s like if I 
complain I’ll be complaining to myself (Indonesia beneficiary 3, 2013). 
Hence, larger organisations (e.g. co-operatives) which NGOs were not involved in 
after their projects finished seemed to result in a loss of identity for the individuals in 
them. This issue challenged the effectiveness of these structures and NGO 
accountability for sustainable poverty alleviation, given that NGOs were no longer 
monitoring these co-operatives’ operations.  
 
7.4 A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH AND PROJECT OUTCOMES 
The findings show that facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability was essential for achieving effective project outcomes of the MED 
NGOs investigated. NGOs’ perceptions of whether their operations successfully 
achieved these outcomes, and how they interpreted success, are highlighted in the 
next sections, followed by beneficiaries’ perspectives. 
 
7.4.1 NGOs’ perceptions of success  
For the NGOs investigated, success was not interpreted as fulfilling commitments to 
donors, but rather fulfilling commitments to beneficiaries for sustainable poverty 
alleviation. As mentioned in Section 6.4, NGOs emphasised the essential role of a 
participatory approach in facilitating participation of poor communities, the private 
and public sectors throughout the NGOs’ projects. As such, NGOs’ projects were 
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considered successful when they increased social and economic status and built 
capacity for poor communities, so that these communities were lifted out of poverty 
and continued working after NGOs’ projects finished.  
We want the continuation of the project, that community people will be in driving 
seat, community people will take the decision, community people will continue the 
work of the project after [us] phasing out of the project (Senior Executive NGO 4-
Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
…as long as we are looking at sustainability of project activities, sustainability of 
impact, then I think at least we are on the right track. If we’re only driven by how 
much money is spent, and [not] other factors that don’t consider the ability for the 
impact to continue, then it’s problematic. Then we’re not doing enough (Senior 
Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Importantly, projects were also considered successful when NGOs facilitated the 
participation of the private sector and governments, actors who continued to work 
with the poor after NGOs’ projects finished.  
We’d like to create good practices that can be replicated by the government (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
But the measure of our success, of our activities, to build those linkages, 
relationships that can continue after the end of [our] projects (Senior Executive NGO 
2-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
This approach required the poor and other actors to take responsibility for their own 
development, representing multiple and reciprocal accountability dimensions. 
Indicators of success identified from discussions with NGO executives are presented 
in Table 7.15. 
Table 7.15 Indicators of success – NGOs’ perspectives 
 Bangladesh NGOs 
(n=12) 
Indonesia NGOs 
(n=8) Total 
Local Int’l ∑ Local Int’l ∑ 
1. Increasing social and economic benefits 
and capacity building  
7 5 12 2 6 8 20 
2. Facilitating participation of private 
sector, governments 
4 2 6 2 1 3 9 
3. Strong team and increased donors 3 1 4 0 3 3 7 
4. Ongoing improvement 1 1 2 0 2 2 4 
5. Being used as a model by other NGOs 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. NGOs often perceive more than one indicator. 
 
Through projects’ successful outcomes, the poor gained social and economic benefits 
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by having extra income and employment opportunities, and maintained these benefits 
after NGOs’ projects finished.  
They’re now all entrepreneurs. They’re shop owners. They run the businesses, they 
provide their products to industry (Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 
2013).  
…measures are economic, increases in income, sales, volume of procurement, value 
of procurement. For us, in the short term, those kinds of economic measures are ones 
that we are able to measure [our success] (Senior Executive NGO 2-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). 
The poor gradually gained social status, where they had a voice, participated more in 
social activities and changed the perceptions local communities had towards them. 
Another thing is social acceptance also increased. Once upon a time, [communities] 
never count the poor people. When they’re member of MEs, they’re getting wealth, 
and their family styles are changing. Now, at the village level, they’re playing their 
title role, [such as] local representative, government representative, or people chief 
representative…They also participated in election, local election…This is also social 
status (Senior Executive NGO 4-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Through partnerships with government in MED projects, increased support was 
provided to development projects and supporting regulation was implemented. 
We could enlist 400,000 [ethnic poor people] as voters, that is our success. And we 
could put [economic development for ethnic poor people] issue in our national 
document and the government is itself planning their development, it’s our success 
(Senior Executive NGO 5-Bangladesh, local, 2013).  
…we’re also successful in getting support from the local government to invest more 
in development programs that before were initiated by [us] and [local NGO] partners 
(Senior Executive NGO 5-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Further, the private sector actively continued to work with the poor communities, 
representing a form of success. 
We’ve seen that in many cases where the farmers did not have access to the market, 
the traders started to buy from them, so they have a good market linkage and they 
also get [better] price than before (Senior Executive NGO 9-Bangladesh, 
international, 2013). 
We succeed to link them directly to the traders. We succeed to raise the awareness of 
the consumers about the small farmers or poor farmers (Senior Executive NGO 3-
Indonesia, local, 2013). 
Importantly, despite some constraints in Indonesia, federations or co-operatives that 
NGOs helped to develop from groups, continued their operations through market 
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participation, taking ownership of their own development. 
After 8 years, we provided them 2 years back-up support, after 10 years, they run 
their own program [federation]…we also registered them in the government 
registration as a group, like an NGO…with that license they can continue their work. 
They provide loan to new beneficiaries, develop their group fund, their capital. With 
that capital, they can run on their own and they can self-sustain (Senior Executive 
NGO 9-Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
…they work on their own, they access fund from [any sources]…So they run co-
operatives, they develop different kind of loans, savings, production… they know 
who is the market, how much they can produce every day (Senior Executive NGO 1-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Another indicator was whether NGOs built strong teams and increased their number 
of donors, such that they had more funds for MED projects and continued operations.  
On a broad level, success in setting up an organisation is developing a very good 
team, developing a [long-term] team, and having a group of people that are 
committed to achieving impact (Senior Executive NGO 6-Indonesia, international, 
2013). 
Is our donor numbers and diversity increasing? We initially worked with only [donor 
X] or [donor Y]. Now, we have a number of donors who are interested to work with 
[us] and fund our project initiatives. So that’s another [indicator of success] (Senior 
Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
Noticeably, success for NGOs was also interpreted as identifying opportunities for 
their own learning and improvement, which helped to increase the effectiveness of 
program outcomes.  
…how I interpret the success…I think we have used this learning to design our next 
year strategy. So, good impacts we will definitely strengthen, where we did not see 
very much impact we have to work on it further (Senior Executive NGO 9-
Bangladesh, international, 2013). 
[success]…use efficiently and effectively the money that we’re given…We’re open 
to improve, we know where we lack…if we did good, we know where we did good. 
And we look for place to improve our strategies and systems (Senior Executive 
NGO 1-Indonesia, international, 2013). 
Further, when NGOs’ approaches were replicated by other NGOs, they considered 
this to be a form of success, such that good practices were developed within the 
NGO sector. 
People from other organisations are trying to learn from us, how they can do it. The 
way we are working has been disseminated in different countries. Many 
international organisations have come and learned from us. In that way, definitely it 
has been successful (Senior Executive NGO 3-Bangladesh, local, 2013). 
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I think we’re becoming as an organisation…this methodology-generating box that 
creates new things that work better, that improves them, that matures them, that 
shares them, and that’s what we’re really good at (Senior Executive NGO 4-
Indonesia, international, 2013). 
The findings show that NGOs’ success did not rely only on the outcomes of NGOs’ 
projects (i.e. poverty alleviation), but also on effective participation processes as a 
pathway to poverty alleviation. Within this process, success was considered when the 
poor were able to generate extra income and had capacity to self-sustain their own 
MEs or continue and grow their partnerships with the private sector, expanding into 
federations or co-operatives with the support of government. These approaches 
helped NGOs strengthen their accountability to beneficiaries, but also involved 
sharing and transferring of accountability to beneficiaries; to take responsibility for 
their own development and sustainable poverty alleviation outcomes. 
  
7.4.2 Beneficiary perspectives 
 
a. Indicators of success 
The indicators of success for NGOs’ programs were also investigated from the 
perspectives of beneficiaries. Their perspectives, compared with NGOs’, are 
summarised in Table 7.16 below. 
Table 7.16 Indicators of success – Beneficiaries’ perspectives 
 NGO (n=20) Beneficiary (n=10) 
Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ Bangladesh Indonesia ∑ 
1. Meeting needs, conditions 
and providing benefits 
8 6 14 6 4 10 
2. Self-dependent 8 3 11 4 4 8 
3. Sustainable MEs 6 3 9 6 4 10 
N.B. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Participants often perceived more than one indicator. 
 
All beneficiaries indicated that NGOs’ projects met their needs and that they were 
benefiting from these projects by engaging in different microbusinesses to generate 
extra income. 
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We have shop, by raising cattle we can generate extra income…Some people 
involved in business, some people involved in agricultural activities, [both] useful to 
generate income…We have nothing to say. We are satisfied (Beneficiary 3, 
Bangladesh, 2013). 
…[I benefitted] very very much. [NGO’s project] is very good…It’s like, before I 
couldn’t own a catering business, and now I can have my own catering [ME] 
(Beneficiary 2, Indonesia, 2013). 
The extra income provided these beneficiaries with economic empowerment, which 
helped them become more financially independent.  
With the loan, we are working, and we are having better life, being self-dependent, 
we can send our children to school to educate them (Beneficiary 1, Bangladesh, 
2013). 
…it’s useful joining the co-operatives. I have more income. It helps my husband 
fund the family…So I can school my children…I can save up…I can have my own 
transportation, a motorcycle (Beneficiary 4, Indonesia, 2013). 
Through economic empowerment, they were also socially empowered. 
Now, I am self-dependent. I can fulfil my needs. I do not have to depend on my 
husband anymore...[NGO] creates awareness among people about family planning, 
health, education (Beneficiary 5, Bangladesh, 2013). 
I meet many people, increases connections and increase my experience. I want to 
join the co-operatives because there are many people from everywhere joining there 
(Beneficiary 3, Indonesia, 2013). 
At the time of conducting the interviews, all beneficiaries were actively participating 
in NGOs’ projects or working in groups, federations, and co-operatives. While 
beneficiaries in Indonesia typically had been participating in groups or NGOs’ 
projects for only a short time (e.g. four or five years), in Bangladesh groups had been 
working for quite a long time (e.g. from 10 years). 
A number of years…Could be 15 years or even more (Beneficiary 2, Bangladesh, 
2013). 
…I’ve only been here for five years (Beneficiary 2, Indonesia, 2013). 
For the beneficiaries interviewed, NGOs’ projects were considered to provide 
effective outcomes for their poverty alleviation, evidenced by generating extra 
income and having a better life. These outcomes reinforced NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries and legitimacy of NGOs’ operations.  
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7.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented findings regarding mechanisms of a participatory approach to 
accountability to beneficiaries. Both mechanisms and barriers were highlighted, in 
relation to beneficiaries, NGOs, and the environmental context. While mechanisms 
for facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability remained 
informal, they showed strong evidence of contributing to effective outcomes of 
NGOs’ projects; particularly for building capacity and networks for poor 
communities so that they had the capabilities to continue working with other actors 
(e.g. private sector, government) if they chose, once NGOs’ projects formally 
finished. Mechanisms had a strong practical focus because of the constraints 
associated with beneficiaries and the local context (e.g. illiteracy, cultural and 
religious challenges), and represented a shifting accountability as NGOs took 
responsibility for their operations, but also required beneficiaries to take 
responsibility for their own development. Findings were also presented from the 
perspective of beneficiaries and the donor NGO, providing a basis for comparison 
and further insights. A discussion of these findings and comparison with the 
literature, is presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8:  DISCUSSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Drawing on findings presented in the previous three chapters, this chapter discusses the 
findings in light of the Research Questions and existing literature, investigating the 
nature of NGO accountability to beneficiaries in the context of MED, and mechanisms 
to foster this form of accountability. 
 
Section 8.2 discusses the findings in relation to the first research question: What are 
NGOs’ approaches to gaining legitimacy in the context of MED? Section 8.3 discusses 
the findings in relation to Research Question Two regarding how approaches to 
gaining legitimacy affect MED NGO managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience 
and goals towards beneficiaries (Section 8.3.1); and Research Question Three 
regarding to what extent MED NGO managers’ perceptions of beneficiary salience 
and goals towards beneficiaries facilitate a participatory approach in their 
accountability to beneficiaries (Section 8.3.2). Findings to address Research 
Question Four are discussed in Section 8.4 on identifying what mechanisms NGOs 
use to facilitate a participatory approach for their accountability to beneficiaries in 
MED, and what are the barriers to these mechanisms. Lastly, Section 8.5 discusses 
findings to address Research Question Five on how a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability contributes to outcomes of NGOs’ MED programs. 
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8.2 STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO GAINING LEGITIMACY 
As noted in Chapter Five, (and to a lesser extent the findings presented in Chapters Six 
and Seven), the strategies underpinning MED NGOs’ operations had direct implications 
for their approaches to gaining legitimacy and strengthening accountability. 
 
8.2.1 MED NGOs’ operations  
Findings in Section 5.2.1 indicated that MED NGOs aimed to alleviate poverty in a 
sustainable way through economic development, such that the poor could be 
empowered socially and economically to take ownership of their development, live 
with dignity and be a strong voice in their communities. These goals provide a 
foundation for NGOs’ approaches to gaining organisational legitimacy. Within this 
aim, NGOs adopted progressive step-based support to gradually lift the poor from 
poverty. The support helped NGOs achieve effective outcomes for their programs, 
reinforcing operational legitimacy (output, outcomes, and impacts), thereby 
strengthening NGO accountability (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). However, not all of 
these steps were facilitated by individual NGOs. Rather, NGOs often engaged in 
different steps depending on the project focus, and the capabilities and needs of the 
poor (e.g. either livelihood, market linkage, VCD, or a combination was selected). 
Thus, similar to practices of MED NGOs identified by other research (Bhatt, 1997; 
Choudhury et al., 2008; Chu & Luke, 2012b; Ghate et al., 1996; Green et al., 2006; 
Schmitz et al., 2011; Strier, 2010; Vargas, 2000; Virgil, 2010), MED projects 
commonly involved NGOs providing support (e.g. livestock, credit, and training) and 
facilitating partnerships with the private and public sectors. Further, the poor were 
not passive recipients of support. Rather they were required to actively contribute 
(e.g. labour, savings, and commitment). NGOs’ support is summarised in Figure 8.1 
below.  
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Figure 8.1 Support for MED  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Not a focus of MED NGOs 
 
Figure 8.1 shows that the extremely poor needing charity provision were not a focus 
for MED. Rather, MED NGOs focused on those (e.g. extremely poor) who satisfied 
pre-requisites or conditions (e.g. commitment, labour, savings, or land). For this type 
of beneficiary, who struggled for daily survival, a livelihood approach to MED to 
help them achieve food security (subsistence level) was essential. Once the poor 
passed the subsistence level, they were assisted to participate in market linkages and 
subsequently federations/co-operations or VCD. To facilitate this transition, NGOs 
provided support in various forms, as summarised in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 NGOs’ support for levels of subsistence and networking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under a livelihood approach (1), the extremely poor were often required to work in 
groups, which helped them learn to work and support each other. Through groups, 
they were provided with grants (in the form of equipment, livestock) or credit (with 
very low or zero interest rate), and training in basic skills (e.g. personal and 
microbusiness skills) and techniques, so that they could engage in income generating 
activities to earn extra income. Credit with full interest rate was avoided so that they 
were not exposed to commercial credit risk. Further, the extremely poor were also 
provided with other support related to health, education, nutrition, etc., or linked to 
safety net programs from government so that they received direct support (e.g. rice). 
At this level, partnership with other actors (e.g. traders, private sector companies) 
was not emphasised, yet beneficiaries’ active participation was still mandatory 
through contributing something (e.g. labour, savings), and demonstrating 
commitment to working groups or MED projects. This practice while appropriate for 
the extremely poor (lacking skills, struggling for food security), required them take 
active roles and responsibility for alleviation of their poverty. As such, the extremely 
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poor were both assisted and accountable for their well-being and development, 
ultimately becoming financially independent.   
 
Figure 8.2 (2) shows that when the poor achieved the subsistence level, NGOs helped 
them improve production and sell extra quantity to markets by connecting them with 
suppliers or traders through linkages. These actors worked with MEs (selling goods 
or services (e.g. vaccination, foodstuffs on credit) or bought MEs’ products. These 
linkages, while helping MEs access wider supplies and markets, built capacity and 
networks for MEs. As a result, the poor directly accessed resources from the private 
sector, providing MEs with opportunities to maintain or expand their businesses and 
be accountable to each other within groups.  
 
As detailed in Figure 8.1, depending on the capabilities and development of the poor, 
some working groups with NGOs’ assistance subsequently participated in VCD, or 
developed into more formal and larger structures such as federations or co-
operatives, involving groups or numbers of MEs. Details of the forms of NGOs’ 
support are summarised in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3 NGOs’ support for the functional (sustainability) level  
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Figure 8.3 (1) shows that NGOs connected MEs (or groups of MEs) with the private 
sector companies through VCD. MEs were assisted to form partnerships with large 
private sector companies and worked directly with these companies. At this level, 
NGOs emphasised their facilitating roles (rather than direct involvement) by 
providing support to the private sector, which then worked directly with MEs 
through partnerships. By doing so, these NGOs facilitated wider accountability 
amongst private sector companies and the poor communities. Further, for some MED 
NGOs, rather than focusing on VCD, they helped working groups develop into 
federations or co-operatives. Funds for these activities were mainly from grants, low 
or no-interest loans provided by NGOs, or interest paid by group members. These 
federations or co-operatives had a committee, provided credit to group members, 
managed and organised business activities (e.g. production, marketing, sales, or 
purchase). These practices provided a structure that enabled the participation of the 
poor and required collective accountability amongst the poor households and other 
actors, helping to achieve effective and sustainable poverty alleviation. 
 
Consistent with other research (Jones, Kashlak, & Jones, 2004; Karnani, 2007), in 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3, the involvement of the public sector (e.g. local governments) and/or 
the third sector (e.g. local NGOs, civil organisations) was essential to facilitate effective 
participation of the poor communities. These partnerships were particularly important 
for international NGOs that lacked local knowledge and contacts. Further, as these local 
actors had an understanding of local communities, they played important roles in helping 
NGOs access and gain trust from these communities. The involvement of local actors 
enabled them to take active roles in poverty alleviation for their own citizens, extending 
accountability to multiple actors.  
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8.2.2 Facilitating a strategic approach to gaining legitimacy 
NGOs’ support for MED showed a strong focus on developing multiple dimensions of 
accountability within NGOs’ mission and goals - sustainable poverty alleviation. 
Returning to Table 3.1 (Section 3.4.1), MED NGOs’ approaches to gain legitimacy can 
be viewed from both institutional and strategic perspectives, such that NGOs may use 
conformity, selection, persuasion (or a combination of these) to gain legitimacy at 
organisational and operational levels (Suchman, 1995). Through investigating the 
approaches to obtaining financial support from donors, the findings indicated approaches 
to fundraising for the NGOs investigated, were predominantly influenced by their own 
mission and values (a strong sense of internal legitimacy). Similar to the findings of 
Elbers and Arts (2011), the findings showed that a strategic approach to gaining 
legitimacy was dominant within the NGOs investigated. Within this approach, NGOs 
mainly selected or persuaded stakeholders (e.g. donors and beneficiaries) whose views 
aligned with the NGOs’ mission and values, in order to establish legitimacy. Consistent 
with this approach, the first priority for the majority of NGOs was diversifying their 
funding sources to develop financial independence as a pathway to operational 
independence.  
 
a. Diversifying funding sources 
While donations remain the major source of NGO funds, MED NGOs also generated 
funds from the private sector through the CSR schemes (e.g. Indonesia), or from their 
own activities such as providing services or engaging in social enterprises (e.g. 
Bangladesh) (Section 6.2.1). Generating funds directly from the public was very limited 
within the NGOs investigated, focusing instead on corporate fundraising. By 
diversifying funding sources, NGOs were able to increase funds for their operations, 
helping them manage the challenge of decreasing funds from existing donors (e.g. 
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donors preferring to fund local government or large (or local) NGOs, or interested in 
other development areas). This finding is consistent with existing research (Islam & 
Morgan, 2011; LeRoux, 2009; Luke & Chu, 2013), indicating that NGO strategies to be 
financially independent provide opportunities for operational independence, reinforcing 
organisational legitimacy. This independence increases NGOs’ negotiating power with 
donors and allows them to pursue their own mission and values, effectively shifting 
NGOs’ accountability focus from upward (donors) to downward (beneficiaries) 
(LeRoux, 2009; Murtaza, 2012; Siddiquee & Faroqi, 2009).  
  
Notably, for donors providing corporate funds, NGOs were cautious of the associated 
risks (e.g. mining, cigarette companies’ CSR funds, for-profit activities conflicting with 
NGOs’ not-for-profit identity, risking mission drift). These risks as indicated in the 
literature often jeopardise NGOs’ reputation and legitimacy (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; 
Muhammad, 2006; Stiles, 2002). 
 
b. Facilitating selection and persuasion strategies 
Within legitimacy theory, an organisation can select stakeholders who value or support 
its practices or activities as a strategy for gaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). By 
diversifying funding sources, findings in Section 6.2.2 indicate a selection strategy to 
gaining legitimacy, such that NGOs seek or bid on projects aligned with their expertise 
and mission. This selection strategy  helps NGOs deal with legitimacy issues identified 
in the literature (Andrews, 2014; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Hug 
& Jäger, 2014; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014), including 
conflicts between their needs and mission and those of donors. This is particularly 
relevant when donors focus on quantitative outcomes, short-term projects, or where their 
policies and requirements are different from those of NGOs (Section 6.2.4a). Further, a 
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selection strategy for gaining legitimacy from beneficiaries’ perspectives was also noted 
regarding requiring participation of beneficiaries. Specifically, beneficiaries were 
required to satisfy pre-requisites or conditions to participate in NGOs’ projects (Section 
5.3.1). As such, beneficiaries were required to take responsibility (through active 
participation rather than being passive receivers) for their own development as a 
sustainable way out of poverty. 
 
Legitimacy theory also suggests a persuasion strategy for gaining legitimacy. Within this 
strategy, an organisation may campaign for new projects or promote their image to 
potential stakeholders (through demonstrating the success of past projects or 
popularising their practices) (Suchman, 1995). This strategy was also evident in this 
study (e.g. promoting examples of NGOs’ prior successful projects, increasing donors’ 
understanding of issues NGOs were working on) (Section 6.2.2, 6.2.3). As such, NGOs 
emphasised the importance of information systems and communication skills. Findings 
also reveal good managerial reputation and networks played important roles in gaining 
legitimacy and donors’ support. While these strategies were often undertaken through 
formal methods (e.g. reporting systems), methods for persuading beneficiaries to 
participate in MED projects was essentially informal (e.g. demonstrating successful 
cases in the field). Further, persuasion also required NGOs to build trust from the poor 
communities to gain access and also motivate people to participate (Section 7.2.1d).  
 
The findings on selection and persuasion strategies for gaining NGO legitimacy are 
consistent with the theoretical perspectives of a strategic approach, indicating the 
essential role of management strategies in gaining legitimacy (Deegan et al., 2002). 
Under this approach, managers provide symbolic assurance to gain and maintain 
access to resources (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Further, these findings are consistent 
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with Elbers and Arts (2011) (in studies on India and Ghana), such that NGOs are not 
powerless in their relationships with donors. Rather, NGOs adopt strategies of 
influencing and buffering to avoid restrictive donor conditions. This strategic 
approach was also reflected in NGOs’ strategies for gaining legitimacy from 
beneficiaries when NGOs select and persuade beneficiaries to participate in their 
projects, aiming to generate sustainable poverty alleviation.  
 
However, through the above strategic approach, NGOs do not tailor their operations 
to satisfy particular stakeholders’ demands (e.g. donors’ expectations) in contrast to 
various research (Candler & Dumont, 2010; Ebrahim, 2003a; Najam, 1996; Omona 
& Mukuye, 2012; Rahmani; 2012), or simply provide what beneficiaries request 
(Dalsgaard, Minh, Giang, & Riise, 2005; Grunwald, 2007; Sievers & Vandenberg, 
2007). Rather, a sense of internal legitimacy reinforced NGOs’ mission and goals. 
Notably, after selecting or persuading donors and beneficiaries, NGOs were required 
to conform to their commitments to these stakeholders, which indicates a partly 
institutional approach to gaining legitimacy, but secondary to an overarching 
strategic approach.     
 
 Elbers and Arts (2011) contend a strategic approach depends on the presence of 
alternative sources of funding, strong performance, or a certain level of trust. 
Findings from this study reveal that of the NGOs investigated, a strategic approach to 
gaining legitimacy (through selection and persuasion) was inherent to their 
operations. The strategic approach then led NGOs to focus on diversifying funding 
sources, demonstrating and communicating good performance, and gaining trust 
from donors and beneficiaries. Hence, while funding is important, “status” through 
maximising funding was not an NGO objective. Rather, NGOs showed a strong 
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sense of internal legitimacy based on their own values and beliefs, effectively 
strengthening accountability to beneficiaries.  
 
These findings provide a different view of NGO legitimacy compared to the 
literature. As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, most available research views NGO 
legitimacy through an institutional theory lens to investigate how NGOs conform to 
institutional requirements to gain organisational legitimacy (Atack, 1999; Lister, 
2003; Ossewaarde et al., 2008; Sonpar et al., 2010) under different forms: moral 
legitimacy (Atack, 1999), regulatory, normative, cognitive, and pragmatic (or output) 
legitimacy (Lister, 2003; Ossewaarde et al., 2008), or taken-for-granted culture 
which NGOs need to comply with to gain legitimacy (Doh & Teegen, 2002; Edwards 
& Hulme, 1996b; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). A comparison of approaches to 
gaining legitimacy based on the literature and the findings from this study is 
presented in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Approaches to gaining legitimacy 
 The existing literature Findings from this study 
Approaches 
to gaining 
legitimacy 
An institutional approach 
conforming to institutional 
requirements to gain 
organisational legitimacy 
A strategic approach aligned with organisational goals and 
mission through selecting and persuading stakeholders who 
share these goals and mission to gain organisational 
legitimacy; followed and subordinated by an institutional 
approach 
Forms of 
legitimacy 
- Moral legitimacy through 
representativeness, distinctive 
values, effectiveness, and 
empowerment (Atack,1999) 
 
- Regulatory, normative, 
cognitive, and pragmatic (or 
output) (Lister, 2003; 
Ossewaarde et al., 2008) 
 
- Taken-for-granted culture 
which NGOs need to comply 
with to gain legitimacy (Doh 
& Teegen, 2002; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996b; Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009) 
 
Organisational legitimacy: complying with stakeholders’ 
demands (e.g. government’s regulation, donors’ 
requirements) consistent with organisational goals and 
mission. 
 
Operational legitimacy: achieving effective program 
outcomes, underpinned by selection and persuasion 
strategies 
                                          
Selection strategy: 
- Select donors who share NGOs’ goals and mission 
- Select beneficiaries who satisfy NGOs’ pre-requisites 
and conditions 
 
Persuasion strategy: 
- Persuade donors through demonstrating successful 
performance via information systems and available 
networks (formal) 
-  Persuade beneficiaries through demonstrating successful 
cases in the field (informal), or building trust 
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Notably, while a strategic approach helped NGOs limit the potential influences of 
donors, other challenges remained (see Section 6.2.4b, c). Consistent with the literature 
(Gauri & Galef, 2005, Stiles, 2002), the findings showed preferences for funding local 
NGOs to enhance local capacity, such that international NGOs were required to form 
partnerships with local NGOs. This raises concerns about the roles of international 
NGOs in the field and the independence of their operations in such partnerships. It also 
raises questions regarding whether these NGOs have to compromise on approaches to 
accountability, and if so, whether their legitimacy should be viewed differently from 
local NGOs. Other challenges to a selection and persuasion strategy regarding social 
context included low levels of public trust in NGOs (e.g. Bangladesh) due to corruption 
(Islam & Morgan, 2011; Khan, 2003; Stiles, 2002), perceptions of (relative) economic 
progress (e.g. Indonesia), or religion (e.g. Christian NGOs raising funds in Muslim 
countries) (Stiles, 2002). While the literature acknowledges the impact of these factors 
on NGO accountability (Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Eversole, 2003; Simsa, 2003; Yamin, 
2003), these constraints also need to be considered in NGOs’ approaches to gaining 
legitimacy in practice (particularly international NGOs), and understood as hindering 
factors that affect NGOs’ approaches to gaining legitimacy.  
 
8.3 FACILITATING A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH  
The literature suggests that when an NGO’s strategies for gaining legitimacy place 
beneficiaries as central to their operations, these strategies reinforce managers’ 
perceptions and goals that focus on strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
(being powerless stakeholders) (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Mitchell et al, 1997). 
Managerial perceptions and goals then help to facilitate a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability (Hug & Jäger, 2014; Jordan & Tuijl, 2006b; Unerman & 
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O'Dwyer, 2010). The findings of this study support these perceptions and are discussed 
in the next sections. 
 
8.3.1 Effects of stakeholder management on beneficiary accountability 
As noted in Section 3.3.3, beneficiaries are dependent stakeholders who have legitimacy 
and urgency, but lack the power to require NGO accountability (Assad & Goddard, 
2010; LeRoux, 2009). Hence, they are reliant on NGO managers’ attention (through 
managers’ perceptions and goals) to support their claims as stakeholders (Mitchell et al, 
1997). Consistent with the findings of other researchers (Assad & Goddard, 2010; 
Bendell & Cox, 2006; Kilby, 2006; Kovach et al.,  2003; LeRoux, 2009; O’Dwyer, 
2007), the findings from this study (Section 6.3.1) reveal NGO managers often perceive 
beneficiaries as their key stakeholders, as they are the reason for NGOs’ existence and 
the priority within their overall operations. While NGOs are often criticised for focusing 
on accountability to donors and overlooking accountability to beneficiaries (Agyemang 
et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), the majority of NGOs 
investigated in this study were aware of the imbalance of power between donors and 
beneficiaries, and considered accountability to donors as a short-term objective, while 
accountability to beneficiaries was considered a long-term and overriding objective. 
Prioritising accountability to donors helped the NGOs obtain funds for projects, with 
benefits for beneficiaries representing long-term outcomes and impacts. Thus 
accountability to donors was a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.  
 
The above perceptions were reinforced through managerial goals within MED projects. 
Specifically, NGOs considered the roles of beneficiaries as central to empowerment 
through participation, taking responsibility for their own development. This is because 
once NGOs’ MED projects finished, beneficiaries must be the ones to continue these 
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activities. The literature suggests that when NGOs consider the improvement of poor 
peoples’ lives as a driver of development, their goals are increasing levels of 
participation and involvement by the poor, promoting responsiveness to beneficiaries 
(Keystone, 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). Notably, MED NGOs in this study were 
against using the term “beneficiaries” due to negative connotations (e.g. passive 
receivers); undermining their active role in the development process (e.g. engaging in 
income generating activities, generating income, employment, production, paying 
interest, and contributing to their social and economic development) (Section 6.3.2). 
These findings are consistent with Keystone (2006), who indicates the term 
“beneficiaries” is problematic in its own right as it reinforces a perception of people who 
passively receive aid. Similarly, the use of the term ‘downward’ in NGO accountability 
reinforces the idea of power asymmetry (Keystone, 2006). In this study, NGOs preferred 
the term “development partners”, “participants”, or “target groups”. Further, NGOs also 
emphasised the importance of beneficiary-driven projects and considered donors as 
partners in these projects. While there is debate regarding the language that shapes NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries in the literature and in practice, arguably within the MED, 
the term “beneficiaries” can be applied literally (as those who benefit). Further, 
beneficiaries in MED projects not only involve the poor, but also the non-poor living in 
poor communities, the private sector companies and the public sector, who are involved 
in and benefit from these projects. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the term 
“beneficiaries” remains appropriate when it is viewed considerately and positively, 
particularly towards the poor, acknowledging that there is no benefit without active 
participation and commitment.  
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The above goals and perceptions provide a foundation for facilitating a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability, and emphasise active participation of the poor in 
MED projects, which is discussed in the next section.  
 
8.3.2 Essential role of a participatory approach 
The discussion in Section 8.2 shows that a focus on selection and persuasion strategies 
for gaining legitimacy places accountability to beneficiaries as a central objective in 
NGOs’ stakeholder management. This objective emphasises the importance of active 
participation of the poor and various actors (e.g. local government, private sector 
companies), thus facilitating a participatory approach within the NGOs investigated.  
 
The findings (Section 6.4) of this study support the literature emphasising the essential 
role of a participatory approach to strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
(Hug & Jäger, 2014; Jordan & Tuijl, 2006b; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2010). As NGO 
managers’ perceptions and goals centralise the active roles of the poor, meeting their 
needs and understanding their expectations are essential for calling on their active 
particiation, through facilitating dialogue with them (i.e. consulting, knowing their 
views, responding to their concerns). However, the findings (Section 6.4.1) suggest that 
the poor’s needs and expections must be aligned with their conditions and abilities, 
based on their own choices and decisions, and within the NGOs’ scope and capabilities. 
When NGOs’ projects are based on the needs of the poor, the poor then have more 
motivation to actively participate and be more accountable for their activities. 
Ultimately, the poor will operate and control MEs and are responsible for the outcomes. 
This practice gradually helps the poor take an active role and responsibility for their 
development, while increasing the possibility of successful MED projects through 
participation, ultimately enhancing mutual (NGO and beneficiary) accountability. 
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Consistent with other research on MED support for poverty alleviation (Brett, 2003, 
Midgley, 2008; Strier, 2010), the findings (Section 6.4.2) also show that when the 
poor earn extra income, they can improve their living standards. When economically 
empowered, they can participate more in social activities and increase their voice 
within the family and the community. These outcomes are part of what NGOs are 
accountable for to participants. Further, findings (Section 6.4.3) also show that by 
requiring the poor to actively participate in MED projects, NGOs provide them with 
a transforming process within which the poor are able to gain knowledge, 
experience, and networks, preparing them with confidence and capacity to join larger 
markets or businesses. Through this process, the poor’s capacity is built so that they 
are able to continue their MEs or work with other actors independently (e.g. private 
sector companies, traders) once NGOs’ projects formally end. These approaches 
reinforce a shift in NGO accountability, preparing the poor to be fully accountable 
for their own development; thereby helping NGOs realise long-term impacts from 
their programs. In particular, one NGO executive noted that power to beneficiaries is 
not something to give. Rather, NGOs considered that power was something to 
assume but could only be exercised when people were given opportunities to do so 
by communities, policies, and support (Senior Executive NGO 1-Indonesia, 
international, 2013). These perspectives reinforce the importance of NGO managers’ 
perceptions and goals that provide dependent stakeholders (e.g. beneficiaries) with 
opportunities to exercise their power through a participatory process. 
 
Many authors emphasise the importance of facilitating the involvement of the private 
and public sectors in MED programs. By doing so, NGOs can access more resources 
while outcomes and impacts from MED projects can be continued or expanded with the 
assistance of these actors (Bhatt, 1997; Brett, 2003; Chu & Luke, 2012a; Karnani, 2007; 
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Moyo, 2003; Shah & Shah, 1996; Simsa, 2003). However, while many researchers 
indicate NGOs have a central role in working with these actors, the findings of this study 
show that NGOs work more as facilitators, aiding partnerships between other actors. In 
addition to facilitating active roles of the poor with strong commitment and contribution 
(e.g. labour, savings), findings also revealed NGOs called on the participation of people 
with influence (e.g. village, religious leaders, husbands). The involvement of these 
communities provided a supportive environment for the poor to actively participate in 
MED projects. Similarly, the involvement of local government provided the poor with 
access to available resources, and helped continue and replicate outcomes from NGOs’ 
projects. Further, by involving the private sector companies, these actors provided 
resources (human capital, networks, supplies) and market access to MEs that NGOs 
themselves were not able to provide, giving MEs opportunities to grow (Brett, 2003; 
Chu & Luke, 2012a; Helmsing & Knorringa, 2009; Karnani, 2007). These goals and 
perspectives were supported by the donor NGO, emphasising that participation by the 
private sector provides a holistic approach to poverty alleviation, particularly when 
NGOs have limited resources and project timeframes. The key concept is letting the 
market work with the poor or MEs. 
 
Overall, the findings show a directional shift in NGO accountability from vertical (NGO 
accountability ‘down’ to beneficiaries or ‘up’ to donors, governments) to horizontal, 
whereby beneficiaries and other actors actively participating in MED projects take 
responsibility and ownership of their development and be accountable to each other. 
Dixon and McGregor (2011, p.1351) suggest that “relief and development efforts are 
better thought of as ‘webs’ rather than linear chains, and that accountabilities pull in 
multiple directions rather than simply upwards and downwards”. This approach is 
consistent with the notion of extended or socialising accountability, focusing on 
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interdependencies and interactions between organisations and other actors (Ebrahim, 
2003a, 2005; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; Roberts, 1991). 
This form of accountability helps NGOs achieve a more complete recognition of 
organisational and operational legitimacy through the organisations’ operations; 
balancing their strategic objectives (Roberts, 1991) – being accountable to donors as a 
short-term objective and beneficiaries as a long-term objective. 
 
Table 8.2 summaries approaches to gaining legitimacy and accountability dimensions 
(i.e. hierarchical and socialising) identified in practice from the findings, reflecting the 
nature of NGO accountability to beneficiaries. 
Table 8.2 Approaches to gaining legitimacy and accountability dimensions 
 Hierarchical Accountability 
(Vertical direction) 
Socialising Accountability 
(Horizontal direction) 
Key stakeholders Donors Beneficiaries (the poor, as well 
as the private and public 
sectors) 
Sources of legitimacy From key stakeholders’ perceptions 
of the organisation (organisational 
legitimacy) through organisational 
goals, mission, and values 
From managers’ perceptions of 
key stakeholders (operational 
legitimacy) in achieving 
organisational goals, mission, 
and values 
Legitimacy considerations From outside the organisation “How 
do key stakeholders see NGOs” 
through a strategic approach in light 
of organisational goals, mission, and 
values 
From inside the organisation 
“How does the NGO see itself” 
through a participatory 
approach, facilitating 
participation of key stakeholders 
Strategies for gaining 
legitimacy 
Selecting and persuading 
stakeholders through formal 
accountability systems (e.g. 
accounting information)  
Selecting and persuading 
stakeholders through informal 
accountability systems (e.g. 
facilitating an effective 
participatory approach through 
interactions and dialogue  
 
8.4 MECHANISMS OF A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH 
The above discussion highlights the essential role of a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability. Drawing on the findings presented in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, 
this section discusses mechanisms NGOs use to facilitate such an approach, and the 
associated barriers. 
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8.4.1 Mechanisms of a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability 
Literature on accountability in the public and third sectors is mainly framed in the 
context of reporting mechanisms, and criticises accountability to powerless stakeholders 
(e.g. civil society or the poor) as generally being weak (Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 
2003a; Smyth, 2012). Further, research on accountability processes to facilitate 
relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries is lacking (Smyth, 2012). Within the 
NGOs investigated, findings (Section 7.2) show that unlike mechanisms for NGO 
accountability to donors or governments (mainly involving formal reporting such as 
annual reports, evaluation and assessment reports), mechanisms for NGO accountability 
to beneficiaries remain informal and strongly focused on processes of involvement and 
interaction amongst actors. Considering the illiteracy levels often associated with the 
poor, these mechanisms appear to be practical and effective in facilitating the 
participation of various actors. Supporting the mechanisms of a participatory approach to 
beneficiaries proposed in Section 3.4.4, the findings of this study suggest a framework 
involving both processes and tools. Processes involve various stages of participation 
(e.g. consulting, partnership, delegated control), while tools involve information 
exchange, monitoring and social review, and internal and external regulations. These are 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
a. Accountability processes  
Based on Table 3.3, accountability processes (i.e. the participation mechanism) have 
been developed by various researchers (Arnstein, 1969; Bratt, 1997; Ebrahim 2003a; 
Chu & Luke, 2012a). Findings (Section 7.2.1) support the participatory processes found 
by Chu and Luke (2012a) (in the context of MED NGOs operating in Vietnam), such 
that participation involves three stages consulting, partnership, and delegated control. 
The consulting process undertaken by NGOs at the start of projects emphasises 
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conducting baseline assessments and discussions with key actors (local government, 
local businesses, poor communities) to gain an understanding of local contexts, 
problems, needs, and potential solutions for poverty alleviation in the area, before any 
interventions. This strategy is particularly important for international NGOs that lack 
local knowledge. This process again highlights the importance of meeting the needs of 
the poor communities so that they are motivated to get involved and take an active role, 
and considers the needs of the poor in light of their and NGOs’ capacity and market 
demand. Further, by developing the capacity of the poor, they were able to continue to 
work with markets once NGOs’ projects finished. 
 
The next stage, partnership, involves various actors with various types of partnerships, 
depending on the poverty level and capability of the poor. At this level, with NGOs’ 
assistance, the poor can work with other poor households in groups so that they can 
collectively receive NGOs’ support, and work and support each other through sales, 
purchases, or managing credit. Hence, the poor begin to take responsibility for 
themselves and each other at a basic level, such that responsibility is linked to 
accountability, shifting from NGOs to the poor.  
  
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) suggest that NGOs can find it difficult to access local 
communities, but this should not inhibit downward accountability (Hug & Jäger, 2014). 
The findings in this thesis show that NGOs dealt with this challenge by forming 
partnerships with local partners (local NGOs, civil organisations). However, unlike other 
research, suggesting that when NGOs work with the poor through local partners they 
lose sight of effective project outcomes (Andrews, 2014), the NGOs investigated worked 
directly with the poor and gained the support of local partners or local community 
leaders. This strategy helped NGOs access and work closely with poor communities 
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(thus gaining trust from them), as well as enhancing the poor’s participation by involving 
people they knew and trusted. When the poor are more actively involved, the potential 
for effective projects is increased, reinforcing NGO accountability to beneficiaries.   
 
Consistent with the literature which emphasises the essential role of governments in 
providing a supportive environment for MED (Bass et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2004; 
Surender & Niekerk, 2008), this study suggests local government involvement is 
essential and moves beyond passive support. Governments take an active role by 
working with NGOs to improve the poor’s production techniques, or providing them 
with training or supportive policies. Further, the government also provided the extremely 
poor with safety net programs (e.g. Bangladesh), or co-operatives with financial support 
(e.g. Indonesia). Through such involvement, the poor’s access to resources, training, and 
skills was enhanced, and relationships between MEs and the government continued once 
NGOs’ projects finished. This involvement facilitates government accountability to their 
citizens through taking a more active role in poverty alleviation. Notably, while NGOs in 
Bangladesh worked with local government to gain trust and access to poor communities, 
NGOs in Indonesia did so to gain trust from governments so that they were allowed to 
work with local communities. These issues indicate the level of government’s 
involvement in MED projects can be different in various contexts, thereby affecting 
NGOs’ strategies for facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability.  
   
Similar to other research, the findings suggest the important role of partnership with the 
private sector to provide MEs with access to resources and markets (Bhatt, 1997; Brett, 
2003; Chu & Luke, 2012a; Henriksen, Riisgaard, Ponte, Hartwich, & Kormawa, 2010; 
Karnani, 2007; Mitchell, Keane, & Coles, 2009; Moyo, 2003; Posthumus, 2007). Chu 
and Luke (2012a) found MED NGOs in Vietnam provide direct support to poor 
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communities (e.g. training, financial support), then connect them with private sector 
companies (while NGOs may share costs with these companies when first setting up 
linkages or value chains with MEs). However, in this study, MED NGOs were less 
directly involved in these partnerships. Specifically for VCD projects, NGOs provided 
financial support (as a cost-sharing strategy) to the private sector companies. These 
companies then worked directly with the poor communities (providing training, 
information, production techniques, credit, etc.) while NGOs worked as facilitators. 
However, NGOs’ accountability related to selecting appropriate companies based on 
criteria - mission and values aligned with NGOs’ own mission and values, willingness to 
work and co-operate with a sufficient number of MEs, good reputation and financial 
records, willingness to improve and expand their businesses. These criteria helped to 
ensure projects were implemented in a way that was consistent with NGOs’ mission and 
values, while achieving maximum benefits for the poor communities. Ultimately it 
helped NGOs to establish operational legitimacy. This practice showed a strong focus on 
a participatory approach, moving beyond the traditional approach of NGOs as providers 
of support. NGOs in this study transformed their relationship with the poor communities 
and the private sector as facilitators, such that other actors assumed primary roles and 
responsibility for development. NGOs within this approach not only enhanced their 
accountability to the poor by achieving effective long-term project outcomes, but also 
fostered accountability amongst key actors in the communities and minimised their 
dependency on NGOs. 
 
Regarding the third stage of participation, delegated control, the literature indicates that 
at this stage NGOs help working groups assume control and take responsibility for their 
own development (Arnstein, 1969; Ebrahim 2003a). Through this process, NGOs 
prepared groups for a handover stage when NGOs completely phased out their 
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involvement and groups were able to continue to manage and potentially grow 
microbusinesses. At a basic level, groups took control of their development by 
organising activities (sales, purchases, credit), and market information together, and 
replicated their success in other areas. Groups working in more organised and formal 
structures developed into federations or co-operatives. These organisations demonstrated 
a collective voice and played an essential role in communities’ and local government’s 
activities, providing feedback and complaints, or raising concerns. At this stage, the 
responsibility was fully transferred to and controlled by the poor and their communities, 
requiring the poor to take responsibility and accountability for their own development 
for sustainable poverty alleviation, thus providing evidence of a shift to mutual 
accountability.      
 
While the above findings are broadly consistent with other research, in the context of this 
study, the three stages of participation (consulting, partnership, delegated control) were 
not sequential, but rather a recurring, iterative process for facilitating effective 
participation and mutual accountability between actors in the communities. As such, 
findings suggest participation should not be viewed as rungs of a ladder (Arnstein, 1969; 
Ebrahim, 2003a), different types (e.g. non-participation, tokenism, and participation) 
(Bhatt, 1997), or levels from weak to strong (Brett, 2003). Rather, effective participation 
processes should be viewed as a circular and iterative process which involves three 
elements: consulting, partnership, and delegated control. Within this process, actors 
within the communities were actively involved, while NGOs worked as facilitators of 
partnerships, such that communities took responsibility for and ownership of their own 
development. This process is depicted in Figure 8.4 below. 
 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Page 229 
 
Figure 8.4 Process of participation 
 
 
 
 
Notably, a number of issues were identified regarding co-operatives in Indonesia, 
requiring attention. Federations in Bangladesh involved a number of groups with a 
manageable size (e.g. 150 members), requiring no membership fee, focusing on both 
social and economic activities, and receiving no support from the government. In 
contrast, co-operatives in Indonesia were larger in size (e.g. 500 members), involved 
both individual ME members and groups, charged a membership fee, strongly focused 
on economic purposes, and received financial support from the government. While 
federations in Bangladesh reported success, co-operatives in Indonesia were often not so 
successful and lost trust from MEs. These differences highlight the importance of 
relational bonding between MEs, and the interrelated nature of social and economic 
development. Specifically, working groups of a large size and in a more developed 
context, represent challenges to the effectiveness of a participatory approach to 
beneficiary accountability, indicating the need for more effective development and 
bonding of working groups before joining larger structures. This finding is similar to 
Hug and Jäger’s (2014) research conducted in the context of Mexican NGOs, where co-
operatives did not fully communicate with, or in fact hid information from MEs (e.g. 
decision-making regarding sales prices, quantity, and production). Moreover, leaders 
took money from co-operatives, dismissed people who raised complaints, and 
manipulated audit processes and reports. Arguably, NGOs need to adopt more tailored 
support to achieving effective outcomes in large groups, such as educating the poor on 
large group management and internal accountability processes, thus increasing NGO 
accountability to the poor communities (Hug & Jäger, 2014). 
Consulting Partnership 
Delegated 
control 
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b. Accountability tools 
Returning to Table 3.4 regarding proposed tools of a participatory approach, the 
findings of this study (Section 7.2.2) suggest that these tools are very informal, 
including (1) information exchange, (2) monitoring and social review, and (3) 
internal and external regulation. Based on the findings, for accountability to 
beneficiaries, preferred tools involved information exchange where NGOs provided 
information to and received feedback and concerns from beneficiaries. Within this 
informal approach, information provided to participants was based on their needs and 
enabled them to participate and gain benefits from NGOs’ or governments’ projects. 
Information was exchanged regularly through various channels (e.g. group meetings, 
training, local staff routine visits, telephone, or internet) on a timely basis. To a lesser 
extent, information was also exchanged through monitoring and evaluation, or 
through the private sector and local partners. Through these channels, the poor also 
provided feedback, raised concerns and received NGOs’ responses. These tools were 
very informal yet practical and suitable given the illiteracy of the poor and NGOs’ 
available resources. They were also considered satisfactory by beneficiaries. 
 
Findings also suggest that social audit was not well established in NGOs’ practice of 
accountability to beneficiaries. Rather, less formal, project monitoring and review 
practices were undertaken for NGO staff or donors. These practices were conducted 
throughout the MED projects, when projects finished, or across multiple projects or 
activities of NGOs’ operations in order to assess effectiveness and consider 
opportunities for learning and change. The findings are similar to those of Mason, 
Kirkbride, and Bryde (2007) who suggest that the routines of social audit provide a 
tool for achieving ongoing accountability. However, the practices of social audits 
identified from the findings were far less rigorous than the expectations of a social 
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audit detailed in the literature, with often only selected elements implemented by 
MED NGOs. This difference could be related to literature (e.g. Ebrahim, 2003a) 
commonly considering social audit as an NGO accountability mechanism to a range 
of stakeholders including donors and governments as a formal process; and NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries typically being informal. Hence, given the 
characteristics of beneficiaries (e.g. low education levels), NGOs may have 
encouraged beneficiaries’ participation in social audit as an informal process. 
 
Whilst the existing literature suggests questionnaire is the most common method for 
conducting social audits (or variations thereof) (Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001), the 
findings of this study are slightly different, indicating focus group discussions were 
the most prevalent method for conducting monitoring or social reviews. This method 
again emphasises the participation of various actors (e.g. civil and government 
organisations and local private sector businesses) involved in and benefiting from 
NGOs’ projects, particularly the poor. Through this process, beneficiaries and other 
actors participating in NGOs’ projects were able to give feedback and raise concerns. 
Through feedback and concerns raised, comparison of results with objectives and 
benchmark performance indicators was undertaken, providing opportunities for 
learning and improving, thereby strengthening accountability to beneficiaries. 
Notably, while this practice was considered valuable by NGOs, beneficiaries seemed 
unaware the importance of this practice to NGO learning and improving. Therefore, 
increasing awareness of the importance of this practice by beneficiaries is something 
that requires attention in NGOs’ practices. 
 
Self-regulation was proposed in Section 3.4.4 as a key mechanism for a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability. While the findings of this study support this 
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suggestion, they also indicate that for effective NGO accountability to beneficiaries, 
regulation should be both internal and external. External regulations involve the 
requirements of donors and local governments with which NGOs have to comply 
(formally holding NGOs to account), to gain legitimacy from these stakeholders. 
Further, while internal regulations remained voluntary, these criteria and principles for 
NGOs’ own operations and internal management (e.g. human resources, financial 
management, freedom from conflicts of interest, discrimination, and other unethical 
practices) were considered important by NGOs for internal standards. These standards 
provided a framework for NGO management and staff to work within the codes of 
conduct, consistent with organisational mission and values, helping to strengthen internal 
NGO accountability. While there is a lack of sector-wide regulations, the importance of 
internal or self-regulation practices could be promoted more to donors and beneficiaries 
to enhance the reputation of NGOs. Further, given the similarity of NGOs’ internal 
regulations, there is potential for these to become shared (industry) standards which 
NGOs could choose to comply with on a voluntary basis, further enhancing (perceived) 
legitimacy.  
 
8.4.2 Barriers to a participatory approach  
Drawing on findings presented in Section 7.3, this section discusses key barriers to a 
participatory approach to NGO accountability to beneficiaries, in relation to 
beneficiaries, NGOs, and social contexts. 
 
a. Beneficiary-related barriers 
Regarding beneficiary-related barriers, findings are consistent with the proposed 
framework building on prior literature (Figure 3.2), detailing low education, low skill 
levels, perceived weak negotiating position, and culture. While low education may 
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lead to difficulties in convincing beneficiaries to try new methods or learn new 
techniques, low skill levels may limit beneficiaries’ ability to expand their businesses 
or work professionally with the private sector. Further, perceived weak negotiating 
position of beneficiaries, cultural, and/or social pressures (e.g. gender inequality, 
religion, family relationships) are other key barriers that hinder beneficiaries’ 
willingness to express any criticism (constructive or otherwise) in their feedback or 
negotiation. These barriers limit the process of effective participation by 
beneficiaries, and limit NGOs’ opportunities for learning and improving project 
outcomes, thus hindering their accountability for successful project outcomes.  
 
Importantly, the findings also reveal other barriers including cultural expectations of 
receiving donations, the poor’s living conditions (e.g. remote areas), and lack of 
management and leadership by the poor. The nature of NGOs’ support was often 
understood by beneficiaries as charitable provision, such that calling on their 
participation without provision in the form of charity was a significant challenge for 
MED NGOs, particularly in Bangladesh. Further, participation required the poor to work 
in groups to access information and services, yet this was a large hurdle when the poor 
lived in remote areas with limited infrastructure. Further, working groups comprised of 
the poor often lacked leadership, resulting in some groups collapsing. In a close and 
supportive community environment (e.g. having a positive attitude towards the poor), as 
observed Vietnam, Chu and Luke (2012b) found working groups comprising both poor 
and non-poor can help NGOs deal with these constraints. However, this strategy was not 
revealed in this study, particularly in Bangladesh, where social discrimination and 
negative attitudes towards the poor were noted (Section 7.3.3). Further, lack of 
leadership was noted in Indonesia, resulting in cases of failed co-operatives. Hence, 
contextual factors play an important role in poverty alleviation.   
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Several factors to deal with beneficiary-related barriers to facilitating a participatory 
approach were identified by both NGOs and beneficiaries. Similar to the literature 
emphasising the importance of trust, facilitating effective program outcomes, and 
support from communities where the poor live (Darcy, 2002; Eversole, 2003; Hammer 
& Lloyd, 2011; Wellens & Jegers, 2014), the findings (Section 7.2.1d) showed that to 
facilitate effective participation of the poor, NGOs worked closely with them to build 
trust with them and the wider community. In particular, convincing the poor through 
demonstrations of successful cases in the field or within their communities so that they 
could see and believe in the outcomes of MED projects was an important motivation to 
participate. Further, gaining the support of those in the communities with power and 
influence (e.g. community leaders, elderly, religious leaders, husbands) was very 
important, so that they did not impede the poor’s participation.  
 
Findings showed that that under a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability, 
information was not exchanged through formal reporting systems; rather it required 
beneficiaries’ participation through various less formal channels such as group meetings, 
local NGO staff. Therefore, to facilitate effective information exchange, a number of 
factors was also identified. First, given that the poor often had other commitments and 
were illiterate, information exchange needed to be relevant to their needs so that they 
understood the potential benefits and were interested in participating. Second, as the poor 
often had a low level of education, information must be presented and provided slowly 
and simply (e.g. visually) so that they could understand and remember. Further, NGO 
staff and facilitators were required to be trusted and known to communities. They needed 
to develop a comfortable environment by engaging with and encouraging beneficiaries 
so that they had the confidence and trust to give feedback and raise concerns. Further, 
communication infrastructure (telephone networks, and internet availability) was also a 
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key factor for achieving effective information exchange. While NGOs were aware of the 
importance of information exchange, beneficiaries at times seemed less aware. Hence, 
increasing their awareness of the importance of having input and sharing ideas, needs 
perhaps to be reinforced in communication with them.  
 
b. NGO-related barriers 
Consistent with various authors (Agyemang et al., 2009; Dombrowski, 2010; Ebrahim, 
2005; Wellens & Jegers, 2014), findings revealed time and cost were common barriers to 
facilitating a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability as calling on the 
participation of various actors is a time-consuming process. In contrast to the literature, 
however, the findings did not reveal conflict demands between stakeholders (e.g. donors 
and beneficiaries) (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), or organisational culture and 
structure (Hammer & Lloyd, 2011) were major barriers to MED. This is perhaps due to 
mechanisms for accountability to donors and beneficiaries being different (formal versus 
informal), with the majority of MED NGOs indicating that they viewed accountability to 
beneficiaries as a long-term objective. However, the findings revealed other NGO-
related barriers. First, as MED NGOs required the poor to satisfy some pre-requisites 
(e.g. commitment, labour, savings or land), they excluded the extremely poor from their 
projects. This strategy may be viewed as limiting NGO legitimacy, moving away from 
the core reason for their existence of poverty alleviation. However, the NGOs 
investigated were aware of this limitation and indicated that the extremely poor, who are 
not able to satisfy any of these pre-requisites, are not ready to successfully participate in 
MED. Aid from other NGOs providing charity or emergency support was considered 
more appropriate for this group. Another NGO related barrier was gaps in 
communication, where perceptions of NGO staff were different from participants’ 
perceptions regarding their needs and expectations (Section 7.3.2). These gaps limit 
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NGO opportunities to understand issues of the poor communities in order to provide 
adequate support. Further, given NGOs were operating on a low cost basis, limits were 
noted regarding appropriately qualified staff to facilitate project changes and outcomes 
based on beneficiaries’ feedback. Lack of sufficient funds also restricted NGOs from 
developing financially sustainable operations, to ensure appropriate support for 
sustainable poverty alleviation outcomes.  
 
c. Context-related barriers 
While the literature suggests that social contexts often affect an organisation’s operations 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Choguill, 1996; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jordan & Tuijl, 
2006b; Murtaza, 2012; Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005), the findings of this study 
(Section 7.3.3) identified various constraints related to social contexts including political 
setting, interest conflicts, geographic and infrastructure conditions, and social bonding. 
Regarding political setting, Bangladesh was considered to be one of the most corrupt 
countries (ranked 136 of 177 countries)39 (Transparency International, 2014). The high 
levels of government corruption in Bangladesh were noted in addition to heavy 
bureaucracy, persistent political instability, and a poorly developed regulatory 
environment. Meanwhile, Indonesia was considered relatively less corrupt (ranked 114 
of 177 countries) (Transparency International, 2014), yet the political setting was 
unstable, leading to lack of government support. These issues limited the opportunity to 
facilitate an active role by government in a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability (Ahmad, 2006; Ghuman & Singh, 2013; O'Dwyer, 2005; Warhurst, 
                                                     
 
39
 1 representing lowest corruption; 177 representing highest corruption 
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2005), and in continuing the outcomes initiated by MED projects for sustainable poverty 
alleviation in both countries (Section 7.3.3). 
 
Regarding conflicts of interest, in Bangladesh where the majority of the population were 
Muslim (AusAID, 2013a), religious leaders or money-lenders often dissuaded the poor 
from participating in MED projects (particularly those of Christian NGOs). This issue 
required NGOs to spend more time and resources to call on the poor’s participation, and 
impeded their active role in taking ownership of their development. In contrast, 
conflicting interests in Indonesia were not from external parties, but from inside working 
groups due to weak bonding between group members. In the more developed context 
(socially and economically) of Indonesia (AusAID, 2013b), the poor had more 
opportunities to participate in mainstream economic activities, so group working became 
less attractive to the poor or less essential within an MED programs. Based on the 
findings, membership fees required by Indonesian co-operations put pressure on the 
poor, demotivating them from participating in these structures. Further, governance of 
these co-operatives favoured those in charge, rather than members as a whole. These 
issues raise concerns around whether approaches to participation need to be designed 
differently in a more developed context. Importantly, the mechanisms to hold both 
federations and co-operatives to account can be challenged when they are developed 
further without any involvement from or oversight by NGOs. In particular, the 
mechanisms for generating feedback and complaints from members were inadequate 
when there was no third party to investigate, take action, or hold these organisations to 
account. This issue presents another difficulty with federations and co-operations as 
mechanisms in the transfer of accountability. Hence, accountability is potentially 
something NGOs must not only demonstrate, but also expressly teach.  
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Regarding vulnerability to extreme weather events and infrastructure conditions, 
Bangladesh is considered to have the second most vulnerable climate in the world 
(Climate & Development Knowledge Network, 2014), such that the harsh geographic 
conditions and severe natural disasters (e.g. floods, cyclones) (AusAID, 2013a) present 
additional challenges for MED. As a result, calling on the poor’s participation for 
sustainable development of MEs was identified as a significant challenge. While this 
issue was not a major constraint for NGOs operating in Indonesia, a very diverse society 
and geography with different cultures and languages limited NGO learning and the 
potential for replication of MED projects (AusAID, 2013b). Further, strong participation 
required providing the poor with information and services through partnerships with 
other actors. However, the limited infrastructure in Bangladesh required NGOs to have 
more resources and time to not only provide this support, but also to convince the poor 
and other actors to participate in MED projects. In Indonesia, where infrastructure and 
education were more developed, the poor had better access to internet and telephone, 
which often increased their access to information.  
 
Regarding social bonding, while the wider communities did not have a negative view 
towards the poor in Indonesia, discrimination towards the poor in Bangladesh was 
noted (Section 7.3.3). This issue limited the poor’s participation in MED projects, 
while requiring more time, resources, technique, effort and understanding to 
convince other actors to work with the poor and to build their confidence and self-
esteem.  
 
Acknowledging and understanding the above constraints helped NGOs have suitable 
project designs and timeframes, advocacy processes, as well as resources to ensure 
the facilitation of a participatory approach. As such, accountability to beneficiaries 
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for effective project outcomes was reinforced by addressing these issues. Figure 8.5 
summaries the framework of a participatory approach based on the findings of this 
study. This figure builds the original framework, by including mechanisms, factors, 
and barriers identified in the findings, with emergent findings marked with an 
asterisk). 
Figure 8.5 A framework of a participatory approach  
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projects. By being accountable to beneficiaries, the NGOs investigated emphasised that 
their success in achieving sustainable poverty alleviation was not simply increasing 
income for the poor; rather building their capacity was essential so that they were able to 
further maintain and develop income sources through ongoing partnerships with various 
actors. 
 
Accordingly, the NGOs investigated emphasised that their MED projects were 
successful in helping the poor and other actors take the ownership of their development, 
and work together. These successful outcomes provided opportunities for poverty to be 
alleviated in a sustainable way in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Unlike other research 
indicating beneficiaries’ low satisfaction with NGOs’ support (Islam & Morgan, 2011; 
Stiles, 2002; Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006; Yamin, 2003), findings indicate 
beneficiaries were satisfied and considered NGOs’ projects met their needs and 
conditions, providing them with genuine social and economic benefits. They often felt 
empowered and had developed a level of financial and social independence. Working 
groups and ME owners interviewed were still operating businesses. Both NGOs and 
beneficiaries mentioned that through participating in MED projects, the poor gradually 
gained social status, where they had a voice and participated more in social activities, 
leading to a change in the perceptions local communities had towards them.  
 
Researchers have criticised NGOs for centralising power in decision-making and 
following the requirements of government (Pradjasto & Indriaswati, 2006; Warren, 
2005), or being ineffective in building networks with the private sector (Islam & 
Morgan, 2011; Warren, 2005). However, the findings of this study show that through a 
participatory process, government took initiatives (through increasing support to 
development projects or implementing supporting regulation) (Section 7.4.1) and 
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provided valuable support underpinning development projects. Meanwhile, the private 
sector actively continued to work with the poor communities. Further, despite some co-
operative failures, federations and other co-operatives were still operating, taking 
ownership of their development. For the NGOs investigated, these outcomes were a 
major indicator of the success of MED projects and the transferring of responsibility 
from NGOs to poor communities for sustainable poverty alleviation.  
 
NGOs also perceived that their MED projects were successful when they had 
opportunities to learn and improve their approaches. This process helped them build a 
strong team and generate more effective program outcomes. As NGOs generated success 
from their MED projects, the number of donors supporting their projects had increased 
(Section 7.4.1). Another success indicator identified was replication of their approaches, 
becoming common practice within the NGO sector.  
 
Notably, to achieve sustainable outcomes for poverty alleviation through MED, while 
some NGOs implemented projects with long timeframes (eight to 15 years), this was not 
a common practice for most NGOs investigated (average of three to five year projects). 
Further, once projects finished, there was typically no ongoing NGO involvement. At 
most NGO follow-up was informal, irregular, and random; done on an ‘exceptions’ 
basis. This issue raises concern regarding sustainable poverty alleviation and how NGOs 
can be certain of effectiveness for accountability to beneficiaries as a long-term 
objective.  
 
8.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the key findings that address the five research questions of 
this study. It can be seen that MED NGOs focused on a strategic approach to gaining 
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legitimacy, aligned with their goals and mission which placed beneficiaries as a central 
focus in MED projects. Under this approach, NGOs selected and persuaded donors and 
beneficiaries who shared NGOs’ interests (donors) or satisfied NGOs’ conditions 
(beneficiaries), and strongly emphasised the active participation of the poor. Notably, an 
institutional response was also revealed, but secondary to a strategic approach. Within a 
participatory approach to beneficiary accountability, NGOs considered accountability to 
donors as a short-term objective, while accountability to beneficiaries was a long-term 
objective. Through a participatory approach (involving multiple actors), a shift in NGO 
accountability was evident from vertical to horizontal, facilitating not only NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries for their projects, but also mutual accountability amongst 
various actors (the poor, the private and public sectors). Mechanisms and barriers to such 
accountability were also identified. Mechanisms were very informal (suited to 
beneficiaries’ characteristics) and practical for MED. Barriers were predominantly 
related to beneficiaries, NGOs, and social contexts. The findings also show that a 
participatory approach to beneficiary accountability contributes to the successful 
outcomes of MED projects that not only focus on increasing income for the poor, but 
also building capacity such that the poor continue working and deriving benefits from 
MED projects. 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Page 243 
 
CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSION 
9.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
NGOs play an essential role in poverty alleviation. However, while their 
accountability to donors is considered well-developed, weak accountability to 
beneficiaries within the NGO sector has been widely criticised in the literature for 
the last two decades (see Section 3.2.1). While the need for a participatory approach 
to strengthening beneficiary accountability has been emphasised (Hug & Jäger, 2014; 
Jordan & Tuijl, 2006b; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), an understanding of 
mechanisms for facilitating this approach remains limited. To address these issues, 
this study reviewed the fundamental reasons for NGOs’ operations through the lenses 
of legitimacy and stakeholder theories, and investigated NGOs’ approaches to 
gaining legitimacy from the perspectives of donors and beneficiaries. Moreover, the 
study also examined how those approaches affect NGO managers’ goals and 
perceptions of beneficiaries who have been identified as powerless stakeholders, and 
how those perceptions and goals helped to prioritise NGO accountability to 
beneficiaries. The study also identified systematic mechanisms for effectively 
facilitating a participatory approach to NGO accountability to beneficiaries in order 
to achieve sustainable poverty alleviation.  
 
In order to gain insights into the nature of NGO accountability to beneficiaries and 
identify mechanisms fostering this form of accountability, this study conducted semi-
structured in-depth interviews in Bangladesh and Indonesia with executives of 20 
MED NGOs, 10 beneficiaries of these NGOs, and one donor NGO executive. 
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Interview data was also compared and verified with data from publicly available 
sources, and observations during the interview process.  
 
The findings of this study show that the NGOs investigated adopted a strategic 
approach to gaining legitimacy, focusing on strategies for selecting and persuading 
stakeholders (both donors and beneficiaries) who shared NGOs’ values and mission. 
These legitimation strategies centralised the role of beneficiaries in achieving 
sustainable poverty alleviation, and emphasised a facilitation role for NGOs. 
Specifically, NGO managers’ goals and perceptions strongly focused on 
beneficiaries, highlighting practices that required beneficiaries to actively participate 
in MED projects and take responsibility for their development (through engaging in 
MEs). These practices resulted in a participatory approach being central to NGOs’ 
accountability to beneficiaries. In addition, by involving both the poor and other 
actors (e.g. private sector companies, local communities, local government) in MED 
projects, NGOs tried to ensure these groups were accountable to each other and had 
opportunities to continue working together once NGO projects finished. The findings 
also identified mechanisms of, and barriers to, a participatory approach and 
emphasised the essential role of this approach to achieving sustainable poverty 
alleviation. This chapter concludes this study by highlighting the key findings and 
their contributions to the existing literature and practice, followed by 
acknowledgement the study’s limitations (Section 9.2) , and identification of areas 
for further research (Section 9.3). 
 
9.2 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This section highlights key findings of this study and their contributions to the 
existing literature and practice. 
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9.2.1 Contributions to the existing literature 
 
a. New perspectives on NGO legitimacy and power 
As outlined throughout the study, the literature on NGO legitimacy commonly 
adopts an institutional lens and suggests that NGOs need to conform to institutional 
requirements and values in order to gain organisational legitimacy (e.g. Atack, 1999; 
Doh & Teegen, 2002; Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; 
Sonpar et al., 2010). However, building on the perspectives of legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories, the findings of this study show that the MED NGOs examined 
primarily adopted a strategic approach to gaining legitimacy. This was achieved by 
selecting donors who shared NGOs’ mission and values, as well as choosing 
beneficiaries who were interested in NGOs’ projects and satisfied the projects’ 
conditions and pre-requisites. MED NGOs also persuaded donors and beneficiaries 
by demonstrating and communicating successful outcomes through available 
networks. By pursuing selection and persuasion strategies, donors’ requirements and 
beneficiaries’ needs were aligned with NGOs’ mission and values, helping NGOs to 
gain organisational legitimacy from these two stakeholder groups. Importantly, 
findings also show that NGOs are not powerless in their relationships with donors, 
and beneficiaries are not powerless in their relationship with NGOs. NGOs need 
funds from donors, yet they often do not compromise their own mission and values 
in order to obtain funds. The poor need NGOs’ projects, yet when these projects 
bring harm, or no (or little) benefits, NGOs fail to gain trust from communities, and 
thus find it difficult to call for their participation. These findings differ from the 
literature, which commonly suggests that the poor are powerless and passive in 
accepting NGOs’ projects (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Dixon & McGregor, 2011; 
Wellens & Jegers, 2014). The selection and persuasion strategies for gaining 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Page 246 
 
legitimacy allow NGOs to pursue their own mission and values, and be held 
accountable for meeting the poor’s needs. NGOs hence have opportunities to achieve 
effective program outcomes for sustainable poverty alleviation, ultimately helping 
them gain operational legitimacy. These practices provide a valuable foundation for 
strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries.  
 
The findings of this study, while supporting Elberts and Arts’s (2011) suggestion that 
NGOs adopt a strategic approach to gaining legitimacy, also reveal some new 
perspectives. Specifically, Elbers & Arts (2011) contend that pursuing a strategic 
approach to legitimacy depends on the presence of alternative sources of funding, 
strong performance, or a certain level of trust (Elbers & Arts’s, 2011). However, this 
study reveals that of the NGOs investigated, a strategic approach to gaining 
legitimacy (through selection and persuasion) was inherent to their operations and 
management strategies. Within this strategy, NGOs focused on diversifying funding 
sources, demonstrating and communicating good performances, and gaining trust 
from donors and beneficiaries, but their strategies did not depend on these factors. 
This view emphasises the importance of financial independence in NGOs’ operations 
in order to achieve their goals and mission, while focusing on meeting the needs of 
beneficiaries for effective program outcomes. 
 
b. NGOs’ stakeholder management  and accountability 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, beneficiaries are commonly identified as 
dependent stakeholders lacking power to require NGOs to be accountable to them 
(Assad & Goddard, 2010; LeRoux, 2009). Even when present, NGO accountability 
to beneficiaries is considered weak, compared to NGO accountability to donors 
(Ebrahim, 2003a; Najam, 1996; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). However, findings from 
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this study indicate a clear accountability to both donors and beneficiaries, albeit in 
different forms (e.g. emphasis on formal reporting mechanisms for donors, and 
informal mechanisms through dialogue and participation for beneficiaries). This 
indicates a tailored approach to accountability. Further, accountability to each group 
differed in terms of time horizons, with accountability to donors being considered a 
short-term objective, while accountability to beneficiaries was considered a long-
term and overriding objective. Being accountable to donors helped NGOs obtain 
funds for projects and generate benefits for beneficiaries, thus providing the 
resources to achieve long-term outcomes. Accountability to donor was considered a 
means to an end; not an end in and of itself. Hence, accountability to both donors and 
beneficiaries is important, but have different emphasis. 
 
Regarding NGO accountability to stakeholders, Ebrahim (2003a) commonly 
considers the direction of accountability relationships as primarily vertical and 
hierarchical, such that NGOs account to donors and government (upward 
accountability), beneficiaries (downward accountability), itself (internal), or other 
stakeholders (external). However, the findings of this study show a shift in NGO 
accountability dimensions and directions, from vertical to horizontal. As part of this 
shift, NGOs were accountable to donors, government, beneficiaries, etc., but also 
facilitated accountability between beneficiaries (such as the poor), and the other 
stakeholders (e.g. private sector companies, local government). This shift was 
achieved by facilitating interdependences, interactions, and dialogue between these 
actors through partnerships; reinforcing a socialising form of accountability (Roberts, 
1991) in NGOs’ programs. Through this facilitation, these actors took active roles 
and controlled their development. This transfer of responsibility and accountability 
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provided these actors with valuable foundations to continue development activities, 
once NGO projects formally ended.  
 
c. Mechanisms facilitating NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
While some authors emphasise the essential role of interactions and dialogue with 
beneficiaries in order to facilitate a participatory approach to accountability (Hug & 
Jäger, 2014; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014), a comprehensive 
framework for effectively facilitating such an approach is lacking. The findings of 
this study reveal details of mechanisms for such an approach, involving both tools 
and processes. In this study, while mechanisms for accountability to donors were 
quite formal (e.g. reporting systems), mechanisms for accountability to beneficiaries 
remained very informal, particularly in the form of tools. Tools within a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability include: (1) information exchange where 
beneficiaries can get information from, and provide their feedback or concerns to 
NGOs (rather than formal reporting or disclosure systems), (2) monitoring and social 
reviews (rather than social audit), and (3) internal and basic external regulation 
required by government (rather than solely self-regulation). While these tools largely 
remain informal, they were considered practical and suitable for NGOs’ operations, 
given beneficiaries’ illiteracy levels and NGOs’ available resources.  
 
Regarding the processes within a participatory approach to beneficiary 
accountability, the findings suggest that, in contrast to the literature, participation 
should not be viewed as rungs of a ladder (Arnstein, 1969; Ebrahim, 2003a), 
different types (e.g. non-participation, tokenism, and participation) (Bhatt, 1997), or 
levels from weak to strong (Brett, 2003). Rather, effective processes of a 
participatory approach should be viewed as circular and iterative, involving three 
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stages: consulting, partnership, and delegated control. This finding, while broadly 
consistent with Chu and Luke (2012a) in the context of MED NGOs operating in 
Vietnam, is developed further in this study as an iterative process. At the delegated 
control stage, MEs and other actors took control of their own development through 
partnerships within linkages, VCD, federations or co-operations. They then, in turn, 
were able to provide feedback and raise concerns that helped government or NGOs 
in the design of suitable future projects or modifications to existing projects. Within 
this process, MEs and other actors worked directly together through partnerships 
while NGOs worked as facilitators of these partnerships. 
 
The findings also identified barriers that may hinder a participatory approach for 
accountability to beneficiaries. While broadly consistent with the proposed 
framework (Figure 3.2), this study identified additional barriers that hinder the 
effectiveness of a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability. Relating to 
beneficiaries, these barriers include cultural expectations of receiving (when 
beneficiaries expect to receive charitable support from NGOs without making 
contributions), the poor’s living conditions (when they live dispersedly in remote 
areas with poor infrastructure), and lack of management and leadership by the poor. 
These constraints, while requiring NGOs to spend more resources and time to 
achieve effective outcomes for MED projects, also indicate that charitable provision 
needs to be considered and presented carefully (i.e. distinguished from MED), as 
charity may cause passive attitudes that hinder the achievement of sustainable 
poverty alleviation. 
 
Social context is widely identified as a key factor affecting NGOs’ operations and 
strategies (Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Choguill, 1996; Islam & Morgan, 2011; Jordan & 
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Tuijl, 2006b; Murtaza, 2012; Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005). This study identified 
some features of social context that hinder the effectiveness of a participatory 
approach to beneficiary accountability, including political context, interest conflicts, 
geographic and infrastructure conditions, and social bonding. In an environment with 
a high level of corruption and political instability (e.g. Bangladesh), facilitating the 
active role of government in a participatory approach to beneficiary accountability, 
and continuing the outcomes initiated by MED projects for sustainable poverty 
alleviation is challenging. Further, when there are conflicts of interest in working 
groups, including external (e.g. religious leaders, money-lenders), or internal (weak 
group management) factors, enhancing or facilitating participation or partnerships 
between actors becomes more difficult. In a country highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters like Bangladesh, calling on the poor’s participation in sustainable 
development of MEs is a significant challenge. Meanwhile, a country with higher 
levels of social inclusion (i.e. less negative attitudes towards the poor), like 
Indonesia, provides a more supportive and encouraging environment for poverty 
alleviation programs.  
 
9.2.2 Contributions to practice 
The findings from this study indicate that the MED NGOs investigated placed 
beneficiaries as central to their operations, emphasising accountability to them. 
NGOs in this study not only helped the poor generate extra income, but also 
facilitated accountability between the poor, and with other actors within the 
communities. Through their MED operations, NGOs deliberately stood back from 
these partnerships and strongly emphasised their role as facilitators. By taking active 
roles, the poor had opportunities to be lifted out of poverty in a sustainable way. This 
approach was evidenced as successful via the implementation of output linkages and 
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VCD, or development of federations and co-operatives. It reinforced the importance 
of ensuring the participation of different sectors in communities, and presents a 
valuable consideration for other countries in their support for MED. NGOs 
connected poor communities with the private sector and facilitated their 
participation. Under these arrangements, households, the private sector, and local 
government constituted key stakeholders working directly together, while NGOs 
acted as facilitators to help strengthen stakeholders’ relationships and capacities. 
Importantly, the connection and participation of various sectors was supported and 
strengthened in communities, providing opportunities for MEs to grow and expand.  
 
Notably, the findings also reveal limitations and issues of larger working groups 
(such as co-operatives in Indonesia), where there is no further support or oversight 
from NGOs after their projects formally finish. When groups developed to become 
large in size in a more developed context like Indonesia, hindering factors such as 
weak bonding within groups and lack of leadership emerged. These factors require 
NGOs to adopt a more tailored support for helping groups overcome these issues, 
such as gradually supporting participants or providing training on management of 
large groups. While information exchange, monitoring and social reviews (variations 
of social audit), were considered valuable by the NGOs investigated, beneficiaries 
seemed unaware of the importance of these practices to NGO learning and 
improvement. Therefore, increasing awareness of the importance of these practices 
for beneficiaries is something that requires attention and deliberate communication in 
NGOs’ activities. 
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9.2.3 Implications of research  
 
a. Implications for practice 
Various implications arise from this study. With respect to practice, while NGOs 
may have various policies for poverty alleviation to achieve sustainable outcomes, 
these policies should focus on dissuading dependence on aid by the poor and helping 
them participate in activities to promote their own economic and social development. 
In doing so, utilisation of resources from and involvement of local communities and 
other sectors through a participatory approach is essential. As a result, resources 
available from local communities are identified and used effectively. This process 
facilitates valuable social inclusion and development, resulting in interactions and 
dialogue between participating actors. Through this strategy, the poor actively 
participate in and control their own development, rather than relying on external 
support providers (e.g. NGOs) who may be available only for limited time periods. 
Poor communities thus are provided with an opportunity to engage in and continue 
poverty alleviation activities, progressing out of poverty in a sustainable way after 
NGOs’ projects formally finish. 
 
MED NGOs have been criticised as not always providing economic development 
activities for the poorest of the poor (Surender & Niekerk, 2008). However, the 
findings of this study revealed that economic development (through income 
generating activities) may not always be practical for the poor. The poor, at a certain 
stage (often the extremely poor), need some form of direct support (e.g. aid, charity) 
to achieve food security and basic health. Hence, this support needs to be 
distinguished from MED and other poverty alleviation programs. Further, a 
supportive and encouraging environment needs to be established so that the poor can 
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develop confidence and live with dignity. This process prepares the poor to work 
effectively in MED projects with confidence and commitment, and be lifted out of 
poverty in a sustainable way. Thus the criticism, while potentially true, does not 
necessarily adequately take into account the reality of the development needs of 
specific target populations, or the services which are provided. 
 
While findings reveal a range of processes are important to a participatory approach 
within MED NGOs, implications may also extend to other NGOs. To achieve 
successful project outcomes and work effectively with communities, it is essential 
for NGOs to gain trust and access to poor communities. As such, NGOs need to 
know poor communities’ conditions and expectations, develop an understanding of 
their culture and local context, and call for their involvement from the beginning of 
the project. Failure to do so may cause negative effects to communities such as weak 
participation or creating receiving behaviours, and risk the effectiveness of other 
NGOs’ programs. When these programs are ineffective (e.g. bring harm, or no (or 
little) benefits), NGOs lose trust from communities, and thus find it difficult to call 
for their participation. 
 
While tools for facilitating accountability to beneficiaries remain informal (e.g. 
exchanging information, conducting monitoring and social reviews to follow up and 
evaluate project outcomes, internal and external regulations), each of these tools 
plays a different and important role. Thus, the importance of these tools being 
adopted and implemented collectively rather than selectively is underscored to 
enhance NGO accountability to beneficiaries. Further, for more technical tools (e.g. 
social audit), NGO staff may likely need training to undertake them effectively; and 
donors need to be aware of the training required and support this through project 
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requirements and funds. Importantly, increasing beneficiaries’ awareness of the 
importance of tools for strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries (e.g. 
feedback), not only to facilitate NGOs’ learning, but also to reinforce NGO 
accountability in designing/implementing effective projects, is essential. Thus, 
implications for practice extend to specially addressing these issues with 
beneficiaries.  
 
While external regulation for NGO accountability (particularly to beneficiaries) 
remains limited within the sector, NGOs’ internal or self-regulation practices could 
be better promoted to donors and the public. This action can potentially enhance 
NGO’s own legitimacy (given concerns regarding misuse of funds and ineffective 
processes and performance), as well as provide other NGOs with structure or 
guidelines as a basis for shared (industry) standards for strengthening NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
Another implication for practice relates to working groups. Working groups are often 
important in creating bonding and generating social capital. However, when these 
groups become large in size, they need to be developed and trained in a way that 
ensures strong leadership and accountability, in order to maintain effectiveness, 
avoid internal conflicts or fraud, and subsequent group collapse. 
 
b. Implications for theory 
Regarding implications for theory, the findings of this study indicate that rather than 
focusing on an institutional view to investigate how NGOs conform to institutional 
requirements to gain legitimacy (Atack, 1999), a more nuanced consideration of a 
strategic approach is also needed to fully understand the nature of NGO legitimacy, 
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and their stakeholder and accountability management. NGOs can be strategic about 
how they operate through selecting (or persuading) who they initially partner with 
(potential stakeholders: donors, beneficiaries), then respond to these stakeholders’ 
needs. This strategic approach allows them to pursue their own mission and seek 
funds from various sources (e.g. donations, contract-based projects, income from 
social enterprises, etc.), emphasising their independence. Through this approach, the 
relationships between donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries can be more dynamic, rather 
than NGOs passively conforming to donors’ requirements, or beneficiaries accepting 
whatever NGOs provide, reinforcing the importance of a participatory approach.  
 
Regarding NGOs’ stakeholder management, accountability to beneficiaries (as 
dependent stakeholders) and donors (as definitive/powerful stakeholders) are not 
necessarily separate from one another; rather they are interrelated. While 
accountability to donors is often considered formal and hierarchical, findings 
highlight the importance of NGO accountability to donors being aligned with NGOs’ 
operations and accountability to beneficiaries for effective program outcomes. While 
the time horizon for accountability to donors is typically short-term – fulfilling 
obligations or expectations of funding terms, NGOs’ time horizon for accountability 
to beneficiaries is typically longer-term due to the extended challenge of sustainable 
poverty alleviation. This interrelatedness and time horizontal consideration of 
accountability have not been considered in the literature, and have important 
implications for the notion of sustainable (long-term) poverty alleviation based on 
the poor’s needs and development, regarding both economic and social change. 
 
While the literature commonly considers participation as a ladder with various levels 
and NGOs playing a central role (Arnstein, 1969), the findings show that 
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participation is a recurring and iterative process involving interactions amongst 
various actors, facilitating mutual accountability. Specifically, meaningful 
participation for poor community development should be undertaken through a 
process of three stages: consulting, partnership, and delegated control. Within this 
process, NGOs work as facilitators, linking the poor with local communities and 
other actors and helping them take active roles and initiatives for their own 
development. As such, NGOs’ role as facilitators of mutual accountability, between 
beneficiaries and other actors (e.g. public organisations), is an important 
development for theory with implications for how accountability can be understood 
in this context.  
 
Mechanisms for NGO accountability to beneficiaries, while remaining limited in the 
literature (Ebrahim, 2003a), focus on formal forms which may not work in every 
setting or context. As such, research on this topic should consider the poor’s low 
level of education and NGOs’ available resources, such that NGOs’ mechanisms for 
accountability to beneficiaries do not need to be formal. Rather, they can remain 
informal, but should be easy to use and access for both NGOs and the poor to 
exchange information, interact, and facilitate dialogue, with participation 
underpinning these mechanisms. Barriers to these mechanisms also need to be 
considered in theory, relating to beneficiaries, NGOs themselves, and local contexts.   
 
9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
As noted in Section 4.9, limitations exist regarding the scope and research method of 
this study. This study adopted a qualitative research method, which by its nature 
provides a deep understanding of phenomena within a purposive sample, rather than 
a wide population for the purpose of generalisation (Cavana et al., 2001; Yin, 2009). 
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Therefore, the findings did not aim to respond to all issues on poverty alleviation 
through MED. Rather, they focused on addressing the specific research questions to 
gain an understanding of the nature of NGO accountability to beneficiaries, and 
identifying mechanisms to foster this form of accountability in the context of 
Bangladesh and Indonesia. As such, these findings were based on a limited number 
of interviews with MED NGOs in these countries, a smaller number of participating 
NGOs’ beneficiaries, and only one donor NGO. Hence, the findings represent a 
sample of NGOs operating in these countries, rather than the entire population, and 
cannot necessarily be generalised. Nevertheless, insights from an examination of 
practice in this context potentially provide useful guidance to MED NGOs and other 
poverty alleviation programs elsewhere. 
 
9.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As this study only investigated a small number of NGOs and beneficiaries in two 
countries, similar research conducted in other countries would help to understand the 
similarities and differences in different contexts. Research on a wider range of NGOs 
involved in poverty alleviation (other than MED) could provide a useful extension, 
examining participation and beneficiary accountability in other contexts. Further, 
research investigating MED program outcomes through a longitudinal analysis will 
provide a deeper understanding of the sustainability of these programs.  
 
Given the challenges noted in the implementation of co-operatives in Indonesia (e.g. 
large size, membership fees, lack of bonding, leadership and management) which 
were not evident in federations in Bangladesh, further research into what makes an 
effective co-operative and alternative support (effective structures and operations) 
would be useful for further developing MED NGO accountability practices. Lessons 
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learnt from federations in Bangladesh (e.g. strong group bonding) can also be 
compared and considered for application in a more developed country context (like 
Indonesia).  
 
The findings of this study show that international NGOs face constraints when they 
are required to form partnerships with local NGOs or civil organisations in order to 
implement projects. As mentioned in Section 8.2.2, this issue raises concerns around 
whether these NGOs have to compromise their approaches to MED and 
accountability, and whether their legitimacy should be viewed differently from local 
NGOs. Further research to investigate these issues is important to provide insights 
for theory and practice on NGOs’ operations in this context. 
 
Based on the findings, some NGOs generated income from their own social 
enterprises involving the sales of MEs’ products. However, based on observations 
during fieldwork, several NGOs in Bangladesh operated a large number of shops, 
selling a wide range of high quality products, and being involved in various activities 
(e.g. universities, financial institutions). These practices raise concerns around the 
scope of NGOs’ operations and whether their legitimacy and accountability for 
poverty alleviation is compromised when balancing large scale profit-oriented 
activities with other (poverty alleviation) activities. While a formal reporting system 
is still not well developed within the NGO sector, providing more standardised 
financial reports could help to strengthen the accountability of NGOs. Further, while 
findings from this study show that annual or other formal reports are often not 
suitable for NGOs to discharge accountability to beneficiaries, better reporting 
should be considered informally to downward stakeholders. Research on these issues 
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will provide further understanding of NGOs’ approaches to gaining legitimacy and 
strengthening NGO accountability.  
 
Between 2010 and 2012, development aid fell by 6% (OECD, 2013). While aid 
funding remains essential for NGOs’ operations, effective use of those funds is also 
imperative as a small change in the effectiveness of NGOs’ programs can 
substantially affect poor peoples’ lives (Agyemang et al., 2009). Further, while 
funding is reducing, it is expected there will be some 1 billion people still living in 
extreme poverty in 2015 (World Bank, 2014), requiring sustainable solutions for 
poverty alleviation. Therefore, by strengthening NGO accountability to beneficiaries 
through providing effective programs and calling on the active involvement of the 
poor and the private sector, valuable opportunities can be provided for alleviating 
poverty in a sustainable way.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1A 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - NGOs 
 
1. Introduction 
- Brief introduction of myself and the research study – microenterprise development for 
the poor and approaches to effective program outcomes. 
 
- Based on publicly available information (e.g. annual and other reports), I see that your 
organisation has a focus on poverty alleviation by helping the poor engage in MEs. I 
am interested in examining further how you involve the poor in your projects, what 
approaches you take to enhance projects’ effectiveness, etc… 
 
2. Background on NGO’s support of microenterprise development for the poor 
 
1. Overview/background of this focus? 
2. What types of support (credit, training, technical support, markets, etc.,) do you 
provide to the poor? 
3. Why are these types of support chosen rather than others?  
4. Will these types of support be continued or expanded? 
5. What are the main strengths in providing these types of support? 
6. And what are the main challenges? 
 
3. Funding sources 
7. Where are your income sources mainly from? 
8. How do you raise funds from donors? (Project based funding or by promoting your 
mission to donors, etc.,) 
9. What are your strategies/approaches to raise funds from donors? 
10. Are there any standards that you have to satisfy for fundraising?  
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a. What are they?  
b. Who sets them?  
11. What factors contribute to success of fundraising activities? And what are the 
difficulties? 
12. What are the end purposes of your organisational goals or projects?  
13. Do your approaches to fundraising from donors affect your own mission or goals for 
your projects? In what way? 
a. Are there any conflicts? 
b. If so, how do you balance the conflicts? 
14. Do you generate income from your own business activities? If so, how?  
a. How is the income used?   
b. What is your expectation of this income source? Will it likely increase or decrease 
in the future? If so, why? 
15. Do the approaches to MED affect your fundraising activities? In what way? 
 
4. Key stakeholders  
16. Who does your organisation see themselves as responsible to? 
17. Can you rank your responsibility to them in order of importance? Has this changed 
over time? 
18. Who is the target for your projects? 
a. Where are they living? 
b. How do you identify them? 
19. For what are you responsible to donors? How is this responsibility addressed? 
20. Are there constraints regarding being responsible to the poor and satisfying donors’ 
requirements?  
a. If not, why? 
b. If so, how does your organisation deal with these constraints? 
c. Do you ever feel the need to balance the concerns of donors with the needs of the 
poor? 
21. Do you have goals/mission stating your commitments to the poor? Through what 
means? 
 
5. Accountability mechanisms to the poor 
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22. Do you involve the poor in your projects?  
a. If not, why? 
b. If so, what approaches or processes are used? 
c. Why are these approaches or processes used? 
23. How do you encourage the poor to participate in your projects? 
24. What factors contribute to the success of participation processes? And what are the 
difficulties? 
25. Do you have mechanisms to provide information to the poor?  
a. If not, why? 
b. If so, what are they? 
c. What information is provided? When and how is information provided?  
26. Are the poor able to access information?  
a. If not, why? 
b. If so, how? What kind of information are they able to access? 
27. What factors contribute to the success of information provision process? And what are 
the difficulties? 
28. Do you have mechanism to facilitate feedback or complaints from the poor regarding 
your projects?  
a. If not, why?  
b. If so, what are the approaches or processes? 
c. How often are these mechanisms used by the poor? 
29. What factors assist or constrain this process? 
And how do they affect the poor raising complaints or feedback? 
30. Do you have mechanisms to facilitate responses or learning from the poor’s feedback 
or complaints?  
a. If not, why? 
b. If so, what are they?  
31. What factors contribute to the success of these response processes? And what are the 
difficulties? 
32. Do you use social audit?  
a. If not, why? Do you use any social review process? 
b. If so, when are social audits conducted?  
c. Who conducts social audits? 
d. What is the process of conducting social audit? 
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e. Are there constraints or benefits on conducting social audit? If so, what are they?  
33. Does your organisation have its own regulations? Why? 
a. Are there constraints or benefits on implementing self-regulation? What are they?  
b. What external regulations are you subject to? 
 
6. Accountability to beneficiaries and project outcomes 
 
34. Do you think your operations adequately address responsibility to the donors? And to 
the poor? Why? 
35. What would make your project outcomes more effective? 
36. What timeframes (if any) do you have for your projects? 
a. What factors determine the timeframe of your projects? 
b. When do you decide to cease a project? 
c. Do you ever follow-up on (project outcomes) beneficiaries after projects cease? 
37. Do the poor continue working together once your projects formally cease? If so, in 
what way? 
38. Do you think your NGOs’ operations are successful?  
a. Why? On what basis? 
b. How do you measure or interpret success?  
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APPENDIX 1B 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - Beneficiaries 
 
1. Introduction 
- Brief introduction of myself and the research study – microenterprise development for 
the poor and approaches to effective program outcomes. 
 
- As introduced by xxx (name of the NGO), I understand that you are participating in 
their income generating projects. I am interested in having your feedback on these 
projects, etc… 
2. Background on NGO’s support of microenterprise development for the poor 
1. What types of support (credit, training, technical support, markets, etc.,) do you 
receive from the NGO? 
2. Do these types of support help you generate extra income? In what way? 
3. Should the NGO continue to provide these types of support?  
a. If yes, why? 
b. If not, why? What other types of support should they provide? 
 
3. Key stakeholders  
4. How did you become aware of the NGO’s projects? 
5. Are there any conditions required for you to participate in the NGOs’ income 
generating projects?  
a. What are they? 
b. Is everyone within your community able to know about these conditions? How? 
c. Is it easy for everyone to participate in the NGO’s projects? 
d. What do you think about these conditions? 
 
4. Accountability mechanisms to the poor 
6. What is your involvement in the NGO’s projects?  
7. What processes are you required to be involved in? 
8. Why did you decide to participate in the NGO’s projects?  
a. Are there any reasons that people within your community do not want to 
participate? Why? 
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b. If yes, what can the NGO do to encourage them to participate? 
9. What information (e.g. project information, conditions to participate, etc.) are you 
able to receive from the NGO? In what way? 
10. Do you think you receive enough information from the NGO?  
a. If yes, is the information useful? How? 
b. If no, what can the NGO do to provide you with enough information? 
11. Are you able to access information you need?  
a. If yes, what kind of information do you often need? How do you access it? 
b. If no, why? 
12. Are you able to provide feedback or complaints to the NGO? 
d. If not, why?  
e. If so, how? 
f. How often do you do that? 
13. Have you ever participated in any social review process conducted by the NGO? 
When? What did you do? 
 
5. Accountability to beneficiaries and project outcomes 
14. Do you think the NGO’s projects meet your needs?  
a. If yes, in what way? 
b. If not, why? What can the NGO do better? 
15. Do you think your microenterprise will continue operating?  
a. If no, why?  
b. If yes, in what way? 
16. Did you participate in this NGO’s other projects before?  
a. If yes, did they revisit the project after their assistance finished? If yes, what did 
they do? If no, do you think following up their projects is necessary? 
17. Did you participate in any other NGOs’ projects? If yes, did they revisit the project 
after their assistance finished? If yes, what did they do? 
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APPENDIX 2: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Interview questions Research 
questions Potential themes NGOs Beneficiaries 
Q1 
2. Background on 
NGOs’ support of 
microenterprise 
development for 
the poor 
Q1 
RQ1 
  Conformity Selection Persuasion 
Q2 Q2 Pragmatic - Respond to stakeholders' needs 
- Co-operate with stakeholders  
- Build reputation  
- Locate friendly audiences 
- Recruit friendly 
collaborators 
- Campaign for projects, 
image, or identity Q3 Q3   
Q4    
Q5  Moral - Produce effective outcomes 
- Embed in sector requirements 
- Reinforce symbolic displays 
- Define goals - Demonstrate success  
Q6    
Q7 
3. Funding 
sources 
   
Q8    
Q9  Cognitive - Mimic standards  
- Formalise operations  
- Professionalise operations 
- Obtain permission - Persist 
- Popularise new approaches 
- Standardise new approaches 
Q10  
Q11  
Q12  
RQ2 
- Goals towards beneficiaries     
Q13  - Perceptions of beneficiary salience    
Q14        
Q15          
Q16 
4. Key 
stakeholders 
Q4 
RQ3 
- Stakeholder ranking     
Q17 Q5 - Characteristics of beneficiaries    
Q18  - Responsibilities towards beneficiaries    
Q19  - Approaches towards responsibilities to beneficiaries   
Q20        
Q21        
Q22 
5. Mechanisms 
and barriers to 
accountability to 
beneficiaries  
Q6 
 RQ4 
Processes (of 
participation) 
                 Mechanisms 
- Consulting 
Barriers 
Q23 Q7   - Partnership Beneficiary-related NGO-related 
Q24 Q8   - Delegated control  - Perceived weak 
negotiating  position 
- Cost 
- Time 
- Demand conflicts between 
stakeholders 
- Organisational culture and 
structure 
  
Q25 Q9 Tools - Disclosure 
Q26 Q10     - Low skill levels 
Q27 Q11     - Illiteracy 
Q28 Q12   - Providing feedback  - Culture 
Q29 Q13 
  
   
Q30    - Responding to feedback     
Q31          
Q32    - Social audit     
Q33    - Self-regulation     
Q34 
6. Accountability 
to beneficiaries 
and project 
outcomes 
Q14 
RQ5 
- Contributions of mechanisms of processes  
- Contributions of mechanisms of tools 
   
Q35 Q15    
Q36 Q16   
Q37 Q17       
Q38          
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APPENDIX 3. MED NGOs’ APPROACHES TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
NGOs 
Approach Connecting 
with the 
private sector 
Livelihood 
and linkage 
Value 
chain 
Interested in 
value chain 
Bangladesh     
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
11     
12     
∑ 9 3 1 6 
Indonesia 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
∑ 5 3 3 8 
Total 
20 14 6 3 14 
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APPENDIX 4. FUNDING SOURCES OF NGOs 
NGO
s 
Donations 
Private 
sector 
NGOs’ own activities 
Int’l 
governments 
or other NGOs 
NGOs’ 
own Int’l 
fundraising 
agencies 
Local 
governments 
General 
Public  
CSR 
Service 
provision 
Interest 
(MF) 
Social 
businesses 
Bangladesh 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
∑ 9 4 3 0 1 5 4 4 
Indonesia 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
∑ 5 3 1 3 4 5 1 3 
Total 
20 14 7 4 3 5 10 5 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
